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CHAPTER I 
IWrRODUCTION 
One of Newman's favorite images was that of a trav-
eler lost in a strange land or city who, because he has no 
map of the streets, mounts to some hill nearby to reconnoi-
ter the area and so get a "view." Before getting on with 
the body of this analysis of the Idea, I should like, in 
what will be an extended introductory chapter, to give the 
reader a "view" of the scope of this paper and to provide 
some guidelines indispensable to the reader's finding his 
way through its area with some benefit from the passage. I 
will do so by considering: (1) the relevance of the Idea 
to our day; (2) Newman's quest in the Idea for a principle 
of unity; (J) the relevance of this search to the Greek 
philosophical problem of the one and the many; (4) the fun-
damental problems to which this study addresses itself; (5) 
a review of critical literature relevant to these problems; 
(6) the importance of Aristotle, especially his doctrine of 
equivocity by reference, to this study; (7) the "mechanism,. 
of my interpretation and some technical vocabulary to be 
employed; (8) my purpose in brief. 
John Henry Cardinal Newman's Idea of a University 
is the work for which Newman is best remembered today. 
1 
More to our purpose, it is generally regarded as one of the 
most significant statements formulated on the nature of u-
niversity education, perhaps the most important written in 
the last one hundred and twenty-five years. 1 Its influence 
on university educational theory has been enormous, and, 
sooner or later, anyone interested in the subject must come 
to terms with the issues it raises. They include philoso-
phy and theology, science and religion, humanism and Chris-
tianity, reason and Revelation, nature and Grace, con-
science and commandment, philosophical habit and moral 
training, worldly gentleman and Christian gentleman, Liber-
al Knowledge and utilitarian instruction, dogma and skepti-
cism, Faith and infidelity, to na~e but a few. 
Although these are issues attractive in any age, 
they hold a special fascination and relevance for the man 
of faith, the Christian educator, and even the non-sectari-
an educator of our day. First, Newman's Idea and the is-
sues dealt with therein appeal strongly to the twentieth-
century Christian believer. For during an age in which he 
observes organized religion attacked from without and rack-
ed by fratricidal strife from within; when he perceives 
contemporary man caught up in a vortex uf defiance of all 
religious authority; when he sees, on the one hand, the 
1
rn John henry Newman (London, 1956), p. 25, J. I',l. 
Cameron points out "that modern thinking on University ed-
ucation is a series of footnotes to Newman's lectures and 
essays." 
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loss of respect for traditional orthodox tenets, and repre-
sentatives of the Church sometimes exceeding a~d abusin6 
their authority, on the other; and when this same believer 
sees his theological underpinnings being swept away, and 
the fabric of his traditional religious beliefs becoming 
unravelled, :r..e might well wonder that he has any faith at 
all. 3ut then with this experience before him, he ap-
oroaches the witness of a brilliant nineteenth-century 
... 
Anglican turned Roman Catholic clergyman. There he discov-
ers a loyal and devoted son of the Church. There he ob-
serves a strong sense of dogma and respect for primitive 
Christian beliefs blended with a personal and highly intel-
lectualized quest for the foundations of those religious 
beliefs. Above all, he finds in Nevnnan's witness, vlith its 
sense of doc;ma, doctrine, and fidelity, a fundamental and 
_;;Jerenially sound Christianity that reconciles the needs of 
conscience with the demands of a divinely inspired Church 
body. 
If :~ewman in the scope of his concern for the. foun-
dations of religious truth confronts the contemporary 
Christian, even more so he challene;es the twentieth-century 
Christian educator who may examine r·.:ewrnan 's witness and 
relevance in the licht of a few questions. :,ihat does an 
intellectually bold, progressive, yet faithful exponent of 
the tenets of orthodox Christianity do when he finds him-
self called upon to deliver a series of lectures to a ~ass 
fr~m the ~ai~strea~ of a society which reveals itself, in 
~any ways, to be economically self-serving, socially heart-
fact, the course of this society it sho~ld be the charge of 
ttsir ,:hristian heri taz;e to alter? .!hat, moreover, does a 
loyal son of the Church do who is ma::1dated to lecture or. u-
niversity education in an atmosphere of national distrust, 
episcopal opposition, lay apathy, and clerical indiffer-
e~ce, not to mentio~ in a world of coreligionists who, in 
their overbearing zeal to protect the central authority of 
the RomaYl 8atLolic ,:;hurch in any conflict between human a..l'ld 
divine knowledge, feel only deep misgivin~s about any crit-
icism of thelr reli~ion and extreme reserve toward any in-
' ,, t. t 11 t l h . t'-"' . . ? G.epena.en ~n e_ ec ua researc, or sc~en l.L~C 1nqu~ry?-
The answers to these questions sound fro:n each pa6e 
of the Idea. 'l'here, ~~ev,rman, courat?;eous and resolute, be-
;gins by pointinG Lt~) one thin:dn,; :r.an' s search for the es-
sential intellectual spirit of man regarding the purpose of 
a university and makes it everyman 1 s, using reason, a tool 
he feels best suited to the expression of mankinct•s noblest 
as~irations from a temporal • • < Vl ewpOl.:Tt. includes :nan's 
quest for a more meaningful life that also reflects his es-
2..., . ., . ' ~ th . . ' . . . . .... - ' 1 .. 1 ::;ee ..... •.• c:...ra 1.1., ·' t~v;~:a..v;.. s :..;J"~~ ".rersli,.;~i: 1c1ea 2..tlCI. ..:<ea __ -
ity (London, 1951), for an excellent historical account of 
the foundin.; of i\ ewrnan 's Cni versi "cy, th.e fon:;runr.er of to-
day's ~ational University. 
.5 
s entially religious nature. In the process, i·~ ev;man does 
not Ilorify out of bounds the efficacy of reason, a h~~an 
faculty whose overemphasis is, in part, responsible for the 
i~fidelity of his age, but rather weighs in t~e balance its 
claims against those of faith. In his educational ideal, 
he does not postulate themes for a rationalistic world he 
now cynically believes to be beyond any type of redemptive 
behavior or values. ~/hat i .. Iewman does is affirm the value 
of a quest in· which faith and reason are allied. ,{hat he 
does is confirm the validity of an educational probran de-
signed to meet ma::1's temporal and eternal aspirations. 
I~ewman envelops the university, the locale of this search, 
with intellectual and spiritual pro!!lise and with temporal 
an.d eternal possibilities, not with cynicism and futility. 
In the end, he makes true intellectual culture distinguish-
able from academic illusion, separates truly idealistic 
university e;oals from false "liberal" hopes, a."ld dra.:nati-
cally proclaims the inherent spiritual a.~d intellectual 
nobility of man. These are answers to be treasured in any 
age, not the least of all by Christian educators in our 
own. 
1."inally, there is ~\ewman 's appeal to the modern ed-
ucator, regardless of his religious persuasion. i~ewman ap-
proached the founding of his university like an explorer of 
new educational lands. ·.rhe opportunity offered him the ex-
.citement of an educational adventure in which he had long 
) 6 
been interested. It also conferred the fresh wonder of 
revolutionary academic discoveries. Revolutions in educa-
tional theory or practice -- and r~ewma.'1.' s was a revolution 
in the sense that he urged man to develop or regain a more 
comprehensive view of knowledge and of life -- are always 
inspired by the conviction that so~e significant aspect of 
current educational thinking is dead or outmoded. Such 
revolutions usually take the form of exploring new ways to 
revitalize the educational thought or to modify the academ-
ic practice. 
Nev~a'1. began his educational lectures in Ireland at 
the beginning of an era of technology and professionalism. 
It was an age chara·cterized by a trend toward. specializa-
tion. It was a period marked by an increas~ in knowledge 
coupled with a different view of the purpose of kmowledge. 
'i/hat began to matter now was not so much knowledge for its 
own sake as knowledge for the sake of its usefulness and 
the means to its most effective use. This trend caused 
Newman deep concern because he saw in its effects the cer-
tain fragmentation of the wholeness of knowledge and the 
loss of man's integrated view of reality. Another trend of 
the day he found almost equally abhorrent was one toward 
"viewiness," whereby •nan comes to know a 11 ttle about every-
thing but not much of a substantive nature about anything. 
Newman viewed this superficial kind of knowledge as another 
evil that marked the decline of the humanistic tradition in 
education. Against both trends Newman was not alone in 
open revolt, but he was at the forefront in pointing out 
their dangers and pitfalls for the future state of univer-
sity education. 
In his view, the majestic vision of education found 
in the Middle Ages and embodied in the universities of 
Paris, Bologna, and Oxford was no longer in evidence. 
Nineteenth-century man had lost his sense of ''philosophical 
comprehensiveness," "orderly expansiveness," and "elastic 
contructiveness," and he did not know why.3 Newman ex-
plained why in the Idea: Nineteenth-century man had lost 
his sense of unity. This loss Newman saw evidence of in 
the Church, in the state, and in the schoo1. 4 As. his major 
purpose in the Idea, Newman s&t about to rediscover a prin-
ciple of unity as it would apply to the wholeness of a uni-
versity education and to the integrity of the human product 
of that education. 
Still another challenge facing Newman in the nine-
teenth century was the task of educating a man whose status 
had been or was in the process of becoming sharply reduced. 
Scientific discoveries were moving in the direction of 
3The two foregoing statements are paraphrased from a 
quotation cited in A. D. Culler, The Imperial Intellect, A 
Study of Newman's Educational Ideal Ult"ew haven, 1955), p. 
174. The quotation, in turn, is drawn from the Discourses 
(1852), pp. 139-40, 142. 
4 Culler, p. 174. 
7 
pushing back the history of the earth, of locating the 
earth as a mere speck in the universe, and of assigning man 
a sharply diminished role among the animals. Man still 
~aintained some relative superiority over the rest, but the 
image of man made in the likeness of God was fast disap-
pearing. What remained was a highly modified version of 
that humanistic view of man found in the Ivliddle Ages. 
~ewman counters this position with a strong reaffirmation 
in the Idea that the end of knowledge and of education is 
the human being himself and the intellectual and spiritual 
perfectio~ of his nature. 
The problems that challenged Newman's educational 
programs in the nineteenth century have their counterpart 
in the problems facing educators in the twentieth. In an 
age notable for the proliferation of knowledge, the explo-
sion of nuclear and space technology, professional overspe-
cialization, and scholarly territorialism, modern educators 
find man's status further diminished and his view of him-
self even more fragmented. In the drift from what might be 
called a humanistic to a dehumanized view of himself, mod-
ern man finds himself unable to discover the meaning of the 
scientific and technological advances which characterize 
his age. He is at a loss to find his place in them, much 
less to chart their direction. The wealth of scientific 
and technological know-how at his fingertips tells him how 
to do but not why or what to do. As a result, man appears 
8 
unable to shape his life or to control the scientific for-
ces he has loosed. Ee is left a pawn moved by external 
and internal forces seemingly beyond his control. His val-
ues become barren. Ee dramatizes his pessimism over the 
loss of values, for he sees in the loss the possible fail-
ure of civilization itself. 3ut while his attempts to dra-
matize the fraudulent aspects of modern life may shock man 
into ~~ awareness of his plight, one wonders if they do 
much to rid him of it. 
Twentieth-century man needs an educational ideal 
that would encompass the fundamental meanings he needs to 
survive. He has, perhaps even more so than his nineteenth-
century counterpart, lost his sense of unity -- a compre-
hensive, unifi-ed view of man, reality and the knowledge 
that reflects reality. He has lost his capacity to see 
things as one. He has allowed himself and his world to be 
fragmented, his disciplines to be compartmentalized, and 
his professional territories to be too rigidly assigned. 
This brings us to the challenge facing modern educators. 
It should be their responsibility to develop persons who 
will do more than bemoan their fate and dramatize their 
pessimism over their shrunken fragmented state. It is the 
challenge of contemporary educators to cultivate students 
who will return a chaotic world into order and who will at-
tempt to rediscover a principle of unity for the multiplic-
ity of modern life. In short, twentieth-century students 
9 
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must be reeducated in the possibilities of a more humanis-
tic form of education. The effects of such an education 
will be most evident in the students' desire to seek know-
ledge in a broader context and to see life with a more com-
prehensive view. 
Although some may consider Newman's educational i-
deal too visionary, his theme of the interrelated nature of 
knowledge and his call for an interdisciplinary 5rasp of 
the sciences in pursuit of truth appear as me~~ingful today 
as when they were first expressed one hundred and twenty-
five years ago. There are few vestiges of an ordered world 
left in the twentieth century. If modern man is to sur-
vive, perhaps he will have to impose his vision of oneness 
on the multiple chaos of this century using a method simi-
lar to that Newman proposes in the Idea. For Newman, order 
is the law of the universe and unity is the law of man's 
educational pursuits, not chaos. Even if a modern educator 
cannot subscribe to Newman's alliance of faith and reason, 
he will do well, at least, to heed Newman's search for uni-
ty and call for order. 
This quest for unity is the keynote of Newman's 
~· Its presence is indicated from the very beginning of 
the discourses but may be lost to the reader in the variety 
of Newman's topics and treatments. Nev~an's quest pursues 
a principle of unity among a multiplicity of elements in 
his educational scheme. It embraces the oneness of the 
11 
fact of reality, the fund~~entally interdependent nature of 
the sciences that reflect reality, and an interdisciplinary 
grasp of those sciences. Ultimately, the search pursues 
the development of a man whose unified view of the sciences 
leads him back to God as the Source and End of truth. 
Faith and reason are allied in this joint venture. In ad-
vancing this view of university education, Newman has much 
to say on the relation of Faith and reason, Liberal Knowl-
edge and utilitarian instruction, philosophical habit and 
moral training, worldly gentleman and Christian gentlema~, 
and he says it in many ways, always seeking that one which 
best conveys his primary meaning. In spite of the variety 
of expression, there is one purpose underlying all: to 
show the interrelated nature of Faith and knowledge and the 
university-educated man's need to reflect that relation in 
his own more comprehensive view of this life and the next. 
Earlier, I pointed out that the relevance of New-
man's search for unity extends forward even to our day, an 
age very much in need of a synthesis not unlike Nev~an's 
for dealing with its educational and spiritual ills. New-
man's quest is also one whose implications extend back to 
the time of the early Greek philosophers and one of their 
central problems, the One and the Many. Around the end of 
the seventh century, 3.C., the Greeks turned their efforts 
away from poetry and mythology and laid the foundation of 
that discipline we call philosophy. Their concern was a 
12 
logical explanation of reality. Their efforts centered on 
coming to grips with the problem of the One and the Many, a 
fundamental question that, over the years, has confronted 
thoughtful men, and one long considered especially relevant 
to beginning philosophical studies. How does one explain 
the static and the dynamic, the permanent and the change-
able, the unified and the diverse? How can the multiplic-
ity of things be explained in reference to one principle of 
unity? Correspondingly, how can one nature, form, or thing 
be explained in view of its plural ad~ptation? This has 
long been a root philosophical problem, any dispute over 
the terminology employed to describe it notwithstanding, 
that faces any thinking man who would find a key to unlock 
the door to the mystery of reality. It was a major problem 
for the early Greek thinkers, and it was a central intel-
lectual problem for Newman as well. 
As Frederick Copleston points out, it was to this 
problem of a principle of unity for the ever-changing mul-
tiplicity of things that the early Ionian philosophers be-
gan to address themselves.5 They were much concerned with 
the obvious changes of birth and growth, decay and death. 
They were equally aware of seasonal variations, other nat-
ural ch~~ges, and especially, significant alterations in 
man himself. Yet they perceived something permanent that 
5F. Copleston, A history of Philosophy (Westminster, 
Md., 1955), 1, PP• 13-17. 
underwent these transitions. In their attempts to define 
that permanent element, they advanced various postulates. 
The important thing to note here is not what they advanced 
13 
as the basic element, but rather, that they were concerned 
with the problem of unity in difference in their search for 
the ultimate nature of things. Later, of course, Aristotle 
would propose a coherent solution to the problem, one in 
which the Stagirite would concern himself not so much with 
6 how the "one" can be many, as how a "many" can be one. 
From his temporary home in uublin in 1852, it was 
not inappropriate that Newman in the Idea should confront 
across the centuries those early Greek scholars and their 
funda~ental question. The implications of the problem 
dealt with by them appear not at all a matter of indiffer-
ence to Newman when one considers his total concern for 
some principles of unity among a multiplicity of intellec-
tual, educational, and spiritual interests. His whole life 
provides examples of this, of which his search for a cen-
tral spiritual authority, for an integrated spiritual life, 
and for a unified educational ideal are most notable. ~ven 
while it overlaps the others, our focus here, however, is 
6According to J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being in The 
Aristotelian 'Metaphysics' 2nd ed. (Toronto, 1963), p. 437, 
"The Aristotelian approach is the reverse of the ?armen-
idean. Parmenides sees being as one, and asks how could it 
be many. Aristotle sees beings as manifold. He asks: 
"How could any one nature account for their differences?'' 
Also, see Owens, pp. 459-460. 
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on how Newman confronts the early Greek philosophers, at 
least indirectly, in the scope of his concern for a unify-
ing educational basis. At its core, the quest for unity in 
the Idea might be said to come to grips with the problem of 
the One and the r.~any. For when Newman asserts that all re-
ality is one, that all sciences are interconnected, that 
the view of these sciences must be interdisciplinary, and 
that the person who holds such a view must be one in whom 
?aith and intellectual culture are combined, he is, in ef-
fect, responding to the problem of how many segments of re-
ality can be one, of how many branches of knowledge can be 
one, of how many views of knowledge can be joined in one 
integrated view, and of how many intellectual and spiritual 
capacities can be actualized in one university-educated 
person. These questions appear as no more than variations 
of that fundamental question raised by those early Greek 
seekers of truth. 
There is, however, another aspect of Newman's con-
cern for a unified educational ideal, a concern most impor-
tant to the scope of this study, that also lends itself to 
comparison with that funda~ental antinomy of Greek philoso-
phy, and that is his multiple treatment of the university 
issue, grounds, theme, and gentleman in the Idea. There, 
l'!ewman discusses the nature of a Catholic university and a 
university considered apart from religious principle. He 
approaches his subject on theological and philosophical 
15 
grounds. Ee advances a view that has temporal as well as 
eternal overtones. he addresses his efforts to the worldly 
human product of the university, even while he advocates a 
~ore Christian gentlemanly ideal. The questions arise of 
just how the Catholic and university issues, theological 
and philosophical grounds, natural ~~d supernatural inter-
disciplinary views, secular and Christi~"l gentlemen are to 
be unified and reconciled in s·ome measure. Each element of 
the contrasting pairs appears the same in some ways yet 
different. They are things said in many ways, but they do 
possess a certain unity by reference. Newman, then, ap-
pears to speak with two voices. Eis manifold voice is re-
flected in his dual presentation of the university issue, 
grounds, theme, and gentlema.'1.. Although some critics ac-
knowledge this multiple presentation, they do not explain 
it. I contend that if the integrity of Newman's education-
al ideal and its presentation in the~ are to be under-
stood, there will have to be found some unifying means 
whereby Newman's dual treatment of these issues can be :nore 
adequately explained and h.i.s two voices reconciled. 
This study of the Idea addresses itself to a number 
-
of basic problems, three of which are probably the most 
important in view of the controversy they have aroused. 
First, there is the question of the nature of Newman's 
Gatholic university. Second, there is the issue of the na-
ture of Hewman's university considered apart from the 
16 
Church. Third, there is the problem of the nature of 
Newman's gentleman. The first question will be viewed in 
this study as the primary or fundamental issue of the ~· 
The second and third questions will be approached as more 
important secondary issues. This study, however, will also 
devote itself to several other secondary questions. One is 
the problem of Newman's grounds. How do the supernatural 
or theological lines of the inquiry stand in relation to 
the natural or philosophical ones? Another is the matter 
of theme. What is the relationship between a temporal 
interdisciplinary grasp of knowledge for its own sake and 
a supernatural interconnected view of knowledge for the 
sake of something more? Moreover, does the wholeness ·of 
. 
structure in the I£!! complement its thematic integrity in 
some way? Still another secondary issue is the relation 
of the religion of reason found in the man of philosophic 
habit to the religion of Faith present in the Newman's 
Christian gentleman. Finally, there is the question of 
what makes Newman's idea of a university to be what it 
is -- what is its cause and principle of Being. 
The questions raised and the relationships drawn 
have been addressed by critics in varying degrees and under 
a variety of headings. These headings include Newman's al-
leged severance of intellect from virtue in the Idea, a 
conflict between humanistic and religious elements in the 
work, and the seriousness of Newman's statement on the na-
ture of the gentleman. All of the issues cited above ap-
pear closely knit, and the resolution of one may very well 
enable the reader to clarify the problem and to understand 
better the solution of the others. 
17 
As I indicated earlier, one of the major obstacles 
to understanding the nature and interrelation of the uni-
versity issues, grounds, the wholeness of theme and struc-
ture, and the types of gentlemen Newman sets forth in the 
Idea is his multiple treatment of them. If the content of 
Newman's larger educational philosophy is to be understood, 
there will have to be found some unifying principle whereby 
Newman's dual treatment of various elements in the Idea can 
be reconciled. As I also pointed out, although his presen-
tation of the Idea's material and formal elements has been 
discussed in some detail by the critics, their efforts have 
not, so far as I can determine, gone far enough in estab-
lishing and in applying a principle that would insure the 
unity of his treatment and the integrity of his educational 
aims, leaving him less open to accusations of ambivalence, 
ambiguity or worse. So too, while critical discussion of 
the problems of "severance" and the seriousness of Newman's 
gentleman have oftentimes been provocative, these discus-
sions have, I fear, sometimes cast needless doubts on the 
wholeness of the work, and even worse, the integrity of the 
educational doctrine it advances. A suitable key for uni-
fying the Idea's form, and to some extent its content, 
would help render these doubts unworthy of further consid-
eration. 
18 
That Newman does treat the university issue, grounds, 
theme, and gentleman with more than one voice appears evi-
dent.from the text. Regarding the nature of his universi-
ty, he speaks of it as a place for the advancement of lib-
eral knowledge apart from any reference to religion; yet he 
maintains Christianity as the root principle of education. 
The grounds of his inquiry concerning the nature of univer-
sity education provide a second example. Even while he 
declares "human reason" to underlie his appr.oach, he con-
ducts his inquiry under the sanction of the Church and he 
concedes that his subject matter does admit "of a Catholic 
treatment," Then, too, regarding theme, Newman tells his 
audience, on the one hand, that knowledge sought for its 
own sake is an admirable pursuit, but he even more vigor-
ously asserts that intellectual cultivation is not a suffi-
cient end in a university that purports to educate the 
whole man. Accordingly, even though Newman appears to em-
phasize the importance of the man of cultivated intellect 
as the foremost product of university education, he stress-
es the spiritual deficiencies of such a man and intellec-
tual state left to themselves. In the matter of' religious 
assumptions, we may find a fourth example. Newman dis-
claims "superp.atural discernment," "divine illumination," 
or a "connection with Revelation" as his starting point. 
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Yet he makes the existence of a personal God, as the Source 
and End of the wholeness of knowledge and the interrelated 
view by which it is to be grasped, an indispensable point 
of departure. Correspondingly, Newman's view of the reli-
gion of reason differs markedly from what he considers true 
religion. The former type he makes characteristic of the 
man of philosophic habit, an element in his educational i-
deal. A fifth example of Newman's two voices is to be 
found in his gentlemen. Notwithstanding the fact that New-
man proposes as the ideal human product of the university a 
man of cultivated intellect whose appeal lies chiefly in 
. 
his comprehensive view, he undercuts the integrity of this 
ideal product by assigning him a host of spiritual defi-
ciencies. Newman seems to demand of him a spiritual per-
fection that lies beyond his earthly capacities. 
That critics recognize Newman's multiple treatment, 
that their controversies center on problems relating to 
this treatment, and that they have not yet found a key suf-
ficient to explain them is evident from their commentaries. 
The scholarly controversy in the wake of the alleged con-
. 
flict between humanistic and religious elements in the Idea 
points to Newman's multiple treatment of the university 
issue, the first of the basic problems on which we said 
this study will focus. Is Newman's fundamental issue the 
nature of a university considered in the abstract or the 
nature of a Catholic university viewed in the concrete? 
20 
Although the problem between humanistic and religious el-
ements can be stated in other terms, e.g., a conflict be-
tween philosophy and theology, Liberal Arts and theology, 
science and theology, knowledge and virtue, or sectarian 
and nonsectarian education, fundamentally, as it emerges in 
critical discussion, the problem centers on whether New-
man's university is a place for the humanistic or Christian 
development of man. Newman leaves little room to doubt 
that it is a place for one or other type of h~~an develop-
ment. But should the university be viewed primarily as a 
humanistic center in which knowledge for its own sake is 
set up as an independent and self-sufficient goal? Or 
rather, should it be considereq a place designed primarily 
for the advancement of one's Faith and the fostering of 
one's virtue, along with intellectual cultivation? Is the 
education promoted there h~~anistic and nondenominational 
or Christian and sectarian? Is nature or Grace the prin-
ciple of the university's educational thrust? Does the 
true spirit of the place emerge from its stamp of Faith or 
from its mark of Reason? Does Nev~an place man or a God-
like man as the focus of the development it offers? Back 
of these queries is the more fundamental question of the 
primary nature of Newman's university. Is Newman's basic 
concern a university in the abstract that with its humanis-
tic education makes all things subject to man in his far --
ranging view, or is it a Catholic University which with its 
supernatural orientation makes man capable of viewing him-
self and all things as subject to God? 
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Critical commentary on the conflict between reli-
gious and humanistic elements in the Idea supports both 
claims. It indicates critics have not yet found a princi-
ple sufficient to explain whether Newman's twofold treat-
ment points primarily to a Catholic University or a univer-
sity in its essence. T. Corcoran argues that Newman's Idea 
is marked by a philosophy of "severance" between intellect 
and virtue that contrasts sharply with -the traditional 
doctrine of Christian Europe" that characterized the. 1854 
Brief of Pius IX on the founding of a Catholic university.? 
According to Corcoran, Newman severs the link between in-
tellect and virtue to such an extent that he renders impos-
sible the university's becoming an instrument of the Church 
at all. Fernande Tardivel, rvrichael Tierney, and John z. 
~iise challenge that position. Wise, for example, counters 
that when Newman affirms knowledge as an end in itself, he 
?corcoran's argument and the quotation cited are 
presented by Martin Svaglic in Victorian Prose: A Guide to 
Research, ed. David J. DeLaura 0\lew York, 1973), p. 136. 
Svagl~c draws these materials from "Liberal studies and 
Moral Aims: A Critical Study of Newman's Position" 
(Thought, 1926). In reference to the former work, I should 
point out that Charles Stephen Dessain's guide to research 
on Newman's philosophy and theology and Martin J. Svaglic's 
presentation on Newman the man and humanist are indispensa-
ble guides for the student interested in Newman's philo-
sophical, theological, and educational thought and develop-
ment. Hereafter, the work will be referred to as Victorian 
Prose. 
is speaking of the formal object of a university. 'dise 
adds that Newman does recognize the dangers of mere intel-
lectual cultivation and that he is aware of the universi-
ty's need of the Church to maintain its integrity. 8 C. F. 
Harrold insists that Newman is no more than following his 
humanistic theory to its logical conclusiono 9 In support, 
Earrold quotes Newman to the effect that 
we attain to heaven by using this world well, 
though it pass away; we perfect our nature, not 
by undoing it, but by adding to it what is more 
than nature, and by directing it towards aims 
higher than its own.10 
Harrold further maintains that the liberal education of 
Newman's university aims not at moral improvement but at 
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general cultivation of the mind. Notwithstanding this aim, 
Harrold singles out Newman's point that a liberal education 
left alone may promote pride and self-centeredness. 
Charles Dessain calls the reader's attention to the natural 
earthly purpose of Newman's university and emphasizes that 
the qualities to be gained there "are not virtu.e, though 
they sometimes look like it." 11 Dessain cites Newman's 
8Ibid. 
9c . .F. Harrold, John Henry Newman (New York, 1945), 
p. 108. 
10Quoted in Harrold, p. 108, from the Idea, 1852 
edition. 
11c. s. Dessain, John Henry Newman (London, 1966), 
p. 104. 
words to the effect that a university education should 
prepare one for this world. It is not the education of a 
"convent" or a "seminary. •• 12 For F. McGrath, the Idea 
advances two separate theses which Newman "skillfully 
blends."l) The first is "the necessity of including reli-
gious teaching in any scheme of studies." 1LJ. The second is 
the point that "cultivation of mind, rather than immediate 
preparation for professional occupations, is the primary 
end of a university."15 
2) 
While Michael Tierney assumes th~ position that the 
main function of Newman's liberal knowledge is preparation 
in the virtue of prudence, A. Dwight Culler takes up where 
Harrold leaves off. Culler points up the ambivalence in 
Newman•s attitude toward-religious and humanistic ideals, 16 
traces it to problems in Newman's adolescence and evangeli-
cal background, and resolves the conflict in a Christian 
humanism he feels to be characteristic of Newman's educa-
tional ideal in its completed form. 17 Culler asserts that 
12Ibid., p. 105. 
1 ~cGrath, p. lJJ. 
lLI-Ibid. 
l5Ibid. 
16 Culler, p. 228. 
17Ibid,, P• 242. 
the humanistic and religious views taken together "enable 
man to fulfill his own nature and then to place that na-
ture, fully developed, at the service of God." 18 I find 
Culler's assertion here inconsistent with his claim else-
24 
where that Newman's gentleman is not to be taken as a ser-
ious expression. 19 This is a matter that will be treated 
below with the problem of the nature of Newman's gentleman. 
P. A. Dale, on the other hand, assumes the more radical 
position that the Idea is fundamentally a justification of 
Church control of university education. 20 He dismisses 
the humanistic possibilities of Newman's educaiional goals. 
The criticism cited points to problems in the rela-
tionship between Newman's university in the-abstract and 
his Catholic university in the concrete. Some of it recog-
nizes his multiple treatment of the university as a place, 
on the one hand, that advances humanistic goals, and on the 
other, as a place that fosters Christian educational ide-
als. None of it, however, appears to unite Newman's two-
fold treatment of the fundamental nature of a university in 
quite satisfactory a manner. Corcoran appears at one end 
of the critical spectrum; Dale, at the other. In between, 
18Ibid. 
19Ibid., p. 2)8. 
20
victorian Prose, p. 139. Dale's argument is drawn 
from "Newman's The Idea of a University, The Dangers of a 
University Education" (Y§, 1972). 
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there are Harrold and others who draw parallel lines of 
humanistic and religious development in such a way that 
there is no possibility of convergence. Culler speaks of 
a Christian humanistic ideal; yet he elsewhere undermines 
this position by stating that Newman's statement on the 
gentleman is an ironic one. 21 There appears to be more am-
bivalence in the attitudes of the critics than there is in 
Newman's presentation of what his educational ideal is all 
about. Noticeably lacking is a key to its unified presen-
tation. 
Another problem of this study deals with the nature 
and interrelation of Newman's grounds in the Idea. This 
issue, as the critical discussion of it makes evident, 
bears on the fundamental nature of Newman's university. 
Does Newman pursue the nature and scope of university edu-
cation in the abstract on humanistic and philosophical 
grounds? Or, on the contrary, does he follow more reli-
gious and theological lines of inquiry in pursuing the 
scope of Catholic university education in the concrete? 
The tendency of critics has been to reject one set 
of grounds. Harrold sees Newman "surveying the subject 
from various lights, advancing and retiring from it, illus-
trating, confirming, comparing ...... 22 He observes Newman 
21 Culler, p. 2)8. 
22 Harrold, p. 96. 
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auuroaching his subject from many angles, but the two main 
... ~ 
ones he feels are the vantage points of the humanist and of 
the Roman Catholic. 2.3 ''We are reminded," Harrold notes, 
"that Newman's mind and thought were shaped not only by the 
humanism of Oxford but also ••• by the Christian humanism of 
24 the early Fathers." He concludes that Newman's educa-
tional ideal is valid both in the world and in the Church, 
and so, Harrold seems to suggest, are his grounds. McGrath 
first states that in· Discourses I - V I~ewrnan pretty much 
adheres to his avowed purpose of treating university educa-
tion from a philosophical standpoint and that the univer-
sity envisioned is "a university in its essence, and [inde-
penden-t] of its relation to the Church. , 25 ~vlcGrath con-
tinues: "the whole drift of his earlier discourses makes 
it abundantly clear that his 'university in its bare and 
necessary idea' excludes, to use his own phrase to Ornsby, 
'the assumption of Catholicism. '" 26 However, in speaking 
of the apparent difference between Newman's and the Pope's 
view of the nature of a university, McGrath says that it is 
a matter of approach. The Pope's concern was a Catholic 
2
.3Ibid., p. 115. 
24Ibid. 
25Quoted in McGrath, p. 168, from the 1852 edition, 
Preface, p. v, of the Idea. 
26McGrath, p. 172. 
university in the abstract. 27 In sum, McGrath states that 
although Newman initiates the discussion on purely philo-
sophical grounds and maintains this approach through the 
fifth discourse, the remaining ones reflect a combined 
philosophical and theological treatmento 28 Zlsewhere, 
!iicGrath will assert that Newman's sense of balance is dem-
27 
onstrated not merely in his attitude toward human knowledge 
but in the method of his approach to it. 29 Dessain too 
claims that Newman "made the basis of his Discourses as 
broad as possible."30 
Culler acknowledges Newman's multiple treatment of 
grounds and ascribes its use to Newman's need to satisfy 
different segments of his audience.31 Even though, as 
Culler points out, the discourses present a ''philosophical 
definition of the idea, the inner form or principle, uni-
versity education,"32 and although Newman employs a "ra-
tionalistic approach" to them, the grounds overall emerge 
27Ibid,, P• 279. 
28
rbid., pp. 281-282. 
29Ibid., pp. 312-313. 
3°Dessain, p. 103. 
31 4 Culler, p. 1 5. 
32Ibid., P• 173· 
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as "humanistic" and "religious ... J.J This to Culler is not 
surprising in view of Newman's concern that his approach 
not be .. too philosophical ... 34 Culler further observes that 
the total treatment is marked by a "precarious balance," 
notwithstanding the fact that the humanistic ideal is pre-
sented with some ambivalence.35 
A third important issue to which this study address-
es itself is the nature and interrelation of the Idea's 
temporal interdisciplinary grasp of knowledge for its own 
sake to a supernatural interconnected view of knowledge for 
the sake of something more. The question involves Newman's 
whole educational scheme and the role of the university 
within that scheme. It again raises the question whethe~ 
Newman's university is primarily of a-religious or a secu-
lar character. It also relates to the matter of Newman's 
grounds. The issue appears fundamentally to focus on 
whether the "connected view" should encompass man and this 
world or whether it ought to extend beyond, as well, to God 
a~d the next. Does the intellectual cultivation to which 
this view is central center on man's temporal intellectual 
aspirations, or does it look more to man's ultimate spir-
33Ibid. I P• 227. 
34Ibid. I P• 148. 
35Ibid., P• 228. 
29 
itual needs, even while it does not neglect the temporal 
ones? 
It is difficult to think of an element more basic 
to Newman's whole educational ideal than that of "view." 
If there is a phrase that sums up his idea of a university, 
it is that of a "connected view." It carries the burden of 
Newman's educational thrust and the brunt of his education-
al labors in the Idea. It is to this perspective that any 
interpreter of the Idea sooner or later must turn. For 
Newman touches bottom when he declares that all knowledge 
forms a whole and when he affirms the need of the mind to 
reflect that wholeness in its grasp. 
Newman's treatment of the interdisciplinary grasp 
serves a dual purpose. It defines to some extent the ex-
perience of this special type of "viewing" and establishes 
it as the goal of the university-educated man. Unfor-
tunately, what Newman's presentation fails to do is fix 
the parameters of the "view." It tells us that the idea of 
a university entails an awareness of the bearing of one 
science on another by which the whole of truth can be per-
ceived.36 It tells us that the "view" envelops a knowledge 
of first principles and relations rather than mere facts.37 
It elaborates an enlargement of mind that surveys "many 
36The Idea of a University, ed. I. T. Kerr (London, 
1976), p. 97 hereafter cited as Idea of a University. 
37Ibid., p. 121. 
things at once and as one whole"38 and that grasps the 
"relative disposition of things ... 39 Newman's presentation 
of the "connected view" speaks to the fact that reality is 
one, that knowledge abstracts segments of reality, that 
this knowledge is one and should be grasped integrally ac-
cording to one's capacity. Newman's treatment does not, 
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however, appear to indicate sufficiently the means whereby 
one can combine lesser views into a single unified vision 
of reality that accounts for God and man, this world and 
the next, and man's temporal and eternal concerns. Still 
this is something, as he himself points out in the Preface, 
the university must do if it would educate the whole man. 40 
Does the "view" look to the development of the university-
educated man as a gentleman or to his growth as an intel-
lectually cultivated saint? The "connected view" has an 
important role to play in perfecting the human intellect 
and in improving the quality of human life in this world. 
Does Newman also mean it to play a significant part in 
man's preparation for the next? 
The nature of the "view" advocated in the Idea has 
generated its fair share of controversy ranging from 
Corcoran's position which renders that interdisciplinary 
38 b"d 
. 1..1:_., p. 122 • 
39Ibid., p. 105. 
40Ibid., PP• 6-7. 
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view ill-suited for God's purpose to Dale's which leaves 
the interdisciplinary grasp practically unfit for man's. 
v/ise, Tardi vel, Harrold, McGrath, Culler, Dessain, Svaglic, 
and Clancy assume positions between these extremes. Their 
stands on the issue reflect in the main their claims for 
the fundamental nature of Newman's university and his 
choice of grounds. Harrold, for example, asserts that dis-
cipline of the mind is of central importance in Newman's 
liberal program. 41 He adds, however, that Newman is op-
posed to purely secular education because .. theology gives 
a unity and coherence to all other knowledge in the light 
of ultimate ends."42 Equally important, he points out that 
the intellectual culture of Newman's university develops 
the gentleman, while the Church, so influential on Newman's 
total educational program, is trying to create saints. 4J 
Harrold also maintains that the general cultivation of mind 
and its hallmark, the "connected view", do not in them-
selves reflect Newman's whole ideal. 1Iartin svaglic takes 
an equally moderate stand when he affirms that Newman's 
purpose is "a union of intellectual curiosity and achieve-
ment with the humility and charity of the truly religious 
41Earrold, p. 92. 
42Quoted in Harrold, p. 101, from the Idea, 1852 
edition. 
4Jibid.' p. 111. 
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man -- a humanism, that is, in the Judaeo-Christian tradi-
tion."44 In the main, McGrath too points out that Newman 
holds to the "essential unity of religious and secular 
teaching."45 For without religion there can be no order 
among the various branches of knowledge. Without religion 
the whole man cannot be educated. McGrath's position sug-
gests that the "view" advocated in the Idea involves no 
real distinction between intellectual and moral training in 
the whole education of man. Culler sees Newman as changing 
course in the middle of the Idea. In the eighth discourse 
Newman seems to refute and to downgrade the philosophical 
view which previously he felt to distinguish so commendably 
his cultural idea1. 46 
Yet another secondary issue pertinent to this study 
deals with the nature and relation of the spurious religion 
of the man of philosophical habit to the true religion of 
the saint. Cast in other terms, the question involves the 
relationship of Newman's Faith in an Omniscient Creator 
Whose Presence bears so integrally on the relationship of 
the sciences as their source and End and Whose Providence 
so intimately affects the lives of the men possessing this 
44The Idea of a University, ed. M. J. svaglic (New 
York, 1960), p. xxii. 
45 McGrath, p. 277. 
46 Culler, p. 227. 
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knowledge to the worldly gentleman's belief in a god of 
reason a..Yld senti:nent whose presence appears somehow to reg-
ulate one's ma..Q'Ylers and tastes. On the one hand, the ques-
tion concerns an approach to religion that dictates there 
is no positive or absolute truth in religion, that declares 
religion to be a matter of taste and feeling, and that ad-
vacates religion as a matter of personal preference without 
any kind of objective reality. On the other side of the 
issue is the claim of the creature standing humbly before 
the limitless demands of his creator as he attempts to work 
out his salvation in a framework that involves all of his 
human activities and embraces all of his human faculties. 
i/hich religious perspective does Newman foster in a univer-
sity program designed for the education of the whole man? 
Is it a purely philosophic habit of mind that may very well 
drive a man only into himself or a combined philosophic and 
religious habit of soul that can lead him to God? This 
question too is not unrelated to those previously consid-
ered, for the religious spirit Newman purposes to inculcate 
affects the type of university he funda~entally proposes, 
the grounds he will employ, ~nd the interdisciplinary grasp 
that he advocates. Once again, Newman's treatment appears 
twofold. In the first instance, his presentation develops 
the religious ideal in the sphere of nature and reason. In 
the second, it portrays the ideal in the domain of Faith 
and Grace. Should Newman's religious ideal as part of a 
total educational purpose be allied with the forces of man 
and reason, or should it be associated with the forces of 
God and Faith in conjunction with reason? 
3efore any further discussion of the question, we 
would do well at this point to clarify Ne~~an's meaning 
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and use of the term "religion." c. F. Harrold's words come 
closest to capturing Newman's position. Harrold states 
that Newman sympathized not at all with a religion of feel-
ing. Newman himself points out that "religion as a mere 
sentiment is to me a dream and a mockery."47 True religion 
for Newman reflects a total human experience. It is, in 
Harrold's words "a synthesis, or harmony, of the activities 
of man."48 It includes a "metaphysical element" in its 
dogma as well as an "ethical element in its sanctions and 
commands. , 49 Then too, there is the ''aesthetic element" of 
its "graceful and emotion-stirring rites, symbols and cer-
emonies ... 50 It contains, moreover, a "political element in 
the organization of the Church as a militant power forever 
at war with the world, ,,5l Furthermore, Harrold sees in 
47Quoted in Harrold, p. 55, from the Apologia. 
48Harrold, p. 4?. 
49Ibid. 
50ibid. 
5libid. 
J5 
Newman's concept of religion an attempt to bring into ac-
count "every human faculty to transform the religious ideal 
into the real -- cultivation of the intellect, the imagina-
tion, the will, the moral sense, and the social sense ... 52 
According to Harrold, religion was, for Newman, irresist-
ibly "all-embracing." His intellect admired "logically 
articulated dogmas" and welcomed authority with its "rig-
orous bounds," not to mention Nev;man' s respect for the 
"elaborate discipline," .. ascetic devotions," and "spiritual 
hygiene" that reflected its two thousand years of exper-
ience.5J Newman just as much admired, Harrold notes, "the 
great Catholic mystical tradition, with its symbolism, its 
sacraments, its ritual, its miracles [and] its realistic 
recognition of the reality of the supersensible world ... 54 
The problem of the two religious views found in the 
Idea has been investigated by various commentators. They 
recognize the distinction between the religion of Faith 
and the religion of reason as fundamental, and they make 
the distinction in general terms. But their overall crit-
ical reaction to the problem leaves some serious difficul-
ties unresolved. The most obvious one is that they have 
52Ibid. 
5Jibid., p. 48. 
54Ibid. 
not yet found a means of reconciling two dramatically op-
posed religious views in one educational scheme. There is 
need of some means, perhaps a suitable philosophical appa-
ratus, to effect the reconciliation. In a question that 
mirrors the conflict between humanistic and religious ele-
ments treated earlier, critics respond much the same as 
they did on the nature of Newman's university, the problem 
of his grounds, and the question of his view. 
Corcoran's position leaves little room for dealing 
with' the problem at all. Although Wise sees in Newman's 
36 
treatment a recognition of the need of the Church to main-
tain the integrity of the university, he does not elaborate 
precisely wherein that unity lies. Harrold draws a sharp 
line between the faith and the religion of the man of phil-
osophic habit and the Faith and genuine religion of the 
saint. Harrold sees in the former the intellectual count-
erfeit of the latter.55 But he observes primarily in Hew-
man's presentation two parallel lines of development, one 
of which is characterized by a false religion of sentiment; 
the other, by a true reli~ion of a sound Christian spirit. 
One marks the worldly gentleman; the other characterizes 
the saint.56 
Culler's position on the matter is not much differ-
55Harrold, p. 112. 
~ 6 . 11 ~ Ib~d., p. 1. 
ent. He affirms the ambivalence in Newman's thought re-
garding the two religious views. The religion of philo-
sophy, Culler feels, places man in relation to man. The 
religion of the saint places man in relation to God.57 
But Culler sets strict limits for Newman's university. 
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The university, he observes, can teach faith and morals as 
subjects, but it cannot teach one "to believe the dogmas 
of faith or to practice the precepts of morals ...... 58 Al-
though Culler concedes that the university can be used by 
the Church for its higher purposes, he thinks Newman does 
not so use it. Culler does not assert that the faith and 
morals of a student are to be neglected in Newman's univer-
sity, for the Church, Culler points out, "would be present 
there to care for these things just as a doctor might be 
present to care for a student's health."59 But this stance 
runs counter to the nature of a close alliance between in-
tellectual culture and spiritual perfection as part of the 
total education of the university student. In the matter 
of a truly unified intellectual and spiritual educational 
program, the faith and morals of a student would not be 
merely not neglected; they would be positively fostered 
and advanced. 
57 Culler, p. 232. 
5Bibid., p. 261. 
59Ibid. 
According to IvlcGrath, on the other hand, l~ewm~'1. 's 
treatment appears 
to state firstly that any university must 
inculcate religious expression and leaven 
all instruction with religion, and then to 
state that in a Catholic university such 
religion would be de facto the Catholic 
religion.60 
J8 
McGrath goes on to say that in a sermon given shortly after 
the opening of the university church Newman took as his ma-
jor theme the refutation of the assumption "that, to be re-
ligious, you must be ignorant, and to be intellectual, you 
must be unbelieving." 61 Elsewhere in the same sermon, New-
man described the interrelation of religious and secular 
knowledge. 11:cGrath employs Newman • s words from another 
source to show that, in Newman's judgment, the ~niversity 
church symbolized "the great principle of the university, 
the indissoluble union of philosophy with religion ... 62 
A fifth issue, one of the most important for this 
study, is the nature of Newman's gentleman. Is he the em-
bodiment of Newman's educational ideal? Does Newman speak 
of more th~'1. one type of gentleman? Should he primarily be 
interpreted as a worldly or a Christian model? How ser-
60McGrath, p. 170. 
61Quoted in NicGrath, p. 41 J, from Sermons on Various 
Occasions. 
62 Quoted in McGrath, p. 40J, from the Campaign. 
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iously ought Newman's treatment of him to be taken? That 
the gentleman is the end product of Newman's university ed-
ucation most critics appear to agree. That the gentleman 
represents some kind of educational ideal critics also gen-
erally grant. There is little critical agreement, however, 
on whether the gentleman's fundamental nature is Christian 
or worldly, much less on how seriously Newman's view of him 
ought to be considered. 
Dessain sees Newman's gentleman as "the ideal pro-
duct of a university, prescinding altogether from reli-
gion."63 Harrold also views him as an ideal and as the 
product of university training: 
the final product of intellectual cultivation 
at a university considered apart from religious 
principle, at once assisting and di$torting the 
development of religious character.64 
Culler too perceives the gentleman as an idealized type. 
That the gentleman is some type of educational ideal ap-
pears not to be at issue. The seriousness of Newman's 
statement on him, however, is another matter. Although 
Harrold, Vargish, Griffin, and others assume the position 
that Newman is quite serious, Culler, Buckler, McGrath, and 
others advance an ironic or derogatory interpretation which 
appears to be the more current and popular one. John R. 
6Jnessain, p. 104. 
64 Harrold, p. 11J. 
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Griffin attacks the latter stand. He appears most obvious-
ly to be addressing himself to Buckler's kind of remark 
that "the 'gentleman', which is education's best end prod-
uct, is a figure with which no man of truly imaginative 
vision would allow himself willingly to be identified." 65 
Griffin cites Newman's remark at the end of Discourse V 
that "Liberal Education makes not the Christian, not the 
Catholic, but the gentleman." 
Culler's interpretation of the gentleman also in-
vites special consideration, especially in view of the 
position on Newman's gentleman this study will adv-ance. 
According to Culler, Newman did not know what to call his 
gentleman, and, for want of a better term, he chose to name 
the one who possesses intellectual cultivation the "man of 
philosophic habit. "66 For Culler, in addition to being a."l 
"idealized type," he is one who reflects an "unattainable 
ideal" and one whose value is largely "inspirational."67 
He is, moreover, "the living embodiment of Newman's concep-
tion of knowledge." 68 His responsibility is to seek the 
perfection of the intellect: "a clear calm accurate vision 
65victorian Prose, p. 139. 
66 Culler, p. 190. 
67rbid., p. 189. 
68l£11., p. 190. 
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and comprehension of all things, as far as the finite mind 
can embrace them." 69 Equally important is his intellectual 
duty to be neither too narrow in his range of studies nor 
superficial in his mastery of them. Culler adds that if 
there is one thing that characterizes the "man of philo-
sophie habit" more than anything else, it is his ability to 
view many things "at once as one whole." However, Culler 
voices his impatience with this ideal because Newman couch-
es its qualifications in "contrasting pairs" and in "nega-
tive form."70 Even more reason for impatience, Culler 
feels, is the fact that the "man of philosophic habit'' e-
merges from Newman's portrait "not so much a creature of 
impossible virtues as a creature from whom an impossible 
number of vices have been subtracted ... 71 He asserts that 
Newman in his efforts to preserve the wholeness of man 
makes the product of university education the most ineffi-
cient of all human types, the "jack-of-all-trades ... 72 Fi-
nally, in speaking directly of Newma~'s celebrated defini-
tion, Culler states that "it is ironic that this portrait 
should be taken as a serious expression of Newman's posi-
69Quoted in Culler, p. 191, from the ~, p. 1)9. 
7°culler, p. 191. 
71Ibid. 
72~ •• p. 19). 
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i tive ideal. ,.73 
In the light of his position that the humanistic 
view and the religious view in combination enable man to 
fulfill his nature and to present that nature fully devel-
oped in the service of God, I find Culler's ironical treat-
ment of the gentleman inconsistent. Culler identifies the 
gentleman with the .. man of philosophic habit." He consti-
tutes one-half of what Culler calls Newman's positive ide-
al. If the gentleman represents half of Newman•s Christian 
humanistic ideal, why should he not be taken seriously? . 
If, moreover, the portrait of the gentleman contains New-
man's finest comment on the religion of philosophy, are-
ligious view most characteristic of the gentleman and most 
typical of a more humanistic approach, why would Newman 
wish this commentary to be viewed ironically? Harrold and 
other critics stress Newman•s point that intellectual cul-
tivation and a religion of philosophy are not enough be-
cause they do not add up to Newman's concept of a whole ed-
ucation. To treat Newman's worldly gentleman ironically is 
to undermine a constitutive element of the total ideal. 
Such an approach leaves only the Christian part, important 
as that may be. 
There remain two other questions of significance for 
this study. The first deals with a wholeness of theme in 
73Ibid., p. 2)8. 
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relation to a wholeness of structure. ':'he second concerns 
the cause an.d Entity of .'Ie\'Jrllan' s idea of a university. 
I·:arrold, Culler, ~.:cGrath, 3vaglic, and others have discus-
sed. ~! ewm~"l' s theme of the wholeness of Jr.nowledge and the 
inte5rated view by which this knowledge must be held. 
Culler and Svaglic have provided excellent analyses of the 
structure of the Idea. No one, however, has explained the 
relation of theme to structure in such a way as to show how 
adequately the structure of the discourses conveys the in-
terrelationship of the various branches of knowledge. If 
the governing principle of the Idea is one that declares 
all knowledge to be whole and that proclaims the need of 
tr.e mind to reflect that wholeness and if the structure of 
the discourses helps to bear the burden of this theme, then 
it appears appropriate for the unity of structure to be in-
vesti5ated in relation to the wholeness of theme. The 
structure of the~ has its most notable characteristic, 
wholeness, only according to its reference to the~e. The 
theme of the Idea is a whole of the sort that has two com-
ponents: a wholeness of subject and a wholeness of view. 
Correspondingly, the structure of the Idea is another whole 
that has two parts: one dealing with the relationship of 
subject to subject; the other, with the mind's interrelat-
ing of these subjects by appropriate discourses. Once a-
gain, it should be noted that the structure of the~ 
appears whole only in relation to the wholeness of theme 
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fiewman adva..11.ces. 
The final question pertinent to the scope of this 
study is the cause and Entity of Newman's idea of a univer-
sity. The problem relates to those previously discussed, 
especially the one dealing with the fundamental nature of 
Newman's university because it asks what makes the idea of 
a university to be what it is, and why it is what it is. I 
introduce the question not merely to clarify Newman's edu-
cational theme but also to provide a philosophical expla-
nation of that which gives the idea its Being, the "connec-
ted view." At its core, the question is a philosophical 
one and must be given a philosophical answer. We have al-
ready seen that Newman advocates a liberal education that 
pursues knowledge for its own sake and that ultimately pro-
duces a "habit of mind," the chief attribute of which is a 
"connected view" of o.ld and new, past and present, far and 
near. This view perceives many things "at once and as one 
whole." ·It grasps not only reality and the branches of 
knowledge that mirror reality but their relations. It en-
tails a comprehensive perspective or philosophical know-
ledge that grasps the relationship of all sciences on a 
natural philosophical level by a man of cultivated intel-
lect who has a predisposition to virtue, though he may more 
likely be spiritually deficient. It is on the foundation 
of this rationally connected hold of reality and of all 
intellectual disciplines, albeit one subject to spiritual 
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degeneration and moral stagnation, that Newman lays a hope-
inducing superstructure of Christ's message and promise 
which assures that man's real destiny is-a God-given immor-
tality. The view of the superstructure embraces a compre-
hensive perspective of the sciences and of reality by a man 
of intellectual cultivation whose ultimate purpose is to 
become a saint with the moral and intellectual attributes 
of a Philip Neri. In contrast to the secular and mundane 
goals of the man of philosophical habit, it looks to trans-
cendent and supernatural ones which serve to satisfy both 
the basic religious and intellectual aspirations of the u-
niversity educated student. This study's treatment of the 
cause and Entity of Newman's Idea will limit itself to the 
philosophical aspect of Newman's whole educational struc-
ture. 
Not a few literary critics and scholars treat some 
aspect of Newman's philosophical approach, and some of the 
major influences thereupon, in the Idea and in his various 
other works. Speaking of Newman's Grammar of Assent, J. F. 
Cronin states that in all major issues Newman's position 
can be reconciled with the philosophy of Aristotle.74 
Harrold deals provocatively with Newman's debt to Aristo-
74J. F. Cronin, Cardinal Newmanr His Theory of 
Knowledge (Washington, D. C., 1935), p. xiv. 
tle. 7 5 Culler _points to :,;evr.nan 's use of Aristotle's 
science of Sciences, and to f\:ewman' s concern with 't!le prob-
lem of the One and the :~la..."1.y. ¥.. ,,/eatherby addresses his 
f • . t t • . :l 1. 76 ef or ... s, ~n par , o Newman s ~rea ~sm. ~. varc;ish 
probes l'iev;man 's epistemolosic~l framework. 77 .Ferc;al 
l;.cC.:ra~h accounts for ;Xevro1an' s use of some I'homistic prin-
ciples. ?:dwar'i Sill em provides a clear introduction to 
~'{evrmar:.' s philosophy in the first part of his two-volume 
7p '. t. ._; ecu. ~on. Charles .Jessain offers a comprehensive view 
of introductory studies to I~ewma.."1.' s philosophy i.n his 
guide to r;ewma.Ylian philosophical research. 79 
:·rotwi thstanding. the variety and quality "of scholar-
ship and criticism relating to the~. I do not believe 
that ahyon·e has attempted to, explain newman's idea of a 
university in reference to the cause and principle of its 
3eing. I~o one, so far as I can determine, has tried to 
analyze what makes the Idea to be what it.is and why it is. 
~ 75H~ro1d, pp. 14, 104, 1))~1)4. 
I·~ 7 6.. 'r th b C d · 1 ,,. · ·- · · '· · . . .~. :, ea .. er y, ar ~na ~\ ewman ~n .tJ.~ s A~e: ... ~ s ?lace in English Theoloiiy al"ld l.i terature C'iashv~lle, 197 3), 
77 T. Vargish, Newman: The ontemulation of iv:ind 
(New York, 1970). Varg~sh a so traces the argument on 
"Severance" from corcoran. 
78sae The Philosonhical Notebook of John 
Nev.rrnan, ed. E. S~ em, 2 vo Louva~n, 19 9;, 
7 0 ' ;Seen. 7, above. 
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In view of the largely philosophical nature of Newman's to-
tal educational ideal and treatment, e.g., philosophical 
grounds, philosophical habit of mind, philosophical wisdom, 
relieion of philosophy, and man of philosophical habit, 
such an omission appears a serious one. 
In a discussion of the view advocated by the Idea, 
the question arises whether it should be labeled "a con-
nected view" or "the connected view.'' The former would be 
one which se§s truth and the relation of the sciences only 
gradually and in partial steps. The latter would pertain 
more to the one and only absolutely true view of knowledge 
and the sciences. Ideally, there is probably "the connec-
ted view" or the whole integrated grasp of knowledge and 
~· 
1 truth toward which the mind should move. Here the object 
' f 
~.·· would be truth in all its fullness -- perhaps the Beatific 
; 
~ !. 
~ 
vision of God -- according to one's human capabilities. 
E 3ut even this grasp would be limited and finite because it ~· 
I~ is grasped humanly, in contrast to the one and only true ~·. and complete "connected view" of reality found in the mind 
I' 
)\, 
! 
of God. Practically, however, the view advocated by Newman 
as the goal of a university education is a more or less 
perfect grasp of the relation of one science to another, of 
one segment of reality to another, as the sciences and the 
reality they reflect mirror the Ultimate Truth t/ho is their 
Source and End. The perception of truth would be gradual 
and limited according to the individual's capacity to 
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understand. It would be, however, no mere matter of intel-
lectual cultivation that centers on man but a blend of in-
tellectual and moral cultivation that leads ultimately to 
God. 
This brings us to the point of the importance of 
Aristotle, especially his doctrine of equivocity by refer-
ence and some of his notions on cause and Entity, for this 
study. Why use Aristotle in an interpretive study of New-
man's Idea? Can some of Aristotle's doctrines be employed 
to explain the integrity of Newman's educational ideal and 
the unity of his treatment? Is some Aristotelian approach 
fitting in the light of Newman's educational background and 
interests, and is it suitable in view of Newman's material 
and formal presentation in the Idea? 
Newman himself observes in Discourse V that "while 
we are men, we cannot help, to a great extent, being Aris-
totelians, for the great Master does but analyze the 
thoughts, feelings, views, and opinions of.humankind."80 
Elsewhere he states that Aristotle was "the most compre-
hensive intellect of Antiquity" and that it was he who 
"conceived the sublime idea of mapping the whole field of 
knowledge and subjecting all things to one profound analy~ 
80rdea of a University, ·p. 102. A few lines later, 
Newman adds: ''In many subject-matters, to think correctly, 
is to think like Aristotle." 
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sis."81 Then, too, there is the fact that Newman's thought 
was no doubt affected by the dominant influence Aristotle 
wielded on the Oxford curriculum till the mid-nineteenth 
century. Furthermore, the liberal or philosophical know-
ledge, which Newman advances as the end of a university, 
exists for its own sake, and it resembles to some extent 
the wisdom treated by Aristotle in the first book of the 
Metaphysics. Newman even uses terms like "Philosophy" and 
"First Philosophy" to describe it. Analogues of Newman's 
premise that philosophical knowledge consists in an aware-
ness of the bearing of one science on another by which the 
"whole" can be perceived can be found in Coleridge, Gibbon, 
Bacon, and others, but, ultimately, Newman's approach is an 
adaptation of Aristotelian doctrines set forth in the Meta-
physics.82 It should be noted, however, that while the 
associations drawn have merit, they must be viewed cau-
tiously. Although Newman's philosophical knowledge does 
envelop a variety of features similar to those found in 
Aristotelian wisdom, certain key characteristics can be 
claimed for it as a whole which distinguish it from the 
wisdom of Aristotle rather than identify it with that wis-
dom. Newman's liberal knowledge, for example, at its most 
81Quoted in Culler, p. 187 from the Historical 
Sketches, pp. 111, 195. 
azs 1. vag ~c, p. xv. 
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Aristotelian is distinct from the wisdom of Aristotle be-
cause Newman's consists in an interdisciplinary grasp of 
the bearing of one branch of knowledge on the other. This 
is a matter proper to the Physics. It is not a study of 
3eing gua Being which belongs to the Metaphysics. Even so, 
one still may claim that Newman's philosophical knowledge 
is wisdom in a secondary sense, if he uses "wisdom" as a 
term that is equivocal by reference, a consideration that 
leads us into the major justification of the interpretive 
scheme to be employed. 
For the main reason for using Aristotle in this 
study centers on the manner in which Aristotle's doctrine 
of equivocity by reference can be used to clarify the unity 
of Newman's educational ideal and the way it can be em-
ployed to render more intelligible Newman's handling of 
various issues. Specifically, the doctrine serves to clar-
ify NeviiJlan's treatment of a Catholic university and a uni-
versity in the abstract, theological and philosophical 
grounds, temporal and eternal "connected views," theme in 
relation to structure, and worldly man of philosophical 
habit in reference to the Christian gentleman. Aristotle's 
doctrine also provides the means to help explain the cause 
and Entity of Newman's idea of a university -- its ultimate 
"why." Furthermore, Newman's search for unity among a mul-
tiplicity of educational elements and his multiple treat-
ment of the university issue, grounds, theme and gentleman, 
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in the scope of their concern for unity in difference, lend 
themselves to comparison with that fundamental Greek prob-
lem of the One and the :,:any. .Because Aristotle's doctrine 
of equivocity by reference proves helpful in solvin5 some 
problems of sameness in difference in Nevnnan 's material and 
formal presentation in the Idea, just as it proved helpful 
in ,rovidinG a coherent solution to that central problem 
facinG the early Greek philosophers, Aristotle's doctrine 
appears warranted as a schematic device. Any critical ap-
paratus that would help insure the unity of r-.rewman • s edu-
cational ideal and the integrity of the elements that ela-
borate this ideal merits our consideration. Aristotle's 
doctrine of equivocity by reference, as interpreted by 
83 . Joseph Owens, 1s a device that can be presented in such a 
way that it shores up the unity of Newm~'1. 's educational 
doctrine and the integrity of his treatment found in the 
Idea. 
'Nhile it is true that the reader may not arrive at 
the final truth of the Idea's unity by such a means, at 
least he will be given the benefit of a plausible solution 
to the problems of unity relating to Ne·wrnan 's educational 
thought, and he will be provided a substantive interpreta-
tion of the formal elements whereby Newman presents his 
university view. The use of an Aristotelian scheme is' also 
e3see n. 6, above, for the comolete citation of 
text. Eereafter, this text will be cited as Owens. 
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supported by our recalling once a:;ain :,:evr;Tian 1 s tendency 
tnroughout his life to seek a principle of unity ~~ong a 
hos~ of intellectual, educational, and spiritual concerns. 
In the Idea's discussion of the oneness of reality, the 
wholeness of knowledge, the compreh~nsive view of knowledge 
and reality, ~~d the composite intellectual and spiritual 
make-up of the ideal product of the university, that life-
time concern is adequately reflected. Given i'Jewman 's ad-
miration for Aristotle and Aristotle 1 s influence on i~ew-
m~~·s educational development, one sees in the Aristotelian 
approach a sui table means of pursuing one avenue of :·Iew-
m~~·s lifetime search. 
Thiq interpretation of the Idea is determined by 
three considerations, if some Aristotelian method is to be 
followed. 'J:lhe first is that we distinGuish clearly the 
purpose of our interpretation from ?'Iewman 's formal intent 
in the Idea. To say that his university issue, grounds, 
theme, structure, and gentleman ca~ be interpreted after 
the manner of Aristotelian equivocity by reference is not 
to say that Newman meant to speak in Aristotelian equivocal 
terms or that he intended these issues to be so treated. 
Rather, I mean to say that here is a means whereby the 
reader may better understand the unity of ~Jewma..'1. • s educa-
' tional ideal and the integrity of its treatment in the 
~· .zut a v1ord of caution is in order. 'l'here is an 
ordinary, common-sense understanding of the vvord "equi vo-
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cal" that is antithetical to the Aristotelian use of the 
term employed in this study, The two uses must be separat-
ed. Aristotelian equivocity by reference does not, accord-
ing to Owens' interpretation, suggest a use of terms that 
_;_ ;'; .intentionally vague. misleading, or ambiguous, It does 
not suggest a use of terms to deceive, dodge, or hedge. 
On the contrary, as a later section of this chapter will 
point out in some detail, 84 Aristotelian equivocity by ref-
erence refers to things expressed in various ways but al-
ways in reference to one nature or form that is the primary 
form or nature of the thing. Equivocity by reference in-
volves primary and secondary instances of terms and the 
things they signify. But only the nature or form of one 
of the things said to be equivocal is primary, 'Any second-
ary instance derives its ultimate meaning from that pri-
mary nature or form. r1·:y Aristotelian use of the term 
"equivocal" purposes to establish a priority of issues in 
the Idea. A more current use of the term would more likely 
provide for a misleading or ambiguous statement regarding 
their true nature and relationship. So, too, when I claim 
that some key Aristotelian notions on cause and Entity can 
be used as part of an interpretive scheme to explain the 
cause and Entity of .Nevvman' s idea of a university, I do 
84 See pp. 57-65, below, for an extended discussion 
of Aristotelian equivocity by reference. 
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not assert that these Aristotelian ideas were operative in 
Newman's conception of the university ideal reflected in 
the lectures. Whether Newman consciously adverted to Aris-
totle for any of the principles, in terms of which the Idea 
will be dealt with in this study, is another matter. 
A second consideration influencing this treatment of 
the Idea is the need the Aristotelian scheme satisfies, a 
matter touched on earlier in the chapter. Although critics 
recognize Newman's search for a unified educational ideal 
and even while they acknowledge to some extent his manifold 
treatment of university issue, grounds and the like in the 
Idea, they do not provide a satisfactory means of unifying 
the ideal and elements of Newman's presentation. Culler 
appears to come the closest, but even he does not go far 
enough. For Culler points out that the central intellectu-
al problem of Newman's formative years was the problem of 
the one and the many.B5 He adds that all of the basic 
problems found in the man of philosophical habit are forms 
of this root issue and stem from Newman's conception of 
knowledge. 86 In short, Culler sees Newman's problem as one 
dealing with the way in which the mind can reconcile the 
unity its nature so badly need~ with the multiplicity of 
B5culler, p. 204. 
e6Ibid. 
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the external world. Culler reduces Newman's problem of 
educational unity, with its implications for an educational 
ideal, to a philosophical problem. But philosophical prob-
lems require philosophical solutions. If the basic prob-
lem of educational unity for Newman is seen by Culler in 
the light of the one and the many issue, then Culler's so-
lution to Nev~an's problem should take into account a 
scheme that also addresses itself to that fundamental ques-
tion raised by early Greek thinkers. 
What is needed is an interpretation that goes a 
step beyond Culler. What is needed is one that shows the 
central problem of unity in Newman's educational ideal, 
i.e., how all knowledge interrelates and the need of the 
mind to show that interrelation, to have its correlative 
in Newman's manifold treatment of the elements that elabo-
rate the oneness of knowledge and view in the Idea. What 
is needed is an interpretive mechanism, such as Aristotel-
ian equivocity by reference, that not only clarifies New-
man's cardinal principle of the wnoleness of knowledge and 
the need of the mind to reflect that wholeness in its view, 
that not only serves to reconcile Newman's multiple ap-
proach to the issues of the nature of a university, the 
grounds of the study, the nature of a "connected view," and 
his idea of a gentleman, but one that also clarifies, uni-
fies, and reconciles these issues in terms of a specific 
doctrine geared to answer the problem of sameness in dif-
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ference. 
A third consideration affecting this a.Ylalysis of the 
Idea is that the interpretive scheme be harmonious with 
those elements to which it is applied. In order to give 
the reader a general sense of the critical mechanism invol-
ved and some estimate of its applicability, I will offer an 
explanation of Aristotelian equivocity by reference, as 
interpreted by Owens, and I will cite three ways the doc-
trine will be applied in this study. The overview of 
Aristotle's doctrine will be drawn from joseph Owens' sol-
id, scholarly interpretation of Aristotle's Metaphysics. 87 
Apart from its other notable qualities, Owens' work pro-
vides an appropriate Artstotelian critical apparatus suit-
ed to the purpose of this study. In its elaboration of 
Aristotle's doctrine of equivocity by reference, it sup-
plies a plausible means to explain Newman's manifold treat-
ment of elements in the Idea. It also furnishes background 
on Aristotelian notions dealing with the principles invol-
ved in sensible change and the .Being of sensible realities. 
~hat Cwens' thesis does, in short, is afford the critical 
reader that Aristotelian unifying device necessary to 
"form" a helpful, more philosophically "connected view" ot 
·what makes Newman's idea to be what it is, even while it 
87rt is mandatory to indicate which of Aristotle's 
interpreters will be used, inasmuch as their analyses of 
Aristotelian theory oftentimes differ so markedly. 
provides him with the no less important means of unifying 
~ewman's multiple treatment of university issue, grounds, 
theme, and gentleman in a manner and to an extent not pre-
viously attempted. In this study, equivocity by reference 
will be applied in three ways: first, to Newman's treat-
ment of the following issues: a Catholic university and 
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a university in the abstract, theological and philosophical 
grounds, temporal and eternal "connected views," theme in 
relation to structure, and worldly man of philosophical 
habit in reference to a Christian gentleman; second, to the 
"connected view" as a cause or principle of change; and 
third, to the "connected view" as that which gives Entity 
to Newman's idea of a university. But first an explanation 
of Aristotelian equivocity is in order. 
According to Owens, to understand Aristotle's philo-
sophy, especially his Metaphysics, one must understand his 
doctrine of equivocity. If he does not, the reader may 
very well find himself hopelessly lost in a maze of confu-
sion and ambiguities as he attempts to understand the Aris-
totelian text. But understanding Aristotle's use of equiv-
ocals also presents some problems. Part of the difficulty 
lies in the equivocal nature of equivocity. 88 Aristotle's 
use of the term is manifold. so many of the things he 
studies and the terms he employs are equivocal o "Being'', 
88 Owens, p. 121. 
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"~ntity," "cause," "wisdom," a::1d "form" provide a few exam-
ples. I~ his profound concern with the study of sensible 
thin;:;s, .1.ristotle loo1?;:s at thin~s with the S2Jne name to de-
ternine v1hether they are lexpressed uni vocally or equi vccal-
~9 ly, ·~, .rre studies them to ascertain how they are the same 
. 90 in form yet dJ.fferent. I:e finds that thine;s are in some 
ways the sar:1e and in other ways different.91 Always his 
focus is on things known directly and in themselves,92 
Aristotle looks for a universal form within sensible 
things. Ee wants to J~now how a "many" ca.YJ. be a "one." .r .. e 
finds the answer in the form or definition of the thing on 
a :')hysical level and in the Entity or 3ein6 of the thing on 
a metaphysical plane. Eis doctrine Qf equivocity is the 
. 
zeneral means of Aristotle's physical and metaphysical so-
lution to the problem of how a "ma.YJ.y" ca.'1 be a ~·one, .. and 
its most important element is form. 
The Aristotelian doctrine of equivocity concerns 
"thi::1;s said -- or •neant in many ways. ,.93 The doctrine em-
braces terms, concepts, and definitions and the things 
go /Ibid,, p. 126. 
90~, . d 
.,!.OJ.,,, p. 127 • 
91- .. 130 • .!.bJ.a., P• 
-
02 
"' Ib"" ~·· pp. 129, 132. 
O'i • 118. "'""Ibl.d,, p. 
defined. It should be noted, however, that although words 
and concepts can be said to be used equivocally, it is 
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. th t . . 1 . 1 94 h t . . tl • th1ngs a are pr1mar1 y equ1voca • T a 1s Ar1sto e s 
primary concern -- the equivocal nature of things. second-
arily, he is interested in the equivocity of words and con-
cepts. Once again, Aristotle's procedure, according to 
Owens, involves looking at things denominated by the same 
name to determine whether the things are expressed univo-
cally or equivocally.95 If they are expressed equivocally, 
Aristotle assigns reasons for the equivocity. He studies 
and cites various ways the things are equivocally stated. 
He does not restrict terms to one exact meaning. Rather, 
he employs them univocally or equivocally as the terms and 
96 the things being treated demand. Aristotle's central in-
terest in the matter may be summed up as a search for same-
ness in difference. 
Understanding Aristotle's doctrine of equivocity im-
poses two obligations on the reader. One is to determine 
what is the primary and fundamental meaning of the term, or 
more precisely, the primary and fundamental nature of the 
thing signified by the term. The second is to locate sec-
94Ibid., p. lJO. 
95Ibid., p. 126. 
96Ibid. 
o~dary instances of the term or of the thing signified ~~d 
to assign some proportional relation of the secondary in-
stance to the primary one. Eaving done this, the reader 
will be well on his way to understanding the fundamental 
meaning of the term and the primary nature of the thing 
signified, as Aristotle explains it. 
Owens further points out that, in the Categories, 
Aristotle mentions univocals, equivocals and paronyms when 
he speaks ~f the three classes of things.97 Univocals are 
things that have a common name and definition. "Animal," 
for ex~~ple, is defined the sa~e both in man and ox.98 
Equivocals, on the other hand, are things that have a com-
mon name but different definitions. In Cwens' words, "the 
things are equivocal, the name is identical, ~~d the defi-
nitions (as denoted by the na~e) are different."99 Paro-
nyms are the third class of things described by Aristotle. 
Paronyms differ on the basis of what Owens calls grammati-
cal distinctions. For example, grammarians are named from 
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"grammar," the brave from "bravery," senator from "senate, .. 
100 and so on. Today, univocals, equivocals,and paronyms, 
97rbid., p. 111. 
98rbid. 
99rbid., p. 112. 
100Tb"d 
=--.!_·, p. 111. 
or their literal equivalents, designate terms for the most 
?art. For Aristotle, however, they were defined as 
things. 101 All three classes of things merit considera-
tion, but in view of the scope of this study, equivocals, 
especially equivocals by reference, warrant our closest 
attention. 
In Owens' view, Aristotle speaks of three types of 
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equivocal: equivocals by chance, equivocals by analogy, 
and equivocals by reference. 102 Equivocals are "things ex-
pressed in various ways." 10 3 Things are equivocal whose 
definitions differ but whose names are the same. 104 There 
are, however, degrees of difference in the definitions. 
The degree of difference involved in the definition deter-
mines what type of equivocity is involved. The difference 
is total in the case of equivocals b;y chance, the first 
type of equivocal Aristotle treats. 105 Equivocals by 
chance have a common name but totally different defini-
101rbid., p. 112. The definition of univocals, e-
quivocals, and paronyms as things would not prevent Aris-
totle from saying, for example, that a word is used "equi-
vocally." It is just that Aristotle's approach appears 
consistently to be on the side of things. 
102Ibid., P• 118o 
lOJibid., p. 115. 
104Ibid., p. 121. 
l05Ibid. 
tions. "Jate" meaning the fruit of a tree and "date" sig-
nifying a day of the month serve to illustrate this 
type. 106 The only thing in common is the name, and that 
is attributed by mere chance. In equivocals by analogy, 
another type Aristotle proposes, the difference in defini-
tion may not exclude a certain unity. Owens cites Aris-
totle's definition: "By the analogies I mean when the 
second is related to the first as the fourth is related to 
the third ... l07 Owens notes, moreover, that analogy is the 
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principle of metaphor: "As the stone is to 3isyphus, so 
is the shameless man to his victim. •• 108 He concludes that, 
for Aristotle, "the analogous is also found naturally lo-
cated in the things themselves." 109 
Squivocals by reference are the third type Aristotle 
discusses. Here again the difference in definition does 
not exclude a certain unity. This time it is by reference. 
Once again, in one sense, the definitions are the same: 
in another sense, they are different. In this type of e-
quivocity, things are expressed in various ways but always 
in reference to something one or in reference to one nature 
106
rbid., p. 110. 
l07Ibid., p. 123. 
108
rbid. 
109Ibid. 
6J 
or form that is the primary form or nature of the thing. 110 
Differences are overshadowed by some degree of sameness --
of unity, but the differences are still present, and the 
true nature of the term or of the thing it signifies is to 
be found only in the primary instance. 111 Equivocity by 
reference, then, involves primary and secondary instances 
of terms and the things they signify. The primary or fun-
damental instance of the true nature of the things is sig-
nified by the primary instance of the term. Corresponding-
ly, a secondary instance of the true form or nature is sig-
naled by a secondary use of the term. Furthermore, every 
secondary instance of the term and that signified has a 
special independent relation to the primary term and 
th. . 112 ~ng. 
Three dominant conclusions emerge from Owens' treat-
ment of Aristotle's equivocity by reference. One is that, 
for Aristotle, terms equivocal by reference reflect the 
equivocity found in things. A second is that equivocity by 
reference involves two terms, in contrast to at least four 
found in equivocity by analogy. One term and thing are 
primary in importance because it is only in reference to 
that term and thing that proportional secondary instances 
have their meaning. But only the nature or form of one of 
111Ibid., P• 119. 
112Ibid., p. 125. 
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the two things said to be equivocal is primary. In refer-
ence to that, the secondary instance derives its form. The 
final deals with the need on the part of the reader to rec-
ognize the two terms involved and to locate primary and 
secondary instances of the true meaning of the terms and 
the funda'1lental nature or form of the things these equivo-
cal terms signify. 
Owens cites various examples of this type offered by 
Aristotle in the ~~:etaptysics. For exa'1lple, a medical trea-
tise and a medical knife are called "medical" through ref-
erence to something one, medical science. 11 3 The tr~atise 
"proceeds from medical science;" the knife is "useful to 
it. •· 114 The form or nature of "medical," here, iq located 
in the primary instance, "medical science," not in the sec-
ondary instances of the treatise or the knife, even though 
they do have their own forms. Each of the secondary in-
stances has a special independent relationship to medical 
science. Owens points out in Aristotle's words that vari-
ous things are "medical by reference to medical science --
for one thing is called medical because it possesses medi-
cal science, another through being naturally adapted to it, 
and another through being a function of medical sci-
tt)Ibid., p. 119. 
114Ibid. 
11~ 
ence." ~ In a second example drawn from the Metaphysics, 
owens speaks of things said to be healthy, e.g., healthy 
color, healthy exercise and so forth. Aristotle explains 
these instances by stating that "everything healthy is ex-
pressed in reference to health, one thing through preserv-
ing health, another through producing health, another 
through being a sign of health •••• "116 Accordingly, the 
nature expressed in the instance of healthy color, healthy 
food, and healthy exercise would be found only in the "dis-
position of the bodily organism."ll7 ,The other instances 
have their own proper forms or different natures, but they 
also have a unity of reference to the nature of the primary 
instance, that is, in Owens• words, they "are of such ana-
ture as to have some reference to health ...... 118 
But what has Aristotle's doctine of equivocity by 
reference to do with the scope of this study? How specifi-
cally does it apply to Newman"s multiple treatment? In an 
earlier discussion of certain basic problems raised by the 
ll5Quoted in Owens, p. 119, from Book IV of the 
Metaphysics. 
116Quoted in Owens, p. 119, from Book IV of the 
Metaphysics. 
117owens, p. 119. 
118Ibid. 
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Idea11 9 and in our review of some critical literature120 
pertinent to these problems, we saw that Newman treats var-
ious elements comprising his formal and material presenta-
tion with more than one voice. We saw that Newman's dual 
presentation pointed, for example, to a relationship be-
tween Catholic university and university in the abstract 
that was not simple but reflected the complexity of same-
ness and difference found in Newman's exposition of philo-
sophical and theological grounds, natural and supernatural 
"connected views," religion of reason and religion of 
Faith, theme and structure, worldly gentleman and Christian 
gentleman. We also saw a complexity of sameness and dif-
ference in Newman's treatment of these elements as issues. 
Which are the most important, and which one is Newman's 
primary question? At the time, I asked how Newman's multi-
ple treatment of these issues could be unified in some 
measure. How can the questions of Newman's university is-
sue, grounds, theme, gentleman and the like be said to be 
the same yet different as issues? I also inquired just how 
Newman may be said to speak variously of grounds, theme, 
religion and gentleman, and yet be said to speak of 
grounds, theme, structure and gentleman with some degree of 
sameness or measure of unity. The question was, and it re-
119 15 See p. - , above. 
120 10 See p. _. ' above. 
mains, whether Newman's manifold treatment of elements can 
be made one. Aristotle's doctrine of equivocity by refer-
ence, as interpreted by Owens, appears ready to supply a 
solution worthy of our consideration. 
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Judged in the light of Aristotelian equivocity, "is-
sue" is the first term that should be treated as an equivo-
cal by reference. All of the issues treated earlier as 
part of the scope of this study suggest a certain unity by 
reference to each other: Catholic University to secular u-
niversity, theological to philosophical grounds, Christian 
.gentleman to the worldly man of philosophic habit, and so 
forth. But these issues also suggest a proportional refer-
ence of secondary issues to the primary one. In the Aris-
totelian context proposed, Newman may be said to express 
the issues of the Idea in various ways but always in refer-
ence to something one, that is, in reference to one issue 
that is primary or fundamental. Although the differences 
in the definitions of the issues are restricted by some de-
gree of sameness, i.e., that they are all issues relating 
to the primary one in some way, still the differences are 
evident, and the true nature of the term "issue" is to be 
found only in the primary instance. In this interpreta-
tion, the nature of a Catholic University is the primary 
issue of the Idea. The nature of a university in the ab-
stract, grounds, theme, religion and gentleman are issues 
only in reference to that primary one. Each one of these 
secondary issues has a special independent relation to the 
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~rimarY one. 3ach de~ends on the 9rimary issue for its ul-
tirr:ate for!': and :neanir;,~ as an issue in the context of the 
l i:.::2.. .,2;.1t the nature expressed in the instances of secular 
university, srounds, theme, relision, and 6entleman as is-
* sues is to be found primarily in the question.of what is 
the nature of a 8atholic university. iach has its own 
·;)roper form or different nature as an issue. All have a 
:J.ni ty of reference to the nature of the primary instance in 
that they contribute in some way to the fashioning of ~'~ew­
~an's Catholic university ideal. 
r:ewma.Yl 's treatment of issues is not the only one 
that may profitably be viewed in terms of Aristotelian 
equivocity by reference in order to render his educational 
ideal and the formal elements of its presentation more uni-
fied and intelligible. As we suggested earlier, ~\ewman • s 
exposition of the relationships of Catholic University to 
s8cular 1.miversity, supernatural to natural grounds, eter-
nal to temporal "connected view," wholeness of theme to 
wholeness of structure, religion of Faith to religion of 
reason, and Christian gentleman to worldly gentlema.Yl may 
~lso be so considered. Here, o~ course, the focus is on 
the relationship of grounds to zrounds, view.to view, .::;en-
tleman to gentleman, 'and the ·like, rath.er than on their im-
portance as secondary issues in relation to the primary one 
of the nature of a Catholic Vniversity. In this context, 
"-srounds," "view," "religion," "wholeness" of theme and 
69 
structure, and "gentleman" emerge not as univocal terms of 
equal importance and meaning but as equivocal ones whose 
significance is to be determined by the importance of that 
to which each term and what it signifies primarily refers. 
Here again we have instances of terms and things whose def-
initions show a degree of sameness in difference. Once 
more, secondary instances have their own proper forms or 
different natures, but they also show a unity of reference 
to the nature of the primary instance. In the process of 
locating primary and secondary instances of these terms, 
one observes that the Idea's philosophical grounds are 
called "grounds" through reference to its theological 
grounds, its temporal "connected view" is called "view" 
through reference to its eternal "connected view," its 
wholeness of structure would be ''whole" through reference 
to a wholeness of theme, and its man of philosophic habit 
is called "gentleman" through reference to its Christian 
gentleman. Philosophical grounds, temporal "connected 
view," wholeness of structure, and worldly gentleman would 
be secondary instances whose importance derives only from 
their relation to the primary ones, at least in the context 
of this Aristotelian approach to Newman•s Idea. 
To understand better the second general application 
of Aristotelian equivocity by reference to the~. that 
is, to the "connected view" as a cause and term equivocal 
by reference and as a principle of the change from unrelat-
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ed branches of knowledi;e to interconnected branches viewed 
in one whole interdisciplinary ~rasp, it may be useful at 
this point to review some aspects of Aristotle's approach 
to cause as interpreted by Owens. Such an overview centers 
on the motivation, starting point, procedure,and goal that 
owens sees Aristotle employing. 121 To supply motivation 
and an irrefutable basis for philosophical speculation, Ar-
istotle states that ''all men by nature desire to know. "122 
This desire for knowledge exists apart from an utilitarian 
121 concern. - r.:a...YJ. needs to know the causes of the material 
universe, and he seeks this knowledge for its own sake. 
Aristotle goes on to his starting point, sensible reali-
124 ty. He begins with things of the sensible universe and 
wonders what are the elements or principles by which·such 
things can be made more intelligible. The 3tagirite finds 
these elements to be real physical principles. 125 ~very 
object in the sensible universe, he observes, is a union of 
two ultimate principles: the material constituent or mat-
ter, and the formal principle or form, which makes the sen-
121owens, p. 17. 
12') 
.... £.Ibid. , P• 158. 
12 3Ibid. 
124Ibid. , p. 172. 
125Ibid. , p. 174. 
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sible object to be what it is. This union is an internal 
one in which that which has the capacity to become a de-
terminate sensible thing does become a determinate sensible 
thing. The union is one in which undetermined matter which 
has the potentiality to become an actual, informed sensible 
reality does become a definite, actual, informed sensible 
reality. 
This explanation of sensible things by means of in-
ternal, constitutive principles of matter and form also in-
volves science or knowledge or the causes of things, a con-
sideration which leads into Aristotle's procedural explana-
tion of sensible things through their causes. Strictly 
speaking, matter and form are the ultimate constitutive 
principles that make up a sensible object. Again, the mat-
ter is that out of which something is made. The form is 
that which gives matter its determination. For example, 
the form or shape of a man informs the matter of marble to 
make up the statue of a man. However, in speaking of know-
ledge of this or any other sensible object, Aristotle des-
cribes these two internal principles, and two external el-
ements as well, in terms of causality. He sees them as 
physical principles, components, producers, and ends invol-
ved in the physical change of what is potentially a sensi-
ble reality to what becomes actually a sensible reality. 126 
126
rbid. 
Aristotle calls these principles and. elements "causes'' and 
speaks thus of them in the Physics: 
The causes are expressed in four ways. Of 
these we say that one cause is the Entity, 
and the what-is-Being ••• , another the matter 
and substrate, a third that from which motion 
takes its source, and a fourth the cause 
correspoy~~ng to this, the purpose and the 
good •••• 
Aristotle's goal is the ultimate cause that fully and fi-
nally answers the questions about which man naturally won-
ders.128 
How does this treatment by Owens relate to our con-
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sideration of the "connected v.iew" as the cause of Newman's 
idea of a university? In the process of determining how 
the "connected view" makes Newman's idea of a university to 
be what it is, this study will address itself to the inter-
nal and external elements involved in the change of mere 
undetermined learning to determined interrelated learning. 
The causes studied in this inquiry will be four: the mate-
rial cause or that out of which the idea of a university is 
made; the formal cause or that which makes the idea to be 
what it is; the efficient cause or that from which the 
movement from unrelated disciplines to related disciplines 
takes its source; and the final cause, the end or good for 
which the id.ea exists. Following Owens' interpretation of 
127Ibid., p. 173· 
128ill.£.' p. 172. 
).:ri.stotlG's ti"'ee..t.:-::e!!"t, VJe v1ill Llse "c2.Ltseu as 2 .. tern1 equ.iv-
oc?.l b~· l~efsrence, ~he causes of the iG.ea of a university 
'Nill be P.X'''~esse:>d ir v~Y·ious; ways 
- ..:.- ..... ..; .... \,.4, -... ... .... ... - - ' 
and they will be denomi-
:lated "cause" o::-1ly in reference to one cause, the formal 
cause or "connected view." ~he burden w5.11 be to establis;~ 
tta nature of the four causes, to locate the instances in 
wi1ich the term "cause" can be applied, and to establi.sh 
some proportional relationship of the instances, one to 
2.::1other. The pri:nary instance of causality will be found 
L1. the "conn2ct ed view." Other pril:.cilJles or conditions 
of the idea will be said to have their own definitions as 
the undetermined material of the idea, as that from which 
the movement of the idea stems, or as that ~ood towards 
which it moves, but these will be treated as secondary 
i:1s"tances of cause. 
Our third application of Aristotelis~ equivocity by 
:ceference i.n this study deals vvi th the term "2nti ty" as a Y) .. 
equivocal by reference and hew the "co::.T:.'1ected view" is ttat 
w:r..ich gives :2-nti ty to :\~e·.vman 's idea of a u.niversity. ..::~J.t 
this analysis also requires so:ne elaboration of Owens' in-
terpretation of ~r~stotle's ~etaohysics. Chapters J-12, 
14, and 19 of Jwens' work a9p~ar especially helpful in this 
effort. It is from these sections ttat I submit a "vocabu-
lar~r" of i.e~n.g and summary statement of that r)art of Aris-
+n+Ic'c do0~rl·~o of ~e=n~ 
v ....J ..... '- ".) - v J. .&. ,_. ... l.. ·~ J as .i.tJ.terpretecl a.l'ld form 1J.lated by 
...... . , . , 1" ~wens, Wnlcn app les to our study. ~opefully, the termin-
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olo;~' presented and the doctrine of ..:•~inz ciravrrl., thouzr. 
dealt wl th i:1. sur:1.mary for:n, will e:;ive the reader a r8ason-
• -'I. ' • ..., .._, • t t l' ' . l .... able Llu.lca-cJ.O::l or t-ne .1.r1s o e 1an -cernuno o:;.y •Jo be em-
:? loyed in this study of what ~i ves :,; ev~rnaJ.1.' s idea of a u-
niversi ty its ultimate principle of .::.eil16· ·J;erminolo<3y 
will be clarified and the Aristotelian doctrine expanded in 
tte course of the study as the need arises. 
According to Owens, Aristotle's total doctrine of 
Jei::Ld; has to be "reconstructed" because the notion of .3eing 
d . th , • • 1 f . + . . . ..... advance ln ue ear_ler 000.-<::S 0 :>,e vapr.ySlCS lS :!10 i- com-
pletely developed in the later ones or, at least, their 
exta~1t versions. :'!1e Aristotelian doctrine on Jeins out-
lined l:er8 is Owens' "recon::;truction" bas(~d on evidence in 
t , t .: .... h • 129 ne pres en .~e i..ap .. "ys1cs. The vocabulary Owens proposes 
reflects his efforts to render the catarial of Aristotle's 
Joctrine on Jein~ in the closest possible alliance with tte 
for~ of its orizinal . 1"'0 ex_:;ressJ.on. J 
For .~ri stotle, 3ein:::;, as that which si~~1ifi es what-
ever is, is a concept or common I)redicate. ::ut a difficult 
problem arises in the translation, much less correct inter-
)retation.., of what Aristotle precisely means by .0ein6· 
. . t .L.l • d • • t . . . L>' 
.u·2..s o •J e uses ous1a, an eve:1. 1n l s :)rlmary Sl;3nlllca-
t.ions, the v.,rord appears to hE.ve various meanings. ?or it 
1;~';'-··J·,· ,, ~· t l)· 
lJOibid., p. 68. 
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means the primary instance of 3eing. 131 Upon it all other 
Being has some dependence. It is the cause of Being in 
things. It often signifies something concrete, and it of-
ten refers to something individual. Owens does not wish to 
use ousia. Neither does he wish to employ "substance" or 
"essence" in order to express Aristotle's concept of Be-
ing.1 32 In their place, he substitutes the term "Entity'' 
as that word best able to describe the equivocal notion, 
or more precisely, the equivocal nature of the sensible 
things Aristotle treats. 133 
. 
An important key, then, to understanding Owens' in-
terpretation of Aristotle's treatment of Being is that all-
important equivocal term"Entity" by which Being is ex-
pressed in various ways but always in reference to some-
thing one or in reference to one form. Entity is the pri-
mary instance of Being. It alone contains in itself the 
true nature of Being, and only in reference to Entity are 
all other things said to have Being. In using Entity as an 
equivocal by reference, Owens handles Aristotle's treatment 
of different sensible things with reference to the nature 
of their primary instance, or secondary instances in rela-
l3libid., p. 13B. 
l32Ibid., p. 140. 
l33Ibid., p. 153. Owens capitalizes "Entity" to 
show the reader that it is being used to render the Aristo-
telian ousia. 
76 
tion to primary instances. ~ntity expresses the primary 
and secondary instances of the 3eir.g of sensible things in 
Dro-oer relation. It is the guide to the things denoted, 
~ ~ 
a:td it assumes the meanin~ of all instances encountered. 
?rorr. -~hese considerations, "=::nti ty" er.1erges as a comprehen-
sive equivocal te~1 that expresses the ultimate principles 
of unity and permanence in concrete things. It is the per-
manent foundational principle of their 3eing. It is the 
principle of s&~eness com~on to everything that is Being. 
~nti ty is ·that which remains permanent notvv'i thstanding the 
cha~zes something undergoes. 7-he primary instance of 2nti-
ty in a sensible thing is its form or what-IS-3eins• s:'his 
form expresses timeless 3eing or what essentially and nee-
essarily is :aeing. The what-IS-3ein5 expresses the formal, 
intelligible perfection of a thing. It is that by which 
the thing is known. 
According to Owens' interpretation, the problem of 
3eing becomes the problem of Entity. Among other thines, 
"Entity" means the formal cause of the Physics. Entity 
also means that permanent substrate that does not change in 
sensible things, while its "affections" do. entity mea1·1s 
the ultimate subject of predication and of accidental 
change. Entity means the substrate of the accidents, the 
matter, the form and the composite in that substrate. 134 
lJ4Ibid., p. 456. 
Primary Entity means a form without matter or a form that 
does not inform matter. 135 
The primary instance of Being in the Metaphysics is 
Entity. The primary instance of Entity in sensible things 
is the form. Moreover, efficient, final, and material 
causes have their ultimate basis in the formal cause. 
Owens sees the Aristotelian formal cause as the "act" or 
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''energy" observed in sensible things. Owens further points 
out that while the Aristotelian form contains elements of 
the Platonic form, in that it is "knowable," "determined,'' 
"necessary,'' and "unchangeable," the Aristotelian form is 
essentially actual, in contrast to the potentiality and 
the passivity of the Platonic form. 136 The Aristotelian 
form is essentially act, and something that does act, does 
know, and does provide ''knowabili ty" to composite sensible 
things. Again, the Aristotelian forms are "knowings," by 
way of contrast to the Platonic "knowables."l37 
Furthermore, Owens notes that things differ specifi-
cally because of their different formal causes. Each one 
of the specific forms or separate Entities is a "what-IS-
135ill£. 
l36rbid., p. 457. 
l37Ibid., 
-
P• 458. 
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Being."138 The presence of matter, that which is unknow-
able, differentiates them, not by adding to the form, but 
by introducing plurality and indefiniteness. For Owens, 
Aristotle explains plurality within sensible species thus: 
he begins with that which is knowable in the sensible univ-
erse; he perceives a variety of forms, separate Entities 
or "what-IS-Being" in different things; he reduces these 
forms to some kind of unity. Aristotle does not, in Owens' 
thesis, choose a "one" and ask how it can be a "many." 
Rather, he takes a "many" and questions how it can be 
one. 139 His response is the unity of a form that gives 
Entity and Being to the matter and the composite. Again, 
Entity as formal cause is form as act. Ultimately, sensi-
ble things have "Entity" because their form is, or can 
share, in the permanence of the "eternal" and "divine."140 
In explaining the science of Being gua Being, Owens 
explicates the science of Entity and so adds to our under-
standing of Aristotle"s use of the term. According to 
138Ibid., p. 459. Although somewhat of an oversim-
plification;-It is not too far wide of the mark to say that 
for Owens the "what-is" pertains to the matter of a thing; 
the "what-IS-Being," to its form. Owens capitalizes the 
"is" to signify that the word expresses "timeless Being" 
as the basis of formal necessity. 
l39Ibid., p. 460. 
140Ibid., pp. ~61-46). 
Aristotle, as interpreted by Owens, there is a science of 
3eing gua Being. It is the science that concerns Bein5 
universally. 141 Man naturally seeks to know the "first 
causes" of Being according as it is 3eing. These four 
"first causes" must be considered in a unity that binds 
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them under one science. In such a context, all causes 
pertain to one nature, namely, Being "qua" Being. 142 owens 
recapitulates Aristotle's manifold use of Being in refer-
ence to some things as Entity, to others as "affections" of 
:Sntity, to still others as they are "corruptions," "priva-
tions" etc. -- all instances of Being referring back to tf1e 
primary instance of Being, Entity. 143 It is the primary 
instance that contains the true nature of Being. Accord-
ingly, 3eing, or 3eing according as it is Being, or the 
true nature of Being, can be found in Entity alone. 1·44 
3eing thus considered is not, in Owens' interpretation, 
used as a genus, but as an equivocal by reference. 145 Cnly 
141Ibid,, p. 259. 
142_b.d 
.:!::.._L. , p. 262 • 
143rbid., p. 265. .3eing, dealt with in the L'<ieta-
physics is expressed in many ways. As an equivocal by ref-
erence, Being denotes one nature, as well as many natures. 
Its true nature is that of its primary instance, Entity. 
But Entity has primary and secondary instances also. Form 
is the primary instance of Entity in sensible things. 
144Ib"d 
----1.:.... , p. 267. 
145Ib"-l ~·· p. 268. 
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thus can there be one science that deals with all :aeing. 
Things will be denominated :aeing, mediately or immediately, 
by reference to Entity. ~ntity comes across as the common 
,.., h' . d d . 146 nature rererred to by everyt lng consl ere as :Oelng. 
All "first causes" pertain to Being ''qua" .Seing. All re-
late to Entity and are applicable to whatever Entity in-
cludes.147 
In relation to matter as Entity, Owens points out 
that for Aristotle the most distinctive characteristic of 
matter is its potentiality. Katter alone has no determina-
tion of 3eing. Only form gives it that determination. 
Something can be or not be. This capability is, for Aris-
totle, the matter. 148 It is the matter of a thing that en-
ables it to become something else. ~~atter is an expression 
of the ,.what-is" of a thing. The "what-is" can be consid-
ered the thing's matter; it can also be viewed as form in 
the sense that the matter gets its actuality from the form. 
So too, may the "what-is" refer to the composite in the 
context that there is under consideration the matter al-
146
rbid., u. 270. Under consideration here are dif-
ferent expressions of Being, not divisions of Being. .c:elng 
extends to its various instances as an equivocal by refer-
ence. Again, the primary instance of Being is Entity. 
147
rbid., pp. 272-273· 
148
rbid., p. 339. One may express Entity as matter, 
but only in-a-secondary and potential wayo 
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ready determined by some form. 149 The "what-Is-Being," 
however, refers only to the form. 15° The matter may be 
considered the thing itself. The matter is the thing view-
ed as potency. It is in reference to form, and so, in ref-
erence to Entity, that matter is said to be or to have some 
Being. In short, matter is a secondary and potential ex-
pression of Entity because whatever Entity it has derives 
from a form. 151 There appears to be consistently present 
for Owens a significant identification of Entity, form and 
act with determination. 
For Aristotle, in Owensv view, form is act; matter, 
potency. Aristotle treats of a potency "to be acted upon," 
as well as a potency "of acting upon something else." 152 
Accordingly, he distingutshes act and movement. Act does 
not seek an end outside of itself. The end of the act is 
the act itself. In movement, however, act is the thing 
being acted upon. 153 The more perfect kind of act is that 
in which the act is agent. Act has priority over all kinds 
149But to know a thing is to know its "what-Is-Be-
ing," not its "what-is." 
l50The "what-Is-Being" is that which belongs by its 
own proper nature. "VIhat-Is-Being, '' is per se. 
l5libid., p. 345. 
152Ibid., p. 40J. 
l53Ibid., pp. 404-405. 
154 of potency. Potency can be understood only in relation 
to act. These considerations relate especially to the fi-
nal cause. So considered, the final cause is ultimately 
the formal because that is the purpose intended -- the end 
of the act is the act itself.l55 
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Again, it is significant to note for this study that 
all Aristotelian causes, as interpreted by Owens, have 
their ultimate basis in the formal cause. Efficient cau-
sality is described in reference to form. The form is the 
agent that can cause that form elsewhere. The efficient 
cause of one thing can be considered formally identical to 
the formal cause of that same thing. Efficient causality 
is "imperfect" and "incomplete" because it finds its com-
plete actuality only in something else. 156 When agent and 
patient are in proper relation, a certain effect is inevi-
table. The actuality of the efficient cause is in the pa-
tient, not in the agent, which, considered as a perfect 
form, cannot have any actuality outside of itself. 
Owens also makes the final cause dependent on the 
formal in his explication of Aristotle's position. The 
final cause is ultimately the form because that is the pur-
pose intended in the instance of act when the end of the 
l54Ibid., p. 406. 
l55Ibid. , p. 40?. 
l56Ibid. , p. 406. 
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act is the act itself.l57 Ultimately, there is involved a 
search for the unchangeable and permanent -- what Owens 
calls "the restless seeking of the divine, the imitation of 
the divine." 158 Finally, material causality is identifi-
able with formal causality. The matter is the form poten-
tially, and it can be known and explained only in terms of 
form. In short, all causality, in Owens' scheme, must be 
considered in relation to formal causality, for only to the 
formal cause can each of the other three ultimately be re-
duced. 
In relation to our study of what gives Newman's idea 
of a university its Entity, Entity will be treated as an 
equivocal by reference. Its primary instance will be lo-
cated in·the form of the idea, the "connected view," for 
that makes the idea to be what it is and explains why it 
essentially and necessarily is. Again, it is important to 
note here that if Newman's idea of a university is to be 
known at all, it will have to be known after the manner of 
Entity. For, as Aristotle points out, to know anything is 
to know it as Entity. Accordingly, to know the idea of a 
university is to grasp its form, what-Is-Being or 2ntity. 
Knowledge of the idea requires a reduction of knowledge to 
Entity because in seeking the Being of the idea we are 
l57Ibid., p. 407. 
l5Bibid., p. 469. 
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seeking its Entity. The ~ntity of the idea is identifiable 
with its formal cause, the "connected view." 
Furthermore, in seeking to explain the Entity of the 
idea of a university, we should bear in mind that the fun-
damental question concerns why the matter of mere learning 
or unrelated sciences is something. The answer, of course, 
is the form or what-Is-Being of the idea. The interdisci-
plinary grasp is the cause of the idea's Being. According-
ly, we must look to this form for the Entity of the idea. 
The idea has Entity or Beingness only because of its form. 
In the foregoing context, the four causes are conceived in 
much the same way as before. Only now, they will be treat-
ed not so much as principles of change, but rather, as 
principl~s of the idea's Being. One~ again, material, ef-
ficient and final causes will be absorbed in a study of the 
formal cause since it alone constitutes the primary in-
stance of Entity. It alone is the primary cause of the 
idea's Beingness. 
After these lengthy but necessary considerations of 
the relevance of the Idea and its quest for unity, some 
problems and critical literature pertinent to the scope of 
this analysis of the Idea, the Aristotelian schema to be 
employed and the reasons for its use, one more task remains 
in the chapter, namely, a summary statement of this study's 
purpose. Basically, its aim is to present an exposition of 
the argument of the Discourses and to interpret the argu-
ment in terms of an Aristotelian framework. Specifically, 
the study calls for an adaptation of Aristotelian equiv-
ocity by reference to these areas of the Idea: first, to 
its issues, grounds, theme, structure, and gentleman; sec-
ond, to the "connected view" as the cause or principle of 
. 
the change from unrelated disciplines to sciences grasped 
in a unified, interdisciplinary fashion; and third, to the 
"connected view" as that which gives Entity to the idea of 
a university. The object of this adaptation is to render 
the content of Newman's artistic statement on the nature 
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of university education more meaningful, his structure more 
intelligible, and his total presentation more unified. The 
means to this end is Joseph Owens' interpretation of Aris~ 
totle's Metaphysics. For i~ enables one to show the extent 
to which Aristotle's treatment of the unchangeable in 
changing sensible things, his efforts to reduce a plurality 
of forms to some type of unity, and the manner in which 
Aristotle's notions on equivocity, cause ~~d Entity can be 
employed to reduce Newman•s multiple treatment of scope, 
grounds, theme, and gentleman to some kind of unity, even 
while these notions enable one to see better what makes 
Newman's idea of a university to be what it is. 
Aristotle's treatment of equivocity by reference, 
cause, and Entity, as interpreted by Owens, also lends it-
self to a more effective analysis of the unifying view that 
forms the idea of a university, a totality that determines 
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the structure of its presentation)and an integrity that 
characterizes the living embodiment of Newman's ideal --
the natural man of philosophic habit whose potential r~ewman 
expands by means of a supernatural view. Again, J:Iewman' s 
approach to view is twofold in the Idea. In tern:s of Aris-
totelian equivocity by reference, the primary instance of 
the view advanced is that "connected view" or interdisci-
plinary grasp of all sciences by a man of intellectual cul-
ture in whom Faith and reason are allied, A man with such 
a view actively cultivates his mind, ~~d he even more ac-
tively pursues Christian perfection. His is a joint ven-
ture having natural and supernatural overtones. In the 
case of this primary instance of view, the nature of a 
Catholic university emerges as the primary university is-
sue, theological ~~d supernatural as the primary instance 
of grounds, and the Christia.Yl gentleman as the primary in-
stance of the university's human product. In the light of 
Aristotelian equivocity by reference, the secondary in-
stance of view advocated is that interdisciplinary ~rasp of 
the sciences held by a man of purely intellectual culture. 
In the context of this view, the nature of a university 
considered ·apart from the Church surfaces as Newman's sec-
ondary university issue, philosophical or natural lines of 
inquiry as the secondary instance of grounds, and the man 
of purely intellectual refinement as the secondary instance 
of Newman's gentleman. 
Newman's educational ideal encompasses spiritual as 
much as it does intellectual growth. It looks to the dev-
elopment of the whole man whose integrated view, according 
to its capacity, embraces all branches of knowledge with 
the philosophical habit serving as its system and Revela-
tion as its guide. Newman's ideal seeks out the mysteries 
of reality and the wisdom of the universe. It aims at the 
satisfaction of man's loftiest aspirations for truth and 
human perfection. But more than this, it purposes to lead 
him to the End of Truth or source of Perfection that gives 
all things their ultimate meaning and value. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE TYPE OF BUILDING: 
BASIC ISSUES IN NEWMAN'S PREFACE 
As I indicated in Chapter I, this study of the Idea 
addresses itself to a number of basic issues notable for 
the critical controversy they have aroused. Three of these 
questions Newman raises and tentatively answers in the Pre-
face. The first considers the nature of a catholic Univ-
ersity. A second deals with the nature of a university 
considered apart from any relation to the Church. The 
third concerns the nature of Newman's gentleman. As I also 
pointed out in the previous chapter, each issue has been 
subjected to critical investigation under such varied head-
ings as Newman•s alleged severance of intellect from vir-
tue, his conflicting presentation of religious and humanis-
tic elements, and his serious or ironic treatment of the 
gentleman. Earlier, I proposed that the major obstacle to 
ascertaining Newman's ultimate responses to various issues 
is his multiple treatment of the issues. Further, I sug-
gested that Newman speaks with two voices; and that, if 
Newman's manifold treatment of issues is to be reconciled, 
there will have to be found some unifying principle to ef-
fect a reconciliation. 
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In my review of critical literature on the Idea, I 
loo:{ed to a number of highly qualified commentators on j·~e·~v­
man's Catholic university and secular university issues and 
found an abundance of incisive commentary but no unifying 
key. As a result, I proposed one in the form of Aristot-
le's doctrine of equivocity by reference as interpreted by 
Joseph Owens. The purpose of this chapter will be to im-
plement that proposal in regard to the issues advanced in 
the Preface. I will do so, first, by an elaboration of the 
argument ~ewman supplies in response to the nature of a 
Catholic university and in response to the nature of a u-
niversity abstractly considered; and second, by an inter-
pretation of these issues and responses in terms of Aristo-
telian equivocity by reference. 
Using "issue" as a term equivocal by reference, I 
propose to unify in some measure ~iewman 's treatment of is-
sues in the Preface and to determine which issue is his 
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fundamental one. All of the issues discussed earlier as 
part of the scope of this study suggest a certain unity by 
reference to each other. These issues include: the nature 
of a Catholic university, the nature of a secular universi-
ty, the grounds of the inquiry, the nature of the "connected 
view," and the type of gentleman. All issues, except, of 
course, the primary one, also suggest a proportional refer-
ence of secondary issues to the primary one. In the con-
text of Aristotelian equi voci ty by reference, I~ewm.an ex-
presses the issues of the Idea in various ways but always 
in reference to one issue that is primary. Although the 
differences in the issues are restricted by some degree of 
sameness, i.e., that they are issues, yet the differences 
remain, and the true nature of the term "issue" is to be 
found only in the primary instance of issue. In this stud-
y, the nature of a Catholic university will be treated as 
the primary issue. The others will be viewed as issues on-
ly in reference to that question. Each secondary issue, 
including the two -- the nature of a secular university and 
the type of gentleman -- raised in the Preface, will be 
treated as having a special independent relation to the 
primary one. Each will be seen as dependent on the primary 
issue for its ultimate form and meaning as an issue in the 
Idea. Furthermore, each secondary issue will be viewed for 
its contribution to the fashioning of Newman's Catholic u-
niversity ideal. 
In dealing with "issue" as a term equivocal by ref-
erence, one must bear in mind that the relative importru1ce 
of issues does make a difference in understandin5 the Idea 
and Newman's formal educational ideal. He must be equally 
conscious of the order in which various issues are address-
ed. For the very meaning of one question may hinge on the 
resolution of another. For example, in order to understand 
secondary questions, like those of Newman's secular univer-
sity, grounds, "connected view," and gentleman, one must 
90 
91 
first address the question of the nature of a Catholic u-
niversity. Only in reference to that issue must all others 
be cor.sidered because only in reference to that question 
are all other issues of the Idea ultimately meaningful --
at least, in the context of the Aristoteli~~ scheme propos-
ed for this study. 
In general, John Henry Newman uses the Preface of 
the Idea to indicate the scope of the nine subsequent dis-
courses. Central to his definition of purpose is a state-
ment of the question and delineation of subordinate issues. 
The question of what is a gentleman, which will generate a 
later issue of whether Newman's idea, as it is formulated 
in Discourse VIII, is a serious expression or not, is part 
of another issue of just what is the nature of a universi-
ty.1 That question, in turn, is part of a still larger is-
sue of what constitutes a Catholic university. This latter 
appears to be the foundational issue Hewman elaborates by 
means of the two foregoing subordinate ones. 
"The view taken of a university in these Discour-
ses," he begins his Preface, "is the following: That it is 
1As I indicated earlier, although Harrold, Dessain, 
Vargish et al. take Newman's definition of a gentleman in 
DiscourseVIII as a serious expression, Culler, lv'IcGrath, 
and others advance an ironic or derogatory interpretation, 
which appears the more current and popular one. However, 
John R. Griffin's "In Defense of Newman's ':;entleman'", 
(Dub?., 1965) is corrective of Culler a..'1.d i:1'lcGrath. 
a place of teaching universal knowledge." 2 In the second 
paragraph, ~~ewman adds, 
such is a university in its essence, and inde-
pendently of its relation to the Church. 3ut X 
practically speakins, it ca.n...v;.ot fulfill its 
object duly, such as I have described it, with-
out the Church's assistance; or to use the theo-
logical term, the Church is necessary for its 
integrity.J 
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havinG touched upon those two root concerns, he pro-
ceeds, two paragraphs later: 
••• some persons may be tempted to complain, that 
I have servilely followed the English idea of a 
university ••• and they may anticipate that an aca-
demical system, formed upon my model, will result 
in nothing better or hiGher than in the produc-
tion of that antiquated variety of huma11. nature 
and remnant of feudal~sm, as they consider it, 
called 'a gentleman.' 
A few paragraphs later, Newman goeq on, 
Heturning, then to the consideration of the 
question ••• thus much I think I have made ,500d, /-:--'" 
-- that, whether o: no a ?atholic University (:£ 
should put before 1t, as lts gre~t object, to 
make its students 'gentlemen, ' still to make them 
something or other is its great object, and not 
simply to protect the interests and advance the 
dominion of science.5 
It is in these four statements, drawn from the Pre-
face to the nine discourses, that ;:,iewman Lnrr.ediately i.:1tro-
duces what I consider to be three of the major issues with 
2
rctea of a University, p. 5· 
3-· . d lOl • 
4, "d I Ol • J PP• 5-6. 
5--b" d d:...2:__. J p. 8. 
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which he will concern himself in The Idea of a University. 
The first asks what is the nature of a university consider-
ed apart from the Church. The second questions what is the 
nature of a university of which the Church is an essential 
part. 'rhe third inquires what is the nature of the human 
product of a university. Then, the question arises con-
cerning what order of priority one ought to assign these 
issues, a question I will approach in terms of Aristotelian 
equivocity by reference. 
Although Newman deals initially with the nature of a 
secular university or the natural form of a university, I 
submit that his ultimate concern is the nature of a Roman 
Catholic University. That was his original charge -- the 
founding of a Catholic University. Was that not the pur-
pose "contemplated by the Holy See in recommending just now 
to the Irish Hierarchy the establishment of a Catholic u-
niversity," he reminds us, early in the Preface. 6 When the 
Supreme Pontiff advocates the establishment of a universi-
ty, it is in the "interests of Revealed Truth'' and "for the 
sake of Religion."? I don't think it too wide of the mark 
to say that Newman can be considered, regarding his ulti-
mate purpose, one with the Pope in rejoicing "in the widest 
and most philosophical systems of intellectual education, 
6Ibid., p. 6. 
?Ibid. 
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from an in.timate conviction that Truth is his rea.l ally ..... 
and .ln. af£'.irminz t:!J.at "?.nowledge and .~eason are sure :TJin-
isters to Faith. ,.S :.:oreover, if it becor:~es the 3uccessor 
of the Apostles to ali.;n himself with st. Pa'.ll in sa~rinc;, 
":ron judicavi me scire aliquid inter vos, nisi Jesum 
Christum, et hunc crucifixum,"9 so docs it become John 
;:enry ~~ev>I!-:J.an, as a worthy an<i devoted son of the Church, to 
make the Figure and purpose of the Cross his ultimate con-
cern in founding a Church university. ~oreover, if the 
Church founds a university 
for the sake of her children, with a view to 
their spiritual welfare and their religious 
influence and usefulness, with the object of 
training them to fill their respective posts in 
life better, and of makin6 them morrointelli6ent, 
capable, active members of society, 
does it not befit Newman, as the instrument of the Vicar of 
Christ a~d the Irish ~piscopate, to establish a university 
in Ireland with a similar purpose? 
Just as he gives abundant evidence, in the dis-
courses, of his preoccupation with the ch<?.r;~e of the Eoly 
3ee and the Irish Hierarchy, so too does :,~evlffian provide 
early indication of the start of his concern with the na-
ture of a Catholic university when h~ speaks, in the Pre-
8r· · d D~ • 
10_, . d ~· 
face, of the university's need for the Church's "assist-
ance," when he questions whether the object of such an in-
stitution ought merely to be an "English Gentleman," when 
he wonders "whether or no a Catholic University should put 
before it, as its great object" to develop something more, 
but especially, when he speaks of the university's need of 
the Church to maintain its integrity. 11 After all, should 
the student of a Catholic university be exposed to a "cul-
tivation of mind" unequal to that of his Protestant coun-
terpart?12 
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Apart from the witness of the Preface itself, Cardi-
nal Newman's lifetime devotion to the cause of Revealed .rte-
ligion, the vital and life-unifying force of his personal 
beliefs, an awful awareness of God's Presence within him-
self, his profound sense of the immediacy of the Church, 
and his sensitivity to the urgent wishes of the Soveris~ 
Pontiff leave little room to doubt the nature of Hewma.'Yl' s 
11Ibid., p. 5. 
12rt is worth noting that Newman's quarrel is not 
with Protestant education so much as it is with secular 
non-Christian education. The alternative to Catholic edu-
cation is not Protestant education but purely secular edu-
cation which has at its core a philosophical knowledge that 
sees the relationship of science and all earthly things as 
subject to man. The point of view here would be natural 
and philosophical. Newman contrasts this worldly type with 
Christian education that provides for transcendent superna-
tural goals and Christian perfection. This latter type 
makes rna.~, science, and all of reality subject to God. 
ultimate educational interest. 13 When the foregoing con-
siderations underscore so heavily the primacy of his con-
cern with spiritual matters, why should it be otherwise in 
his case for the nature of a Catholic university? I say 
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this notwithstanding the fact that the view he assumes most 
. 
immediately is that of the university as a place for "uni-
versal knowledge." 
In incidental reference to the role of the Church in 
Newman's idea of a university -- the fact that fundamental-
ly and ultimately Newman's idea is spiritually oriented 
there comes to mind a statement ascribed to Dr. Whately in 
the biography published by his daughter in 1866. Although, 
contextually, Whately is addressing himself to the problem 
·of "mixed education," his charge might be regarded as not 
untypical of a perennial criticism levelled at Roman Cath-
olic education. Dr. Whately states, "The principle on 
which that Church is constructed, the duty of uninquiring 
unreasoning submission to its authority, renders any doubt 
fatal." 14 How can any man, he goes on to ask, survive in a 
Church "which claims the right to think for him?"l5 How 
13see Dessain, pp. Xll, 20, 2~ and 50 for a rather 
extensive treatment of the impact of Revealed Religion and 
God's Presence upon Newman's life. 
14 Jane iJhately, Life and correspondence of Richard 
Whately, D.D. 2 vols., (London, 1866), 11, p. 244. 
l5Ibid. 
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can a person, he further demands to know, "who is commanded 
not to think for himself" not ultimately disassociate him-
self from such a communion? Cardinal Newman"s whole educa-
tional philosophy, especially his ideas on the nature of a 
catholic university, provides some ready answers to the ob-
jections made by this prominent former friend and associate 
of Newman at Oxford, for the letter and spirit of his edu-
cational ideal run distinctively counter to the core of 
Whately's contentions. 
The Preface to Newman's Idea tentatively recognizes, 
and the subsequent discourses readily approve, the tradi-
tional Catholic philosophy of education, in which intellec-
tual and religious instruction are allied, science and re-
ligion interrelated. Newman never doubts the necessity for 
moral development in the whole education of man. Again and 
again he shows the need for an omnipresent spirit of reli-
gion in university matters. Newman doubts not at all that 
a university's purpose is to infuse a religious spirit. 
This was always his position, both as an Anglican and Roman 
Catholic. In a report giving early expression to his idea 
of a university, Newman statesa 
All academic instruction must be in harmony 
with the Principles of the Catholic Religion, 
the Professors will be bound, not only not to 
teach anything contrary to religion, but to 
take advantage of the occasion the subjects they 
treat may offer, to point out that religion 
is the basis of Science, and to inculcate the 
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love of Religion and its duties.16 
Newman's view of a Catholic University, or of a 
catholic education if you will, is fundamentally a spiritu-
al one, but in no way is it "uninquiring" or "unreason-
ing." Neither would Newman have the educational view of 
his Catholic University students be unthinking. On the 
contrary, it should be pointed out, in the words of C. F. 
Harrold, that Newman's "whole career, both as an Anglican 
and Roman Catholic, was devoted ••• to rendering institution-
al Christianity acceptable to the critical and historical 
sense of nineteenth -century man ... l7 Furthermore, Harrold 
is no doubt accurate in saying that Newman's efforts cen-
tered on a "rational and imaginative justification of ex-
isting orthodox Christianity for educated men and for their 
responsible leaders."18 
If, on the one hand, a desire for order and system, 
a deference toward authority, and a reverence for tradition 
so markedly distinguish his career, so, on the other, does 
a profound respect for intellectual boldness, dialectical 
skill, and solid reasoning characterize an organic part of 
16Quoted in McGrath, p. 118, from the Irish Report 
which, among other things, gave to the professors involved 
a definite status, along with certain legislative and ad-
ministrative powers. 
17Harrold, p. 2. 
18Ibid., p. 54. 
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his practical efforts. While Calvary is the source and ul-
timate end of Newman•s religious and intellectual views, he 
sees man•s testimony to those central facts not restricted 
to eternal efforts, but also extended to temporal ones. 
consequently, Newman voices his concern over the inferior 
standards of Catholic education. As Dessain aptly points 
out, Newman 
wanted Catholics to come out of the ghetto 
and take their place in the world, to adapt 
themselves, to enlarge their minds in the con-
fidence that truth could never contradict 
truth, and to be guided like responsible men 
by their duly enlightened consciences •••• 19 
The Preface reinforces the notion that Newman seeks the 
widest possible intellectual culture, not an intellectual 
isolation that is culturally stagnant. In that context, 
"cultivation of mind," "culture of the intellect," and a 
"connected view or grasp of things" are important watch-
words. 
Furthermore, in reference to Newman•s idea of a 
Catholic university, still another possible criticism comes 
to mind, ru1 objection which, like the previous one of 
Whately, I raise in view of my claim for the importance of 
the Catholic university issue. In Newman's preoccupation 
with the nature of a Catholic university, with its stress 
on the role of the Church, as initially proposed in the 
Preface to the Idea and later developed in its discourses, 
19nessain, p. 168. 
some critics may see contradictory or irreconcilable ele-
ments. For, in the very first paragraph of the Preface, 
cardinal Newman states that a university is a place for 
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teaching "universal knowledge." In the discourses follow-
ing, Newman provides extensively for theology and argues 
against its exclusion. But should he not argue as well, 
critics may claim, for the inclusion of other theologies, 
and not just that of the Roman Catholic Church? They may 
also demand to know how Newman's stress on the natural 
scope of a university is to be reconciled with his superna-
tural or spiritual concern for its foundation. Is there 
not more than ambivalence at stake in the statement and de-
lineation of issues? Might there not even be a certain 
measure of incompatibility in his claims for dogmatic, the-
ological teaching and liberal education?20 
It would be easy enough to respond simply that New-
man believes the Roman Catholic Church to be the repository 
of Revealed Truth, with the charge of conserving and inter-
preting that truth. According to that charge, the Gospel 
would be, in the words of Newman, "no mere philosophy 
thrown upon the world at large, no mere quality of mind and 
thought, no mere beautiful and deep sentiment or subjective 
20T. Corcoran maintains, in effect, that the Idea's 
religious and secular university goals are irreconcilable. 
Culler sees an ambivalence in Newman's presentation of hu-
manistic and religious ideals. Dale eliminates the human-
istic possibilities altogether. See above pp. 21-24. 
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Jp~nion, but a substa~tive massa~e from above, ~uarded and 
preserved in a visible polity." 21 Accordingly, "to the 
::;hurch has been entrusted this revealed message and ti:e aw-
ful respo~sibility of carryi~g it to the whole world as a 
,":'!a tter of Faith. 3u t this Faith, :~ evvrnan would add, re-
quires system, doctrine, propositions -- a corpus of thea-
lo~ical truth. It is this theological system that would 
;ive unity and coherence to all knowledge in lie;ht of an 
11ltimate purpose. In view of this response, it would no"t 
at all be surprising that ;·;evrman assign the Church a certain 
p:::-eeminence and its theology a proportionately more signi-
ficant status in the composition of his university. 3ut 
tf.is response would probably strike these same critics as 
too facile. 
If so, then one could reply to their contention in 
ter:ns of one or two practical considerations. In the Idea, 
Cardinal Sewman is addressin.s himself primarily to Catha-
lies, though his call certainly does not preclude appeal to 
those of other communions. he wants an intelligent, well-
educated laity, and clergy for that matter, who can exert a 
proper influence on their Church and society. He desires 
them to maintain their spiritual integrity in an age marked 
by secularistic, specialized, and naturalistic interests. 
2or this reason, i:fe·,vman says, "I want the intellectual lay-
ties 
21 Quoted in Dessain, p. 142, from Certain Jifficul-
Felt by Anglicans in Catholic Teaching. 
~an to be reli~ious and the devout ecclesiastic to be in-
?2 tellectual."-
In addition to the matter of audience, there comes 
to mind a second practical response. i\ewman has been 
charzed with the founding of a Catholic university by the 
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?ope and the Irish Eierarchy. In the spirit and letter of 
that delegation the Holy Father does, in a ?apal Brief, ex-
!10rt the Irish Bishops, and Newman indirectly, to take any 
measures necessary to insure the founding of a university 
deserving of its Roman Catholic designation. 23 In much tr.e 
same vein, the early Irish ~piscopal advocates of the Cath-
olic university, in their .Address to the People of Ireland, 
also propose "to provide for the Catholic youth of Ireland 
education of a high order, every way commensurate with the 
. t 11 .1. l .l. f t' t. u 24 1n· e_ ec t..Ua wan t..S o ne 1me •••• These practical mat-
ters would appear to supply some justification for l\e'<lrl1an 's 
emphasis on the Catholic Church and its theology in his u-
niversity scheme, if one chose to use them. 
~'iotwi thstanding these considerations, it is possible 
that our concern here ought not to be dispute over whether 
~,;ev..man is ri:ght or wron~ in assigning some priority to Ro-
22
r t d b ·~ '' +. ~uo e y ~cura~n, p. 
?reached on Various Occasions. 
2 3r . d 
.:...2.k.. J p. 27 J . 
277, n. 1, from Sermons 
24 Quoted by ~cGrath, p. 100. 
lOJ 
::1an ,_;atholic theolo;;;y, but rather, to determine whether he, 
in fact, does so; and if he does, 1vhat is the nature an.d 
extent of the l)riori ty. Father Jessain asserts that :;evrman 
"claL-:1ed a l)lace for theolo.::;y in education on general 
c;rounds, without introducin£; pleadinJ;S that ap:plied to any 
+. 1 , .. "25 nar~1cu ar re~1~1on. :-rewma.."'l. appears to bear out Jessain 
·Nl-:.en he states, in a later discourse: ".3ut I have been in-
. 1 ., t , "' 1 ~ " 26 Slmp yon ~aura~ ~neo o6 y ••• , also v1hen he 
~')ro.fesses, in a letter to R. Ornsby, the.t "I am .;oing to 
treat t:1e whole subject not on the assu.:nption of :;atholi-
cism, but in e. way of reasoning, and as men of all reli-
rr; 
"') ·. II .r:::: I 
\ __ \ .· . 
In spite of 0essain's assertion and Newman's dis-
claimer en the preeminent role of the Church and its theo-
logy, it would appear that the Preface a."ld . .:.Jiscourses d.o 
)oint up their importance in :~ewman's thou.:,):-';. ~;ow, al-
tl;.ou.;;h the matter of their relative im.portance can be clar-
lfied by mea:1s of a real and lo~gical distinction, there is 
a.nother interpretation that may prove rnore useful. T!:.is 
explanation concerns itself v1i th a proper understa:ndins of 
t!Je particular point of view regardin.;; issues .·:ewrnan as-
sumes at spscified times in the Idea. :t is to a closer 
25- . .:..iessa~n, p. lOJ. 
26
rctea of a Gniversity, P• 71. 
27~uoted by ~cGrath, p. 142. 
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examination of these views in the Preface that I would now 
return for a substantiation of my contention that i:~ewman' s 
ultimate issue is, in fact, his idea of a Catholic univer-
sity and not merely his idea of a university. For, if the 
former question is foundational, one must show how it can 
be reconciled with the view or notion of a "university in 
its bare and necessary idea" 28 which would exclude "the as-
sumption of Catholicism"29 and insist on a "Natural Theola-
" d h" h ld fl b t t . . t" JO gy, an w ~c wou re ect an a s rae ~nvest~ga ~on 
with its focus on "universal knowledge," an emphasis evi-
dent from the initial paragraph of the Preface. 
I believe that the objection of possibly contradic-
tory or irreconcilable elements in Newman's concept of a 
Catholic university, the claim of a possible conflict be-
tween his natural and supernatural objectives in the estab-
lishment of a university, and the fundamental relationship 
of two cardinal issues can be handled effectively by an ex-
amination of what constitutes Newman's primary and secon-
dary issues, with "issue" being used as a term equivocal by 
reference. This examination will lead, I might add, into 
my treatment of the second major issue Newman proposes in 
28 Quoted by McGrath, p. 172. 
1852. 
29From Newman's letter to Ornsby dated April 14, 
JOidea of a University, p. 6. 
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the Preface -- the nature of a university considered in its 
"essence" or natural fonn. 
In his profound concern with scope, Newman points 
out, midway through the Preface, that 
when the Church founds a University, she is 
not cherishing talent, genius, or knowledge, 
for their own sake, but for the sake of her 
children, with a view to their spiritual wel-
fare and their religious influence and use-
fulness •••• ) 
That statement is of no little importance because it helps 
one ascertain the priority of Newman's issues. It clari-
fies the relationship between a Catholic university and a 
university in the abstract. It points to a complexity of 
·sameness in difference in Newman's treatment of the nature 
of a Catholic university and the nature of a secular univ-
ersity as issues. It also provides a fairly clear response 
to the question whether Newman*s fundamental concern is a 
secular university that with its liberal education makes 
all things subject to man or a Catholic university which 
with its supernatural orientation makes man and all things 
subject to God. The priority of issues is important be-
cause the issue that prevails here may very well determine 
the primary grounds Newman will employ, the dominant "con-
nected view" he will advocate, and the preeminent human u-
niversity product he will advance. If Newman's fundamental 
issue is the nature of a Catholic university, then his 
)libid., p. 7• 
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grounds will more than likely be theological, his view, a 
supernaturally connected grasp, and his gentleman, a Chris-
tian one. If, on the other hand, Newman's primary issue is 
the nature of a secular university, then his grounds of in-
quiry will more likely be philosophical, his "connected 
view," temporal, and his gentleman, worldly. The quotation 
cited helps support the position that Newman's fundamental 
concern is the nature of a Catholic university, a universi-
ty concerned with its students' intellectual and spiritual 
welfare. In accord with the Church, Newman considers the 
university as a place for the advancement of one's Faith 
and the fostering of one's virtue, no less than the culti-
vation of one's mind. It is in line with this concern that 
I propose the question of the nature of a Catholic univer-
sity as Newman's primary instance of issue and the question 
of the nature of a university abstractly considered as a 
secondary instance of issue. I do so using "issue" as a 
term equivocal by reference. 
In the case of Aristotelian doctrine, as formulated 
by Owens, the secondary instances of things said to be e-
quivocal have their true nature or form only in reference 
t th . . t 32 d. 1 . h. . o _e pr1mary 1ns ance. Accor 1ng y, 1n t 1s lnterpre-
tation of Newman's issues, a secondary instance of issue, 
the nature of a university, is denominated "issue., only to 
32That is, they are in a certain way expressed 
according to one form. Owens, p. 121. 
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the extent that it relates to the primary instance. The 
form or nature of the primary instance makes Newman's univ-
ersity issue to be what it really is. It gives ~ntity, if 
you will. The nature of a Catholic university is the pri-
mary instance of what the nature of Newman's inquiry is all 
. 
about. It reflects a primary instance of issue, from which 
other issues derive their form. The nature of a Catholic 
university is that which distinguishes Newman's fundamental 
question from ru1y other issues raised. This question con-
cerns the nature of a university in which both temporal and 
eternal matters count rather than one in which merely tern-
poral affairs are of paramount importa~ce. 
Then, depending on the viewpoint of issues he as-
sumes, Newman can speak variously on the nature of a univ-
ersity, without doing a disservice to the issues or subject 
matter. Thus, in one breath, he is able to speak of the 
university as a place for "universal knowledge," of a "u-
niversity in its bare and necessary idea," or of a univer-
sity in the abstract that disclaims "the assumption of 
Catholicism." For the same reason, Newman can, in the next 
breath, address himself in the Preface, to the university's 
"practical need for the Church's assistance, .. 33 and else-
where, maintain that "Christianity and nothing short of it 
33Idea of a University, p. 5. 
must be made the element and principle of education ... J4 
Thus is he also able to say at the end of the Preface: 
At least it is a matter of deep solicitude to 
Catholic Prelates that their people should be 
taugh~ a wisdom, safe from the excesses and 
vagar1es of individuals, embodied in institu~ 
tions which have stood the trial and received 
the sanction of ages, and administered by men 
who have no need to be anonymous, as being 
supported by their consistency with their pre-
decessors and with each other.J5 
~eedless to say, it is a matter of deep solicitude for 
Cardinal Newman as well. 
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The foregoing treatment of the first issue, with its 
emphasis on the fundamental role of the Catholic Church and 
its relation to the secondary issue viewed equivocall~ is 
not intended in any way to downgrade the importance of the 
secondary issue -- the nature of a university considered 
apart from its relation to the Church. Nor is it meant to 
deemphasize the concern for liberal education that Newman 
displays. It purposes only to place a secondary issue and 
Newman's view of it in due relationship with what I regard 
as the ultimate issue and primary instance of Newman's 
treatment of issues. 
The secondary issue, the nature of a university ab-
stractly considered, cannot be lightly dismissed because 
34Quoted by McGrath p. 
ing Room. 
279, from The Tamworth Read-
J5Idea of a University, p. 15. 
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its importance is readily apparent in the implementation of 
Newman's educational plan and ultimate resolve. In Dis-
courses I-V, Newman maintains, in large measure, his avowed 
purpose of treating his subject from a philosophical stand-
point and of concerning himself with a "university in its 
essence, and independently of its relation to the Church." 
Moreover, it is to the nature of a university abstractly 
considered that Newman devotes a significant measure of his 
efforts even in the Preface. In the Preface and subsequent 
discourses, this secondary instance of issue has its own 
proper form, nature and importance, even though as an issue 
its ultimate significance derives from the primary instance 
of issue. The nature of a university considered apart from 
the Church looks to a "discipline and refinement of intel-
lect,"36 a "cultivation of mind,"37 or a ''culture of the 
intellect"38 that alone characterizes the goals of a univ-
ersity whose scope is purely natural. It is to this same 
end that Newman speaks when he says that the qualities 
sought are "the force, the steadiness, the comprehensive-
ness and the versatility of intellect, the command over our 
own powers, the instinctive just estimate of things as they 
36Ibid., p. 9. 
37Ibid., p. 10. 
3Bibid. 
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S "e+-ore 11, "39 ~as ~ ~· ~ •••• For :\ ew:nan, cul ti vati on of that ob-
jective would start early with the ''first step in intellec-
tual trainir:g [oeins] to imlJress upon a boy's mind the idea 
of science, method, order, principle, and system; of rule 
d t . f . h d ' .,40 an excep 10n, o r1c .. ncss an narmony. Then ~iewman 
adds: 
Let him once gain this habit of method, of 
starting from fixed points, of making his 
::;round good as he goes, of distin5-uishing what 
he knows from what he does not know, and I 
conceive he will be gradually initiated into , 
the largest and truest philosophical views .... 4 1 
Cardinal Newman's treatment of the primary issue, as 
I tentatively interpret its presentation in the Preface, is 
certainly consonant with orthodox and traditional Church 
concerns that emphasize an allia..'1ce of literary and reli-
~ious instruction and a unification of knowled~e and reli-
~ion with appropriate stress on moral improvement. It 
should be noted, however, that the view advocated in his 
treatment of the primary issue is far more intellectually 
comprehensive than the rather narrow, ecclesiastical, or 
lay perspective of some contemporaries who, in their over-
zealous regard for authoritarian demands, would tolerate no 
criticism from within or without the Church. }:is view on 
39Ibid. 
"0 
"1" Ibid., p. 12. 
41~, . d 
.d:..Q.L_ • , p • 1J . 
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the nature of a Catholic university is in no way that of 
so~e contemporaries who could not suppress their apprehen-
sian regarding any intellectual research or scientific in-
quiry, however loyal, docile, and reverent the spirit in 
which it is conducted. ~e\~an's notions on the nature of 
a university that combines intellectual and spiritual cul-
tivation admit to no confusion of misguided personal feel-
ing with traditional Church Doctrine. his is not an over-
riJins concern that the authority of the Church will be 
disputed, much less lost in a world of rapidly changing 
values, by the bonafide intellectual endeavors of its de-
voted sons. 
3ewman fears, rather, the intellectual apathy of 
the Catholic with no views at all, "the mere hereditary 
Christian, who has never realized the truths which he 
" ld ,42 no s •••• For if, according to :~ewman, even fallacious 
views consistently held are much more influential and in-
spirational than no views at all, 43 how much more respect-
able ought that view which reflects a solid, intellectual 
6rasp of the proper relation of things from a natural 
standpoint to be considered. Further, if even a purely 
philosophical point of view is so commendable, even ~reater 
benefits will derive fro~ a rational view that has Revela-
42.,.b.d ~·· p. 12. 
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tion as its guide, for then, that view will truly reflect 
"a wisdom safe from the excesses and vagaries of individu-
als, embodied in institutions which have stood the trial 
d . d th t" f u44 an rece~ve e sane ~on o ages •••• In the former and 
latter statements I see a rationale for the two views ad-
vacated in relation to the nature of a Catholic university 
and in relation to the nature of a university considered 
apart from the Church. The view expounded in the framework 
of a Catholic university reflects a primary, formal in-
stance of "connected view" that looks to the "relative dis-
position" of things in this life and the next. As the 
view advanced in the context of the nature of a Catholic 
university, it will take precedence over the secondary in-
stance of "connected view" advocated in reference to the 
nature of a university considered independent of the 
Church. This view, of course, would look more to the "rel-
ative disposition of things" in this world. Both views 
will be dealt with extensively in subsequent chapters. 45 
The third issue Newman raises and tentatively answers 
in the Pre:face concerns the relation of the university 
and the Church to the nature of a gentleman. Although the 
question will be treated in a later chapter of this study, 
with special attention being devoted to whether Newman's 
44Ibid., p. 15. 
45 See Chs. IV, VI, and VII of this study. 
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definition of a gentleman in Discourse VIII is a serious or 
. . 
46 
. t . t . t h ironJ.c expressJ.on, J. J.s necessary o poJ.n out, .ere, 
that Newman's idea of a gentleman is an issue closely al-
lied with the two issues treated thus far, and the primary 
and secondary instances of the "connected view" touched on. 
Tentatively and from a natural, philosophical view of the 
nature of a university, Newman calls for a man whose culti-
vated intellect and considered view set him apart from his 
fellows, for he speaks as one who knows what he is talking 
about. 47 From the more supernatural view of the nature of 
a Catholic university, Newman wants to produce a university 
man with a more comprehensive view that includes eternal 
matters. It is in light of this latter view that Newman so 
. 
admires St. Philip Neri and will offer him as a model for 
Catholic university students whom he desires to make not 
merely gentlemen, but Christian gentlemen with .an integrat-
ed intellectual and spiritual grasp of this life and the 
next. 
If, thus far, my presentation of the issues Newman 
has raised in the Preface and of the tentative answers he 
has proposed therein appears disproportionately to concern 
itself with the primary issue, it does so only because the 
secondary issues raised in the Preface appear ultimately 
46 See Ch. VII of this study. 
47Idea of a University, p. 11. 
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3icnifica~t only in referenc~ to the prim~ry one. ~gain, 
it i3 r:ot :::.~r pur_::>ose to ne::;ate tr;:? im.._Jortance of tLese sec-
a:f !:.is ~fforts a.ni to which an Ln:;;:ortant part of the philo-
so:)hical an.alysis of tf:.e l)resent study will be dedicated. 
~ut so~e 9osltion on the relationship and priority of these 
issL~es has to be established before these same issues or 
some additional questions, like those of ~rounds, theme, 
and structure, ca.l"l be addressed. 
CHAPTER III 
THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL 
GROUNDBREAKING IN DISCOURSE I 
As an educator, philosopher, and theologian, John 
Henry Newman evolved, and the task of charting his develop-
ment in philosophy and theology, much less his progress as 
a critic and commentator on education, is not an easy one. 1 
The philosophical and theological principles that surface 
in The Idea of a University lend themselves to no simple 
explanation. Neither do these principles, as they underlie 
his statement of issues in the Preface or Discourse I, 
adapt themselves to any simple clarification. No individu-
al works embody Newman's philosophical and theological man-
ifestoes. Neither does any single work capture his doc-
trine on university education, although the Idea does come 
1In Victorian Prose, p. 166, Charles Stephen Dessain 
points out that "the best way to understand Newman's phil-
osophy and theology is to read and reread his own writings." 
A. Dwight Culler reminds us, in The Imperial Intellect, p. 
xii, that the general biographies of Newman too often focus 
on the development of Newman's religious opinions from too 
restricted a viewpoint, namely, the content of the Tracta-
rian movement and the proximity of his thought to Rome. 
Culler adds that a number of significant influences, like 
the five illnesses of his youth and early maturity, have 
not been adequately explained. 
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close. 2 Newman has, however, produced an awesome array of 
books, sermons, letters, notebooks, journals, and manu-
scripts.J To some of these and to some solid, critical ex-
positions and studies of them, 4 the student of Newman can 
advert for help in tracing the genesis of the philosophical 
and theological ideas that serve as a foundation for the 
superstructure of his educational theory and practice. To 
the foregoing he can also turn for background material 
helpful for an understanding of the basic issues as they 
are formulated and developed in the Idea. 
2Although, again, the best way to determine Newman's 
thinking on education is to consider his own words on the 
subject, and though there is no better statement of his po-
sition than in the Idea, F. McGrath, in Newman's Universi-
tys Idea and Reality, p. 281, issues the warning that 
"Newman's complete teaching is not to be found in one work 
alone." He observes, a page afterward, that for a compre-
hensive view of Newman's definition of a university, one 
must study the appendix to the first edition of the Idea, 
along with materials Newman describes as "illustrations of 
the Idea of a University," which he contributed to the 
University Gazette in 1854. 
)Typical sources would include: "Intellect the In-
strument of Religious Training," Sermons Preached on Vari-
ous Occasions (London, 1870); Letters and Corres ondence of 
John Henry Newman, ed. Anne Mozley, 2 vols. London, 1891 ; 
Historical Sketches (London, 1872-73), III; Loss and Gain 
6th ed. (London, 1874); "Faith and Reason Contrasted As 
Habits of Mind," Sermons Preached Before The Universit of 
Oxford (London, 1843 ; Lectures on the Present Position of 
Catholics in England 2d ed. (London, 1851); MY Campaign in 
Ireland, ed. w. Neville (London, 1896). 
4 The texts of Culler, Dessain, Harrold, and McGrath, 
already cited in this study, provide good examples. To all 
four this writer is much indebted for information and in-
spiration. 
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Some investigation of these materials suggests the 
tentative view of a man who unites the offices of student, 
teacher, and educational theorist to an unusual degree and 
a man who sees both teacher and student as seekers of a 
truth whose ultimate value lies in its power to improve the 
. 
temporal, intellectual lot and the eternal, spiritual pros-
pect of educated men. Faith and reason are allied in this 
joint venture. Both work to make men better understand the 
relative disposition of different areas of knowledge and 
serve to bind men in the strength of an intellectual frater-
nity and in the humility of a spiritual kinship as sons of 
God. Newman sees the need on the part of university educa-
tion to realistically portray and appraise the value of this 
intelleetual brotherhood and spiritual bond, as they relate 
to mankind's basic desire for intellectual and moral better-
ment in this world and in the next. In Newman's judgment, 
educated men should purpose to treasure Faith, their spirit-
ual legacy, primarily, and to value reason as a precious 
natural tool, but not to the extent that it jeopardizes the 
supernaturally preeminent position of Faith. For Newman, 
the educated Catholic's primary criterion should be fideli-
ty to the Church and its theology because they reflect the 
wisdom and historical continuity of eighteen hundred years 
of Providentially guided experience. His secondary test 
ought to be the utility of any philosophical system that 
aids him in the pursuit of truth and holiness. Discourse I 
of the ~. in some measure, bears out these assertions. 
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This chapter will not attempt any complete summation 
or appraisal of Newman's philosophical and theological 
ideas, however important they may be in their impact on his 
educational theory and practice. Rather, its purpose is to 
state the argument of the discourse and to relate its mate-
rial on the nature of the university Newman proposes and 
the grounds he will employ to the framework of an Aristo-
telian analysis. The scope of Newman"s university and the 
grounds of the inquiry will be interpreted in terms of 
Aristotelian equivocity by reference with a view to recon-
ciling Newman's multiple treatment of them. The argument 
of the discourse provides for the history of the question 
proposed in the Preface. It traces two germinal questions 
that emerge from that question's immediate historical elab-
oration. It offers a rationale for an ultimate answer, and 
it touches on the historical validity Newman cites for his 
appraisal. Finally, the argument points to the ultimate 
authority upon which Newman draws. To the extent that they 
affect Newman's position in his development of the forego-
ing matters or that they play a role in the educational 
thought reflected in the discourse, some early and forma-
tive educational influences will be brought out. · In rela-
tion to this study, the central question of the discourse 
is whether Newman•s primary concern is the nature of a 
Catholic university pursued on theological and supernatural 
grounds or the nature of a university in the abstract 
sought along purely philosophical lines. 
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Although this introductory discourse might profita-
blY be studied as one whose rhetorical function serves to 
win the sympathy of Newman's audience,5 it may also be 
viewed as one rich in the thematic and structural implica-
tions it generates for the other discourses. Most impor-
tantly, it is one profound for the light it sheds on what 
is Newman's fundamental issue in the Idea and what are the 
primary grounds of his inquiry. 
Newman beginsa 
In addressing myself, Gentlemen, to the considera-
tion of a question which has excited so much 
interest, and elicited so much discussion at the 
present day, as that of University Education, I 
feel some explanation is due from me for supposing, 
after such high ability and wide experience have 
been brought to bear upon it, that any field re-
mains for the additional labours either of a dis-
putant or of an inquirer.6 
5see M. J. Svaglic's introduction to his edition of 
Newman's Idea of a University, p. xvi. 
6Idea of a University, p. 19. It is worth noting 
that in this statement of the question Newman alters his 
focus somewhat from the nature of a university to the nature 
of a university education. The questions appear closely 
enough related in Newman•s mind that he can move comforta-
bly from one in the Preface to the other in Discourse I 
without doing a disservice to either question. Because New-
man•s concern is the foundation of a Catholic university in 
Dublin and the publication of a fairly complete educational 
manifesto to guide in its foundation, it appears reasonable 
that he make the nature of the university proposed a key is-
sue. So long as one understands the end or idea of a uni-
versity to be that liberal or philosophical knowledge which 
consists in an awareness of the bearing of one science on 
the other by which the "whole" can be perceived, he should 
be allowed some flexibility in treating this interdiscipli-
nary grasp and the place in which it is advocated. 
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Not uncharacteristically, Newman draws his attention, and 
ours, to the issue raised in the Preface. He is attracted 
not merely by a question that affects the implementation of 
his plan to found a university, but also, by an issue that 
has concerned him from his Oxford days, namely, the nature 
of a university education. Apart from the fact that his 
question skirts a controversy surrounding Oxford, it also 
leads directly to the nature of a university he will found 
and to a c0nsideration of the ideational structure he will 
shortly be developing. But now, the position to be advanced 
will no longer be that of another, a Copleston or a Davison, 
so much as, in 121£, that of John Henry Newman. 7 
Having reiterated the question, Newman voices his 
concern over the principles of the inquirya 
If, nevertheless, I still venture to ask permission 
to continue the discussion, already so protracted, 
it is because the subject of Liberal Education, and 
of the principles on which it must be conducted, 
has ever had a hold upon my own mind.8 
In these words, the question of the nature of a university 
remains the same, but the more specific issue of the nature 
of a university education is laid bare. Newman considers, 
?Harrold, John Henry Newman, p. 105 and n. 11, p. 
398. Harrold singles out the influence of Edward Copleston 
and John Davison upon Newman's treatment of secular and re-
ligious education as distinct disciplines. For Copleston•s 
and Davison's impact on Newman's position regarding utility 
and specialization in a university, see Culler, pp. 220-222. 
8Idea of a University, p. 19. 
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as well, the lines upon which the inquiry is to be drawn. 
There is also evident, here, the disciplined mind of New-
man, logic-bound, viewing possible facets of the question 
and their implications for himself. His mind appears ever 
at work grappling and grasping for mastery of the logical 
framework within which he will carry out the discussion. 
should the inquiry be conducted on philosophical or theo-
logical grounds?9 The answer will be forthcoming, a few 
paragraphs later. 
In explanation of the source of his concern and in 
development of the history of the question, Newman proceeds 
by calling our attention to that place in which 
I have lived the greater part of my life ••• a place 
which has all that time been occupied in a series 
of controversies both domestic and with strangers 
••• the English University, of which I was so long 
a member, which after a century of inactivity, 
at length was roused, at a time when (as I may say) 
it was giving no education at all to the youth 
committed to its keeping, to a sense of the respon-
sibilities whbch its profession and its station 
involved •••• l 
Newman adverts to "the singular example of a heterogeneous 
and an independent body of men, setting about a work of 
self-reformation •••• " He speci!'ies the difficulties en-
countereda "Its initial efforts, begun and carried on amid 
9critics tend to reject one set of grounds; yet they 
offer no satisfactory key to unify Newman·s dual presenta-
tion. See pp. 25-28, above, for an overview of various 
critical interpretations of Newman's grounds. 
10Idea of a University, p. 19. 
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manY obstacles, were met from without, as often happens in 
such cases, by ungenerous and jealous criticisms ...... 11 
Having cited the first stage of the controversy and having 
outlined the second, Newman declares "inutility'' and "reli-
gious exclusiveness" as the two basic issues emerging from 
the controversies. 12 
Apart from any consideration of the foregoing mate-
rial as allusion to the history of the question or as a 
statement on the root of Newman's preoccupation with the is-
sue of university education, there is evidence here of the 
measurable effect that an eminent English university had on 
Newman when it came time for him to struggle with the prob-
lem of establishing a catholic university. Equally apparent 
is the influence that the two immediate historical contro-
versies surrounding that university's curricula wielded on 
Newman when his turn came to formulate an educational man-
ifesto for a Catholic university in Ireland. 13 Evident, 
also, in this introductory discourse is not only a place 
but people whose ideas and principles might be said to have 
11Ibid. 
12Ibid., P• 20. 
l)For the role played by Oxford in shaping Newman•s 
Idea and the impact of the Edinburgh Review attacks upon 
Oxford with resultant controversy, see McGrath, pp. 115, 
1))-1)7, )06, )12, and 370. See also Culler, pp. 37, 115, 
1)8, 140-141, 1~)-144, 146, 220-221. See also Harrold, 
John Henry Newman, pp. 8 and 105. 
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provided the intellectual springboard for Newman's Idea. 
For the formation of his educational ideal no doubt began 
long before that May day in Dublin when Newman began his 
series of lectures on university education before a distin-
guished audience. So too was the foundation of his educa-
tional construct laid some time before the Catholic Univer-
sity of Ireland, with barely twenty students, opened its 
doors on November 3, 1854. Perhaps Newman's educational 
ideal and construct began the day he set foot on the grounds 
of Trinity College, Oxford, or the day he awoke to the 
beauty of his classical studies, or the day he began culti-
vation of a group of associates, sometimes lifelong friends, 
as an undergraduate, fellow, tutor, Vicar, and leader at 
Oxford. 14 At any rate, Newman's allusion to his days at 
Oxford appears significant in the development of the Idea 
and the search for a more meaningful intellectual and spir-
itual university life that it reflects. 
If Newman's reference to his Oxford days is signifi-
cant because Oxford helped mold his educational philosophy, 
his allusion to the Edinburgh Review attacks is also note-
14Harrold, pp. 13-19. Harrold surveys what Tardivel 
sees as the two important formative influences on Newman's 
religious make-up: "the influence of Oxford itself-- its 
classical studies, its eighteenth-century interests, its 
brilliant Noetic school of liberalism, its commanding per-
~onalities (especially Keble, Froude, and Pusey); and the 
~nfluence of the early Church Fathers.'' Moreover, in much 
t~e same way as Guitton, Harrold roots Newman in the English 
e~ghteenth century. 
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worthy in the context of Oxford related experience. 15 For 
two issues, stemming from the resultant controversies, have 
germinal significance for Newman's Ideao Specifically, his 
declaration in Discourse I of the two questions emerging 
from the Edinburgh criticisms provides important structural 
and thematic groundbreaking for subsequent discourses. The 
issues to which Newman refers in this discourse are "inutil-
i ty" and ••religious exclusiveness." Both issues will sur-
face as two key questions of Discourse II: whether theolo-
gy ought to be taught in a university and whether a univer-
sity should make utility its major concern. In the dis-
course following, Newman's response to these questions will 
serve to elaborate and provide responses for the larger is-
sue of the nature of a university and Newman's ultimate 
question, the nature of a Catholic University. 16 
Furthermore, by resurrecting in Discourse I the is-
l5Harrold, p. 16. In Harrold's words, Newman's "in-
tellectual powers were molded and tempered by Oxford's 
great classical tradition." Harrold adds that Newman voiced 
his debt in the Apologia for a number of religious doc-
trines gained from Oxford thinkers. Harrold also observes 
that it was from the Noetics that Newman really learned to 
think clearly and accurately. 
16Again, regarding the matter of structure, Discourse 
I, in providing the germ of the two crucial questions of 
Discourse II, the first of which Discourses II, III and IV 
will answer, the second, Discourses V, VI, VII and VIII, 
does, indeed, appear to assume an integral part in the or-
ganic structure of the Idea. 
125 
sues of "inutility" and "religious exclusiveness," Newman 
raises two questions with significant transitional over-
tones. For these matters appear under the dimension of an 
unresolved controversy of the past and the hope of a future 
synthesis. Through these issues, Newman looks back to an 
ideological source, one he fondly views as the educational 
font from which he has derived so much intellectual and 
spiritual nourishment; but he also looks forward to some-
thing more for which he feels his university in Ireland to 
be destined. 17 Moreover, these questions also serve to 
connect the educational heritage and experience of a young 
man at Oxford with the present, emerging values of a mid-
dle-aged religious and educational leader seeking an appro-
priate educational ideal for a new Irish university with 
its own special problems. 18 Scanned in the context of the 
l7Newman's words from the Historical Sketches, quot-
ed on p. 169 of Culler, testify to th~s point: " ••• and in 
it [DublitiJ I see a flourishing University, which for a 
while had to struggle with fortune, but which, when its 
first founders and servant were dead and gone, had successes 
far exceeding their anxieties. Thither, as to a sacred 
soil, the home of their fathers, and the fountain-head of 
their Christianity, students are flocking from East, West 
and South, from America and Australia and India, from Egypt 
and Asia Minor, with the ease and rapidity of a locomotion 
not yet discovered." 
18culler, p. 1)8. Culler observes that the picture 
drawn by some of Irish society, along with the attitude to-
ward higher education reflected by that society, was not a 
happy one. Three of Newman's advisers -- Frederick Lucas, 
Robert Ornsby and Henry Wilberforce (all Englishmen, con-
verts to Roman Catholicism and Dublin residents) -- depicted 
the Irish, including the educated ones, as having not the 
least notion of a university like Oxfordo 
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oxford controversies, these issues come across as transito-
ry and unfixed. Viewed in the Newman manner, that is, from 
a naturally and supernaturally connected perspective, they 
will appear to share in a world of educational doctrine 
that is immortal and permanent. 
In addition to its structural and transitional sig-
nificance, the question of "inutility" suggests more, in its 
thematic implications for the whole of the Idea, than a con-
flict between knowledge and the fruit of that knowledge. It 
suggests a conflict between means and ends; between ideality 
and practicality; between classical values and pragmatic, 
utilitarian concerns; between cultivation of one's mind and 
cultivation of one's purse; between humanistic-type activity 
and utilitarian accomplishment; between self-discipline or 
restraint and intellectual disorder or chaos; between natu-
ral and supernatural values; and certainly, between a mean-
ingful and meaningless educational life or perspective. 
Correspondingly, the issue of "religious exclusiveness," as 
Newman treats it, extends well beyond the limits of a dis-
pute over the inclusion or exclusion of theology in a uni-
versity. For it might also be viewed as a conflict between 
Reason and Revelation, between Nature and Grace, between 
gentleman and Catholic gentleman, between Humanism and 
Christian Humanism, a.'"1d even a conflict between God and man. 
But these ramifications of both germinal issues are matters 
for some development and notation elsewhere. I suggest them 
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here only as material correlative and especially signifi-
cant in relation to the import of the two issues stemming 
from the Edinburgh controversies and any possible interpre-
tation of them. 
Furthennore, in regard to the issues of "inutility" 
and "religious exclusiveness," it should be noted that, al-
though there may be some tension and a degree of ambivalence 
in Newman•s attitude towards them or the contexts in which 
they might be treated over the whole work, Newman's total 
position must be evaluated in the light of two factors. 
One is his ultimate, dominant concern over matters of Faith, 
Revelation and Dogma; 19 the other, his desire for a princi-
ple of unity. Newman sees the Church as a unifying histor-
ical principle, Catholic theology as a unifying theological 
principle, and a "connected view or grasp of things" as a 
unifying educational principle. Always, in his efforts to 
resolve differences, to reconcile diverse elements, and to 
synthesize opposing viewpoints, there is present a concern 
for the relationship of~ whole to its many parts. In 
regard to the structure of the discourses the foregoing re-
lationship will become most immediately apparent and espe-
cially relevant. Moreover, just as the relation of part and 
whole must be taken into account in ascertaining the impor-
. l9Dessain, p. x~~. Dessain presents a strong case for 
fa~th and devotion to the cause of Revealed Religion as the 
root interest and unifying concerns of Newman's life. 
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tance of "inutility" and "religious exclusiveness," so too 
must the latter issues, that constitute kernel questions 
for the rest of the work, not be underestimated in the light 
of Newman's search for unity and his efforts to found a 
university whose philosophical perspective does focus on a 
spiritual end, a union with God, the ultimate One whose 
stability, order, permanence and fixedness it is the final 
purpose of the many to seek. 
Thus, in dealing with the matter of utility and spe-
cialization, Newman is really coming to grips with the all-
important question of man's ultimate end or destiny. 20 He 
sees an answer in continued striving for the development of 
one•s natural talents. He advocates the pursuit of know-
ledge for its own sake. He advances a "connected view" 
that he would have a university-educated man develop. 
These are natural goals, but they have their supernatural 
counterparts. If all knowledge is one, if the subject mat-
ter of all knowledge is unified, if, indeed, science and 
religion are really but a part of the whole, then Newman 
does have a key for a university ideal that helps place 
man's temporal interests and ultimate, supernatural concerns 
20Newman's argument is not with specialization as 
such. But of the overspecialized and utilitarian approach 
that emphasizes the product of knowledge rather than the 
knowledge itself he does take a dim view. Moreover, in the 
matter of the useful and the specialized, Newman's ultimate 
criterion is mankind's end in the light of Calvary's mean-
ing. 
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in proper perspective. The whole of man's life purpose is 
not sacrificed or neglected for any partial needs, for in 
Newman's university scheme, man has a "connected view" of 
all branches of knowledge with philosophical habit his sys-
tem and Revelation his guide. These are substantial means 
in a program of temporal and eternal self-growth and devel-
opment, and that, basically, is what Newman's educational 
ideal is all about. 
Thus far in Discourse I, Newman has restated the 
question raised in the Preface and has restricted it to the 
nature of university education. Newman has, in addition, 
questioned the lines of the inquiry and traced the history 
of the question in relation to his Oxford experience, cit-
ing for special consideration, two issues that emerged from 
controversial attacks upon that university's curriculum. 
Now, he will go on to provide a rationale for the approach 
to the nature of university education he will follow and 
the grounds he will employ. By his reference to Protestant 
experience, Newman intimates the mode of his treatment of 
the nature of a university and what will be the lines of 
the inquiry. Newman will also attempt to justify his ref-
erence to Protestant educational principles and to validate 
his use of these on the basis of historical Roman Catholic 
Practice. 
Newman first points out that his opinions on the 
nature of university education are lifelong, not occasional 
ones: 
It would concern me, Gentlemen, were I supposed 
to have got up my opinions for the occasion •••• 
Many changes has my mind gone through: here it 
1.30 
has known no variation or vacillation of opinion •••• 
Those principles ••• were my profession at that early 
period of life, when religion was to me more ~ mat-
ter of feeling and experience than of faith.2l 
Natural self-evident truths constitute the grounds 
of the inquiry and furnish a second reason for Newman's 
"referring, on this occasion, to the conclusions at which 
Protestants have arrived on the subject of Liberal Educa-
tion." He observes: 
The principles on which I would conduct the inquiry 
are attainable, as I have already implied, by the 
mere experience of life. They do not come simply 
of theology; they imply no supernatural discern-
ment; they have no special connexion with Revela-
tion; they almost arise out of the nature of the 
case; they are dictated even by human prudence and 
wisdom, though a divine illumination be absent, and 
they are recognized by common sense,,.,22 
We note here that Newman's reason for consulting Protestant 
thought is that its conclusions on the subject of educa-
tional grounds reinforce the principles on which Newman 
hopes to conduct his inquiry. 
The foregoing excerpts with their attendant material 
relate significantly to the matter of Newman's ultimate is-
21Idea of a University, pp. 20-21. Newman appears, 
most of his life, however, to have had little time for reli-
gion of feeling. His sense of dogmatism seems pervasive and 
constant from quite early an age. The Apologia testifies to 
this. 
22Ibid., pp. 21-22. 
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sue and grounds in the Idea. At the beginning of this dis-
course, Newman questioned the lines upon which the inquiry 
would be conducted. Here he affirms that the grounds are 
philosophical and non-sectarian and that the principles 
"may be held by Protestants as well as Catholics."2J If it 
is possible to determine the issue by the principles and 
lines of the inquiry relating to it, the foregoing matter 
does appear to bear out the contention that the primary is-
sue of Newman's Idea is the nature of a university, not the 
nature of a Catholic university. 
Subsequent reasons seem to generate additional 
support for the position: 
But I shall consider the question simply on the 
23Ibid., p. 22. Although Newman's reference to 
Protestant thought and experience is meant to clarify his 
approach to the university issue and his use of grounds, it 
raises a number of questions. For example, when Newman op-
poses Catholic education to its alternative, that alterna-
tive appears to be Protestant education. But is not Prot-
estant education also Christian education? Newman appears 
to equate Protestant education with secular or worldly edu-
cation and grounds. Should they be equated? If by Protes-
tant education Newman means that education which makes all 
things subject to man, that education in which theology and 
other sciences are not allied, that education in which Faith 
and reason are irreconcilably separated, and if by Protes-
tant education Newman means that education which looks to 
religion as a matter of taste and sentiment, and to God as 
fate, chance, or some impersonal force, then he appears justified in equating Protestant education with that of a 
secular or worldly type. For that education should not be 
called Christian, much less Catholic education, in Newman's judgment. If, however, by Protestant education Newman means 
that education which provides for belief in a personal, 
omniscient God, one that views intellectual and spiritual 
Perfection as the joint goal of education, and one that 
sees man and all things as subject to God, then Newman would 
surely be misled in making such an equation. 
grounds of human reason and human wisdom. I am 
investigating in the abstract, and am determining 
what is in itself right and true •••• I am con-
cerned with questions not simply of immutable 
truth, but of practice and expedience,2~ 
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When Newman states that this is not a disputation "directly 
bearing on the subject matter of Divine Revelation,"~5 when 
he affirms his lifelong profession of the opinions to which 
. . 
26 h h d. 1 . 1 th 1 . 1 he g~ves vo~ce, w en e ~sc a~ms a pure y eo og~ca 
source, supernatural orientation or "divine illumination,"27 
when he asserts that the principles on which the inquiry 
will be conducted can be held by Protestants and Catholics 
alike, when he points out that "the philosophy of education 
is founded on truths of the natural order,"28 and when he 
declares "human wisdom" and "human reason" to be the grounds 
of the question, 29 Newman is providing ample evidence to 
support the assertion that the primary issue of the ~ is, 
indeed, the nature of a university, considered on purely 
natural, abstract, and philosophical grounds. 
But a second look at Newman's presentation leads to 
24Ibid., p. 24. 
25Ibid. p. 20. 
26I.Qis!., p. 21. 
27Ibid., P• 22. 
28Ibid. 
29Ibid., p. 24. 
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quite another conclusion on the nature of his ultimate is-
sue and grounds. It is evident, here, that Newman is using 
protestant educational experience to suggest the natural 
lines of inquiry he will follow and that he is supplying 
historical evidence for his doing so. It is most important 
to note, however, that each time he poses the philosophical 
or non-sectarian grounds of his inquiry, he juxtaposes a 
catholic groundwork.JO Moreover, ever present in Newman's 
words is a theological and supernatural emphasis that his 
disavowals and disclaimers do not dismiss but only point up 
the more forcibly. Examples are many. Although Newman 
deals with principles, grounds, or lines within a natural 
scope, he does so under the sanction of the Church. In 
spite of the natural bent of his mind toward thoughts and 
disputations distinct from the "subject matter of Divine 
Revelation," these considerations are important "for Cath-
olic objects" and do admit "of a Catholic treatment. ,,Jl 
3°Newman's grounds might be interpreted according to 
this dialectic. With philosophical grounds constituting his 
thesis and theological, his antithesis, Newman might be said 
to synthesize the philosophical and theological lines in an 
overall groundwork of inquiry that reflects his concern for 
the development of the whole man, his desire for a Catholic 
university which provides adequately for intellectual cul-
ture, and his search for the man of "philosophical habit" 
who looks at things from a combined intellectual and spirit-
ual point of view. 
Jlidea of a University, p. 20. For Newman, that 
"treatment" is a theological one that gives unity in the 
light of ultimate ends. 
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Newman adds that the opinions he advances 
might be said to evidence the faith I reposed in 
the practical judgment of the Church, and the in-
timate concurrence of my own reason with the course 
she had authoritatively sanctioned, and the devotion 
with which I could promptly put myself at her dis-
posal •••• J2 
so too, though the opinions he expresses are a matter of 
lifelong profession, they are sanctioned by the Church and 
reinforced by Newman•s study of the "records of Christian 
Antiquity ... JJ 
Amid these contrapuntal, natural and supernatural 
grounds of inquiry, the thought suggests itself that, if 
Protestants are able to arrive at such worthy conclusions 
on education, as Newman claims they can, if "Protestants, 
depending on human means mainly,· are led to make the most 
. 
of thema their sole resource being to use what they 
have," with "knowledge" their "power" and little more,34 
32Ibid., p. 21. The opinions he advocates might 
also and again be said to reflect Newmangs preoccupation 
with a principle of unity. If there be any apparent con-
flict in his position regarding philosophy and theology, 
between denominational and non-denominational education, 
between Christianity and humanism, or between philosophical 
and theological grounds, the conflict is not insolvable 
viewed in relation to Newman•s whole and partial view. It 
should be noted that philosophy without theology, science 
without religion, or humanism without Christianity do not 
constitute the whole of Newman's educational viewo Neither, 
in this investigation, do philosophical grounds. They are 
a part. They do not constitute the whole line of the in-
quiry. They are not sufficient in themselves. 
JJibid. 
34Ibid., p. 22 • 
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hOW much more ought Catholics, though they be inclined to 
rest in the knowledge of their "goodly inheritance," be able 
to arrive at even more solid conclusions and use them more 
efficaciously, with not the solitary tool of reason, but 
the added resource of Revelation to guide them?35 Then, 
catholics would be using what they have "by nature to the 
utmost" and, at the same time, be looking out "for what is 
beyond nature in the confidence of faith and hope ... 36 
But, at this juncture, Newman's more obvious con-
cern is to provide historical Church precedent for his use 
of Protestant experience. He first states the principle 
involved, 
The Church has ever appealed and deferred to wit-
nesses and authorities external to herself, in 
those matters in which she thought they had means 
of forming a judgment: and that on the principle 
"Cuigue in arte sua credendum." She has even 
used unbelievers and pagans in evidence of her 
truth, as far as their testimony went.37 
Newman then supplies example1 
She has worded her theological teaching in the 
35while Newman does not identify "Revelation" with 
Catholicism, he does see the Catholic Church as the chief 
repository of Revealed Truth. Her responsibility is to 
conserve and interpret that truth. Her divine commission 
is to be the "visible polity" that guards and preserves 
that truth. 
36Ibid. Although Newman acknowledges, later in the 
discourses;-that we attain heaven by using this world well, 
the focus here appears to be on attaining heaven. 
37Ibid., p. 2). 
phraseology of Aristotle; Aquila, Symmachus, 
Theodotion, Origen, Eusebius, and Apollinaris, 
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all more or less heterodox, have supplied materials 
for primitive exegetics. st. Cyprian called Ter-
tullian his master; St. Augustin refers to Ticonius; 
Bossuet, in modern times, complimented the labours 
of the Anglican Bull; the Benedictine editors of 
the Fathers are familiar with the labours of Fell, 
Ussher, Pearson, and Beveridge. Pope Benedict XIV, 
cites according to the occasion the works of Prot-
estants without reserve, and the late French col-
lection of Christian Apologists contains the writings 
of Locke, Burnet, Tillotson, and Paley.38 
Newman cites further examples of the juxtaposed lines 
of the inquiry when he states that, even though the princi-
ples ''almost arise out of the nature of the case," although 
they "are dictated even by human prudence and wisdom,'' and 
"though a divine illumination be absent, i:t is "in the 
plenitude of her divine illumination" that the Church has 
ever used authorities outside the pale.39 In much the same 
spirit Newman here makes use of Protestant experience re-
garding educational principles. Furthermore, although the 
questions of concern to Newman are matters "of practice and 
expedience," they are matters of "immutable truth" as 
well.~0 Moreover, notwithstanding the fact that he express-
ly purposes to investigate the question on the basis of 
"human reason and human wisdom" and that he wishes not to 
38Ibid. 
39Ibid. 
~O Ibid • , p • 2 ~. 
interject the authority of the Church, Newman does bring 
that authority into account. As a matter of fact, heap-
pears never to forget it. The weight of Church authority 
appears important to Newman because the weight of its ap-
pearance is constant and suggestive in the context of the 
grounds he employs. 
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If some doubt remains concerning the role Newman will 
assign Church authority in the Idea, he dispels it toward 
the end of Discourse I where he takes the opportunity 
of recognizing once for all that higher view of 
approaching the subject of these Discourses, which, 
after this formal recognition, I mean to dispense 
with. Ecclesiastical authority, not argument, is 
the supreme rule and the appropriate guide for 
Catholics in matters of religion,41 
The founding· of the Catho.lic University in Ireland, along 
with the educational doctrine propounded on the occasion of 
its establishment, is such a matter. Here, then, is New-
man•s ultimate view. It is a theological and supernatural 
one. Having formally recognized its preeminent place, New-
man places it back of him, but not too far back because, a 
few paragraphs later, he speaks of the aim of a "Universi-
ty, of which Catholicity is the fundamental principle,"LI-2 
and then in the following section acknowledges that he 
"shall insist on the high theological view of a Universi-
41Ibid., p. 26. 
42Ibid., p. 27. 
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ty"4J with confidence in the knowledge, any criticism or 
argument notwithstanding, that it is a Catholic University 
sanctioned by an ultimate authority: "It is the decision 
of the Holy See; St. Peter has spoken."4L} 
The reasons cited midway and the support developed 
in the latter part of this discourse bear significantly on 
the question of what is Newman's fundamental issue in the 
Idea. His treatment yields two possible answers. One sug-
gests that Newman is addressing himself, on purely natural 
and philosophical grounds, to the root issue of the nature 
of a university in the abstract. The second proposes that 
Newman's ultimate issue is the nature of a Catholic univer-
sity, developed on theological and supernatural grounds. 
Because the evidence for either answer reflects a measure 
of ambivalence on Newman's part, it is difficult for the 
reader to assess the natural and supernatural or the phil-
osophical and theological grounds of the inquiry for their 
true worth, much less ascertain which issue holds dominance 
in Newman's educational scheme. Although some clarifica-
tion of his position rests in the realization that Newman 
here, as well as elsewhere in the discourse, is attempting 
to elicit the support of as many segments of his audience 
as possible, I submit that, while appearing to address him-
44Ibid., p. 28. 
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self to the purely natural issue, Newman by his constant 
reference to the theological and supernatural groundwork, 
really underscores that question preeminent in his concern 
and central to his scope, the nature of a Catholic univer-
sity. 
The answer, then, to the fundamental issue of the 
Idea hinges on a reconciliation of Newman's multiple treat-
........... 
ment of the nature of a university. So too, the solution 
to the problem of Newman's multiple presentation of grounds 
lies in a unification of his twofold presentation of 
grounds. Once again, Aristotelian equivocity by reference 
provides the means to effect the reconciliation and unifi-
cation.45 From an Aristotelian standpoint, the fact that 
Newman speaks variously on the scope of his university and 
grounds can be explained by the primary and secondary in-
stances that together, in proper relation, reflect Newman•s 
primary and secondary views on the nature of the university 
proposed. Accordingly, in the secondary instance, the is-
sue is the nature of a university abstractly considered; 
the grounds are natural and philosophical. But in the pri-
mary instance, the issue is the nature of a Catholic uni-
versity, with supernatural grounds constituting the lines 
of the inquiry. Considered as the secondary instance of 
45For a detailed explanation of Aristotle's doctrine 
of equivocity see Ch. I, pp. 57-65. 
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his view of the scope of a university, Newman's claim for 
the nature of a university considered apart from the Church 
and his call for natural philosophical grounds are most 
reasonable. Correspondingly, considered as the primary in-
stance of his view of the scope of a university, Newman•s 
call for the sanction of the Church, a Catholic treatment, 
a high theological view, "Catholicity" as the basic prin-
ciple, and ecclesiastical authority is also justifiable. 
Once again, it should be obs~rved that, according to Aris-
totelian equivocity by reference, the secondary instances 
have Entity and are ultimately meaningful only as they re-
late to the primary instance. This holds true for the sec-
ondary instances of Newman's university scope and grounds. 
However important the philosophical grounds and the nature 
of a university viewed separately from the Church may be in 
Newman's total educational ideal, this issue and these 
grounds derive their ultimate importance only in reference 
to the primary form or nature of Newman's university scope 
and grounds, namely, the nature of a Catholic university 
and supernatural or theological grounds. Although the 
differences in definition between the corresponding parts 
of each set are overshadowed by some degree of sameness --
the unity by reference to the university issue and grounds 
the differences are still present, and the true natures 
of the terms are to be found only in the primary instances. 
In the last part of Discourse I, Newman supplies 
141 
ample reason for a favorable reception on the part of his 
audience to the voice of the Holy See. He points out that 
the Chair of the Apostles has excellent claim on their at-
tention because a wealth of documented experience and his-
torical successes confirm its veracity and Divine Origin. 
That supernatural origin concerns Newman because he wishes 
not merely to trust the temporal powers or tools of man, 
like reason. Rather, he would shore up his position with 
more of an eternal guarantee from a Providential Source. 
This Newman feels he has in the Catholic Church and the 
Vicar of Christ. For this reason can he sound a note in 
the concluding sections that is triumphant, victorious, 
and supportive. Newman appears exhilarated by the thought 
of his Church's Providentially directed resurgence and 
renewal, oftentimes in the face of humanly insurmountable 
odds. He feels that, because the Church has ever been 
successful, so can they be who follow its Apostolic direc-
tives on this educational mission. 
Newman concludes his introductory discourse with a 
glowing tribute to the perennial wisdom of Rome and the 
richness of Ireland's educational history. 
CHAPTER IV 
·:rrlE s·rRUCTURAL FOUNDATION AND ·rHEMATIC 
SUPERSTRUCTURE IN DISCOURSES II AND III 
This chapter has two objectives: one expository a~d 
the other interpretive. The expository segment aims at 
providing a summary of the major content of Discourses II 
and III. It looks to Newman's.principle of the wholeness 
of knowledge and the need of the mind to reflect that 
wholeness in a "connected view." It also recognizes New-
man's belief in the existence of a personal, omniscient God 
\·/hose influence as their Source and .End bears so intimately 
on all sciences that to apprehend them is in some measure 
to apprehend Him. This expository part also acknowledges 
the existence of theology as a science and grants it a 
rightful place among the sciences. It stresses the point 
that theology cannot be excluded from the university be-
cause its omission would fragment the wholeness of knowl-
edge, cause "neglect" to the other sciences, and compromise 
the ultimate attairunent of truth. No less importantly, it 
poi~ts up Newman's epistemological framework. Finally, it 
indicates two questions with notable thematic ~~d structur-
al significance for the rest of the discourses. 
The second or analytical part of the chapter pur-
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poses to render a :nost important element of ~'ie'r'il1lan 's con-
tent in these two discourses -- his theme of the wholeness 
of knowledge -- in the closest possible allia.."lce with the 
form of its presentation. Specifically, it will attempt to 
relate theme to structure in terms of Aristotelian equivo-
city by reference. In that context, "wholeness" of theme 
and "wholeness" of structure will be considered as equivocal 
terms. We saw in the two preceding chapters that equivocity 
by reference pertains to the relative importance of issues 
and the order in which their treatment ought to proceed. 
All of the issues discussed -- the nature of a Catholic 
university, the nature of a university in the abstract, the 
grounds of the inquiry, and the nature of Newman's gentle-
man-- suggested a certain unity by reference to each other. 
All suggested, as well, a proportional reference of second-
ary issues to the primary one. From the discussion, the 
nature of a Catholic university emerged as the primary is-
sue. The other questions were treated as issues ultimately 
meaningful only in reference to the fundamental one. But 
we also observed in the last chapter that equivocity by 
reference can be applied to an order of priority in dealing 
with Newman's theological and philosophical grounds. That 
treatment centered on the relationship of grounds to grounds 
as much as it concentrated on the relationship of grounds as 
a secondary issue to primary question of the nature of a 
Catholic university. Employing "grounds" as a term equivo-
144 
cal by reference, we determined that the theological 
grounds should be viewed as the primary instance of grounds 
and that the philosophical grounds should be approached as 
a secondary instance. The treatment in this chapter will 
focus on the nature of the relationship between wholeness 
of theme and wholeness of structure in Discourses II and 
III, and it purposes to show that the relationship carries 
over into subsequent discourses. The governing principle 
of the Idea states that all knowledge is whole and that 
man's mind must reflect that wholeness in its view. The 
structure of the discourses is shaped in such a way that 
it helps bear the burden of this theme. Because the rela-
tionship between theme and structure is not simple, and 
inasmuch as it reflects the complexity of sameness in dif-
ference found in Newman's overall treatment of issues and 
in his presentation of theological and philosophical 
grounds, it will be approached with the same critical ap-
paratus. By means of Aristotelian equivocity by reference, 
this section of the chapter will attempt to render Newman's 
theme and the elements of its formal presentation more uni-
fied and intelligible. 
John Henry Newman's preoccupation with oneness seems 
not inappropriately reflected in the thematic and structur-
al unity that might be said to characterize Discourses II 
and III in themselves and in their relation to the other 
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discourses of the Idea. 1 As the structure of all the dis-
courses assumes a specific direction in Discourse II, so 
does the principle of the wholeness of knowledge present 
itself as a significant thematic and structural device. 
still present is the priority of issues and grounds pro-
posed in the Preface and Discourse I; but now, in bolder 
relief, the principle, along with the assumption of belief 
in the existence of a personal, omniscient God, surfaces in 
such a manner as to place the Catholic and secular univer-
sity issues, along with the natural and supernatural 
grounds, in firmer perspective. 2 Both principle and as-
sumption serve to show the ultimate, interrelated nature of 
all ~hings, to point up the consequent interdependence of 
one science on another~ and to clarify the interdisciplina-
ry view with which one should hold the facts of reality, 
the knowledge that reflects these facts, and the Omnipotent 
God Who is their Source. Just as the assumption of the ex-
1 See Ch. III, p. 127, n. 19, and p. 134, n. J2, 
above, for other instances of Newman's preoccupation with 
unity. 
2In the process of analyzing Discourses II and III, 
this reader finds it difficult to lay aside, even temporar-
ily, the notion that this series of lectures, with its per-
vasive Catholic tone, is a preeminently Catholic work about 
a Catholic university and is being delivered primarily for 
Catholics. If that is so, its apparent disproportionate 
emphasis on Catholic theology and concern with the Catholic 
university issue become more understandable. The Preface 
and Discourse I suggest that interpretation. Discourses II 
and III tend to confirm it. 
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istence of God makes more meaningful the principle of the 
wholeness of knowledge, which, in turn, makes necessary a 
"connected view or grasp" of theology in relation to other 
sciences, so does a correlative instance of wholeness ren-
der intelligible the structure of Discourses II and III. 
They form a part, in relation to previous and subsequent 
discourses, which constitute the whole of the Idea. 
In Discourses II and III, Newman is concerned with 
the establishment of theology as a science and its "bear-
ing" on other branches of knowledge. By implication, he 
shows equal interest in the relation of university educa-
tion to the correlative concern of an afterlife. Themati-
cally, he addresses himself to both matters by employing 
the principle that all knowledge forms a whole, by exercis-
ing a "connected view or grasp" of the relation of all 
forms of knowledge, and by advocating the existence of a 
personal God Who gives meaning to the whole of knowledge, 
a personal God Who reflects the ultimate truth which.the 
whole of knowledge comprises, and toward which the inter-
disciplinary grasp moves in partial steps. Accordingly, he 
formulates questions in Discourse II whose answers reaffirm 
the wholeness of knowledge, whose responses point up the 
need for an interconnected grasp, and whose implications 
lead toward an Ultimate Truth as the end of the discourses 
and the whole of the idea. 
In Discourse II, Newman raises two questions that 
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draw our attention to an assumption and a principle which 
with its specific view will help form this thematic re-
sponse.3 First, he asks whether theology ought to be 
taught in a university. Second, he questions whether the 
university should make utility its major concern. After a 
brief clarification of the first question, Newman answers 
it in the form of a syllogism. Its major premise states 
that a university must teach all sciences; its minor, that 
theology is a science. The conclusion follows that a uni-
versity must teach theology. 4 In the main, the discourse, 
develops this response to the first question. 
In support of the major premise, Newman states that 
by definition a university should teach all sciences: 
As to the range of University teaching, certainly 
the very name of University is inconsistent with 
restrictions of any kind •••• I am only putting 
on its popular, its recognized sense, when I say 
that a University should teach universal knowl-
edge.5 
Newman supports this contention by the authority of Dr. 
3Idea of a Universit¥, p. 33. The principle of the 
wholeness of knowledge appl~es to studies and students. In 
reference to studies, it pertains to the subject matter 
viewed. In relation to students, it concerns the mode of 
viewing. 
4
rbid. The conclusion is understood. Regardinc; t.:1e 
syllogis-cical support, Culler stresses that the most cogent 
reason the university should teach theology is that in no 
other way can it reach truth. See Culler, pp. 180-181. 
5Idea of a University, pp. 33-34. 
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Johnson d " ' . 6 an .•,osnelm. ,/hat matters is not so much their 
support as the fact that Newman introduces, in this sec-
tion, the notion that all knowledge forms a whole. It is 
by this principle that he will establish theology as a 
branch of knowledge and ascertain its relation to other 
sciences. nere, he will employ the principle in relation 
to studies -- in relation to the subject of the view or the 
interrelated nature of all knowledge. At the same time, 
Newman will exercise it in reference to students, the ma..'1-
ner of viewing or the interdisciplinary grasp. he believes 
that he can make the whole reaL~ of knowledge intelligible 
by tracing correspondences that exist between the different 
segments that make up the whole of knowledge. 
According to Newma..'1, one can discuss the exclusion 
of theology only in the context of two positions. £ither 
theology does not deal with real knowledge, or else, one 
important branch of knowledge is being omitted.? here, 
6Ibid., p. J4. In his dictionary, Johnson defines 
the university as "a school where all arts and faculties 
are taught; "r•Iosheim, in the role of the historian, points 
out that, before the rise of the University of Paris, "the 
whole circle of sciences then known was not taught" and 
that the University of Paris "which exceeded all others in 
various respects, as well as in the number of teachers and 
students, was the first to embrace all the arts and sci-
ences, and therefore first became a University." 
7Ibid., n. 16. By theology Newman means a science 
that contains a-corpus of truth about God and man's rela-
tionship to Him. Theology embraces system, doctrine, and 
propositions. It provides unity to the whole of knowledge 
ln the light of an ultimate end. 
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Newman is contesting the former view. That view suggests 
that theological beliefs do not constitute knowledge. It 
holds that theology does not contain objective and absolute 
truths, a position Newman cannot abide. For him, such a 
position is intolerable because it maintains that nothing 
can be kno\vn for certain about the Supreme Being. Such a 
position is untenable because it excludes from the subjects 
of one's knowledge " a fact encompassing, closing in upon, 
absorbing, every other fact conceivable."8 It is as if one 
would "investigate any part of any order of Knowledge, and 
stop short of that w'hich enters into every order. "9 New-
man's position is understandable if one admits a God of the 
type in Whom Newman believes. 
He goes on to support his major premise by a gener-
al principle: 
••• when men combine together for any common object, 
they are obliged, as a matter of course, in order 
to secure the advantages accruing from united ac-
tion, to sacrifice many of their private opinions 
and wishes and to drop the minor differences ••• 
which exist between man and man •••• Compromise ••• 
is the first principle of combination.lO 
Newman then supplies specific examples. Both principle and 
illustration stress that, in the advancement of universal 
knowledge, much can be sacrificed that is personal and in-
8Ibid., P• J8. 
9Ibid. 
10Ibid., p. J5. 
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dividual, but the one thing that may not be sacrificed is 
"Knowledge itselr.•• 11 For if knowledge is sacrificed, so 
is science. If science is surrendered, so is truth. If 
truth is sacrificed, so is God. Such concessions would 
render a university, as a place for the fostering of knowl-
edge, science, and truth, unworthy of its name. How can 
such an institution profess every science, yet leave out 
the foremost among them? 12 If, moreover, science, truth, 
and God are disregarded, then the assumption of God's ex-
istence and the principle of a whole knowledge and a whole 
view might just as well be discarded. Such exclusions 
would be, for Newman, morally and intellectually reprehen-
sible. 
To provide additional support for his major and 
minor premises, Newman counters the objection that knowl-
edge pertinent to university study should be limited along 
certain lines. Once again, principle and assumption play 
a role in his response. If one admits a God, Newman points 
out, he admits an all-encompassing fact that cannot be de-
nied without fragmenting the whole of knowledge. 13 This 
11Ibid., p. 36. 
12The validity of the argument hinges on belief in 
the existence of a personal omniscient God and the recogni-
tion of theology as the science which studies Him. 
lJidea of a University, pp. 37-)8. 
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fact holds for natural theology, even more so for Revela-
tion. For Newman, the concept of God refers not at all to 
chance, an impersonal force or fate. The God Who forms the 
subject of Newman•s theology is "an Individual, Self-depend-
ent, All-Perfect, Unchangeable Being ...... 14 Furthermore, 
belief in such a Supreme Being requires an act of Faith. 
It also demands an intellectual act whose object is truth 
and whose result is knowledge. This knowledge forms a sci-
ence that cannot be cast aside as a matter of mere feeling 
or sentiment. God does exist, and man has an immortal 
soul capable of attaining Him in the next life and a mind 
capable of comprehending Him to some degree in this one. 
For Newman, there is no natural evidence to controvert 
these beliefs. At the same time, Newman concedes that if 
one believes theological facts not to be absolutely true, 
if he thinks them to be no more than a matter of sentiment 
or feeling, and if he believes God to be only some imper-
sonal force at work in the world, such a person would have 
good reason to exclude theology from a university and to 
think its exclusion impairs the wholeness of knowledge not 
at all. If, on the other hand, one believes according to 
Newman•s terms, then he cannot exclude theology without 
dislocating the parts and whole of knowledge and without 
undermining the assumption of God's existence. 
14Ibid., p. 46. 
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In Discourse II, Newman pursues the true nature of 
a university with special emphasis on the first of the two 
questions the discourse proposes, namely, the place of the-
ology in a university. This is a concern Newman views as 
fundamental to the establishment of the university's formal 
nature. In treating the question, he reveals the fine line 
separating educational reality from pedagogical illusion 
and theological truth from religious nonsense. He shows 
how some men operate between each pair as if they were in 
an educational or theological labyrinth. This is unfortu-
nate because there are natural and supernatural guidelines 
to insure their not getting lost if only they will use 
them. Newman proposes these guidelines in the form of a 
principle and an assumption. Should anyone choose not to 
incorporate them into his view of university education, 
Newman adds, that view will be a partial, limited one. 
Further, should he wish not to employ them, that person 
will find no reconciliation possible between what a univer-
sity professes to be and what it actually is. Finally, 
should he opt to disregard them, he will discover no real-
istic compromise possible between man's religious and in-
tellectual aspirations. His efforts to find fulfillment in 
a university framework will go begging. Left unreconciled, 
these aspirations will force him into an intellectual iso-
lation and an educational dream world that refuses to face 
theological or secular scientific realities. In short, 
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Discourse II affirms that to deny theology its rightful 
place as a science in a university and to separate it from 
other sciences is tantamount to polarizing equal branches 
of knowledge, proportionate segments of reality, and cor-
responding natural and supernatural aspirations. In New-
man's judgment, such an effort places man's spiritual and 
educational welfare in jeopardy. 
The assumption of belief in a personal God Whom 
theology treats in such a manner that the resultant knowl-
edge qualifies as a science, the principle of the wholeness 
of knowledge with its interdisciplinary grasp of theology 
and other sciences, all matters apparent in Discourse II, 
all elements shaping its thematic unity, are further devel-
oped in Discourse III. While merely sketching them in the 
former discourse, Newman details their thematic implica-
tions in the latter, providing all the while a second an-
swer to the first question of Discourse II.l5 The previous 
lecture argued that theology ought not to be excluded be-
cause to do so would be a grave omission. This lecture 
points out that the omission of theology would also be 
prejudicial to other sciences. Its argument merits sum-
mary, for it serves to amplify the thematic response of the 
previous discourse. 
Early in Discourse III, the objection is raised that 
l5That is, whether theology ought to be taught in a 
university. 
154 
secular and religious subjects should be taught separately 
because they deal with different worlds •16 i'iewman responds 
that the omission of religious subjects would be prejudi-
cial to other sciences. His reasons follow along these 
lines. 17 The object of knowledge is truth. Truth deals in 
facts and their relations. All that exists, as contemplat-
ed by the mind, constitutes a complex fact, a whole which 
can be broken down into many particular facts with manifold 
interrelations. Knowledge is the "apprehension" of these 
facts in themselves and in relation to one another. The 
hu.rnan mind knows the whole fact only in "partial views or 
abstractions. These segments are called sciences. Science 
emerges as a logical abstraction of the "whole vast fact" 
of reality as contemplated by the mind. It is a "partial-
view" by which the mind embraces "larger or smaller por-
tions of the field of knowledge." 18 For, in spite of its 
capabilities, the mind cannot enfold the fact in a. glance 
or all at once. Rather, the mind must view it "under dif-
ferent aspects by way of making progress towards mastering 
the whole."l9 Furthermore, each science differs in its 
16
rdea of a University, p. 51. 
17Ib" . 
__!£•' pp. 52-54. 
18Ibid., p. 53· 
l9Ibid. 
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importance and impact on the rest. All sciences "viewed 
together," represent the whole amount of objective truth 
the mind is capable of grasping. Consequently, the mind 
moves closer to objective truth according to the number of 
sciences it has mastered in right relation. 2° Correspond-
ingly, the fewer parts, sciences, or branches of knowledge 
the mind knows, the less is its grasp of the whole objec-
tive truth. One branch of knowledge depends on the others. 
:C:ach helps maintain the whole circle of knowledge. Again, 
the more parts the mind knows, the closer it is to grasping 
the whole. The better it knows the truth in part, the bet-
ter it will grasp the whole of truth. Finally, if the mind 
knows only one relation between two sciences, it may know 
quite a bit, but it~ knowledge will break down and not be· 
quite so extensive as it would be with the knowledge of 
additional relations. Newman sums up the principle thus: 
I lay it down that all knowledge forms one whole, 
because its subject-matter is one; for the universe 
in its length and breadth is so intimately knit to-
gether that we cannot separate off portion from 
portion, and operation from operation, except by a 
mental abstraction •••• 21 
Discourse III goes on to point out the theological 
implications of the wholeness of knowledge, Newman observes: 
He of course in His own Being is infinitely sep-
arate ••• , and Theology has its departments toward 
20Ibid., p. 54. 
21Ibid,, p. 57· 
which human knowledge has no relations, yet He 
has so implicated Himself with it, and taken it 
into His very bosom, by His presence in it, His 
providence over it, His impression upon it, and 
His influence through it, that we cannot truly or 
fully contemplate i~ without in some main aspects 
contemplating Him.22 
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Here is the core of Newman's argument in Discourse III and 
a link in principle and assumption with Discourse II. If 
we concede that all knowledge forms a whole with one sub-
ject matter, that knowledge is the apprehension of facts in 
themselves and in relation to others, that one's grasp of 
truth is in direct proportion to the number of relations 
.perceived between various sciences, and that God's "pres-
ence," "providence," "impressions," and "influence" bear 
so strongly on other sciences that to apprehend them is, in 
some measure, to apprehend Him, then we must also concede 
that theology, the "science of God'' or the "truths we know 
about God put into a system," is an especially significant 
branch of knowledge and that its omission would seriously 
impair our understanding of all sciences and their rela-
tions.23 For not to know an important part that bears sig-
nificantly on other parts is to jeopardize our knowledge of 
the other parts and the whole. We cannot exclude theology 
or religious truth without compartmentalizing the sciences. 
That the principle of the wholeness of knowledge 
22Ibid. 
23Ibid., p. 65. 
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also plays a substantive role in Discourse III is readily 
24 
apparent. It underlies the right relation of sciences 
and underscores their relative importance. To say that 
knowledge is whole is to affirm that knowledge is one and 
integral. Omission of a part and neglect of due relations 
destroys that integrity. Much as it did in Discourse II, 
the principle gives Discourse III its thematic direction, 
one pointing toward the ultimate apprehension of the whole 
truth and one requiring a science whose principles illum-
inate that truth by shedding their light and influence up-
on its parts. Thus, the principle might also be said to 
direct the mind toward an understanding of the nature of a 
university that purposes to seek the whole truth by teach-
ing all the sciences that reflect it. 25 
No less apparent in Discourse III is Newman's as-
sumption that God exists. 26 His whole argument on the ex-
24Ibid., p. 57· 
25The relationship can be expressed in other ways. 
For example, we can say that the sciences of a university 
interlock. This interlock binds all of them. Some links 
are stronger and, consequently, more important. Theology 
is such a link. Its strength, especially, binds partial 
truths with the whole. Without the interlock and without 
the stronger ~inks, there is no chain, but only separate 
links. Separate links of knowledge make a whole chain of 
knowledge impossible. 
26Idea of a University, p. 62. In Discourses II and 
III, Newman does not attempt to prove the existence of God. 
He merely assumes it. 
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istence of theology as a science, its merits, relative im-
portance, and consequent inclusion in a university hinges 
on that assumption. If God exists, then the science that 
treats of the truths we know about Him should be duly rec-
ognized. If God exists, theology or the "science of God" 
has merit equal to that of any science dealing with a fact 
of reality. If God exists, the science that specially 
pertains to Him is important for our understanding of all 
sciences because His influence extends to all sciences. If 
God exists, theology is a valid science with an undeniable 
impact on other sciences. Finally, if God exists, the ex-
clusion of theology from a university would work a disser-
vice on the other sciences, the other parts, because it 
wouid impair the whole, mutilate· the circle, and throw 
knowledge out of joint. 27 Correspondingly, if God does not 
exist, as Newman understands Him, then theology would not 
constitute a science, would not have any merit in itself or 
importance to other sciences, and its exclusion would be no 
great loss. But admit a personal God like Newman's and the 
wholeness of knowledge takes on a significantly different 
light. 
Of equal importance in Discourse III is the inter-
disciplinary grasp, which is the principle of the wholeness 
of knowledge applied to students. Here, again, Newman em-
Z7Ibid., p. 69. 
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ploys it as a process of viewing sciences, the parts of 
knowledge, in their proper disposition to each other and 
the whole of knowledge. He calls this exercise the "sci-
ence of sciences." It synthesizes the partial with the 
whole view, the partial with the whole truth, many segments 
of knowledge with the whole, and particular facts with the 
"one large system or complex fact" 28 of all that exists, as 
contemplated by the mind. 'vvhen Newman affirms that theol-
ogy cannot be omitted without detriment to the whole and 
other parts of knowledge, he is no more than exercising 
the "science of sciences" to develop his theme. 29 
After the content of Discourses II and III has been 
examined for an assumption, a principle of wholeness-, and a 
correlative view that shape its thematic unity,3° it might 
28Ibid., p. 52. 
29For a rather extensive treatment of the "science 
of sciences," see Culler, pp. 1~2-1S6, 251, 257, 265, and 
2?0. 
30The influence that the assumption of the existence 
of God, the principle of the wholeness of knowledge, or the 
interdisciplinary grasp all wield in shaping the thematic 
unity of Discourses II ana III cannot be overstressed. 
Principle deals with the partial branches that make up the 
whole of knowledge. It justifies Newman's contention for 
the place of theology and its inclusion in a university 
that purposes to teach not partial knowledge or truth but 
the whole range of knowledge and gamut of truth. Assump-
tion treats of the whole and parts of knowledge in relation 
to the existence of a God 't'lho makes them ultimately mean-
ingful. The interdisciplinary grasp incorporates partial 
views into as whole a view as the mind can comprehend. 
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also be examined for evidence of yet another cohesive de-
vice, that of structural unity.3l Within the structure of 
the two questions that open Discourse II and the summarized 
arguments that conclude Discourse III, two answers to the 
first question are enclosed. Again, that question asks 
whether theology ought to be treated in a university. The 
whole of Discourse II provides one complete answer. It 
responds syllogistically that a university must teach all 
sciences, that theology is a science, and therefore, that 
a university must teach theology. The parts of Discourse 
II support the major and minor of that argument. Corre-
spondingly, the whole of Discourse III provides a second 
answer to the first question of Discourse II. It states 
that to omit theology from a university is not only to im-
pair the whole of knowledge by a major omission but also 
to impair the parts, as well, by the importance of the 
omission.32 
Discourses II and III move from question to answer 
31Before going on to structural unity, one should 
note that principle, assumption, and view also come to 
grips in some way with the problem of the one and the many. 
The principle of the wholeness of knowledge treats of the 
relation of many parts to the ~ whole of knowledge; as-
sumption, the relation of many aspects of truth to the ~ 
whole truth which is God; "connected view", the relation of 
man~ partial views to the one whole view that encompasses 
the right disposition of arr-things. 
32Idea of a Universitv, pp. 57-58. 
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with an organizing principle of wholeness which can be 
viewed as equivocal by reference to that found in the 
wholeness of theme. A part-whole relationship can be seen 
in the structural composition of each discourse. The parts 
of each contribute to the structural wholeness of both. 
used as an Aristotelian equivocal by reference, "wholeness" 
of structure constitutes a secondary instance of "whole-
ness" of theme. Then too, for the perception of this 
structural wholeness, there is required an interrelated 
view not unlike that exercised in establishing the oneness 
of theme. 
Discourses II and III are structurally unified. 
Their structural wholeness complements their thematic in-
tegrity. When Newman relates one section of Discourse II 
to another and to the whole to show that theology is a sci-
ence, which cannot be excluded from a university;JJ when 
he, section by section, shows the relation of one science 
to another, especially theology to other sciences; when he 
JJThe sections of Discourse II relate to each other 
and the whole along these lines: statement of the ques-
tion; answer in the form of a syllogism; support for the 
major premise by definition and from two authorities; a 
general principle and specific illustration in support of 
the major premise; support for the minor in the form of a 
response to an objection; a major assumption of the thesis. 
The various parts of the discourse constitute New-
man's whole first response to the question of whether the-
ology should be excluded from a university. The answer, of 
course, is that its exclusion would constitute a grave 
omission, one that would hinder the attainment of truth. 
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employs the makeup of the discourses to point out that the 
partial view, representative of one science, must be relat-
ed to the whole view of all sciences taken together; when 
he, part by part, shows that the partial truth of one sci-
ence must be seen in its proper disposition to the whole 
truth of all sciences; when he by various sections of Dis-
course III captures the bearing of theology upon other 
sciences so that its exclusion is not tolerable without 
neglect to part and to the whole;34 when he, in short, uses 
the structural parts of each discourse to reflect the 
wholeness of knowledge, and to reflect the need to view 
knowledge as one, he does then appear to reflect his theme 
by the appropriate structure. By unifying structurally the 
segments of each discourse, he shores up his thematic pur-
pose. His structure suggests his meaning because all 
parts of the two discourses blend to shape the formal 
structural picture of the two discourses, much the same as 
all branches of knowledge unite to form his thematic view 
of the wholeness of knowledge. 
Concentration on the part-whole relationship or the 
complementary nature of theme and structure, however, 
should not exclude the more distinctively Aristotelian 
34In a similar manner, Newman uses the parts of Dis-
course III to issue a second response to the first question 
of Discourse II. This response states, in short, that to 
~xclude theology is to impair the other sciences by the 
~mportance of that omitted. 
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interpretation that one may assign to the relation of theme 
and structure in Discourses II and III. That interpreta-
tion, following Owens• thesis, addresses itself to the 
"wholeness" of theme and the "wholeness" of structure as 
Aristotelian equivocals by reference.35 Again, it should 
be noted that such equivocals have a common name but dif-
ferent forms and definitions. Although the forms differ, 
there is some unity by reference. Furthermore, the true 
nature of the term or, more precisely, the object it sig-
nifies, is found only in the primary instance. Every other 
instance has a special independent relation to the primary 
one. In Discourses II and III, wholeness is expressed in 
various ways but always in reference to something one, one 
form that is whole primarily. The primary instance of 
wholeness in the foregoing discourses is the wholeness of 
knowledge in relation to studies and also in relation to 
students.36 Accordingly, all knowledge is one, and it must 
be viewed in an integrated fashion. The unity of the view 
and the subject viewed is the theme for both discourses. 
Considered as the primary instance, the wholeness of knowl-
edge makes Newman's theme for Discourses II and III what it 
35see Ch. I, pp. 39-45, for a detailed explanation 
of Aristotelian equivocity. See Owens, pp. 259-267. 
36In general, the principle of the wholeness of 
knowledge is applied primarily to studies in Discourses II, 
III, and IV; to students, in V, VI, VII, and VIII. 
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really is. It gives Entity.37 This principle renders New-
man's theme formally intelligible and makes his contention 
for the inclusion of theology in a university eminently 
reasonable,38 
The wholeness of knowledge is the primary, formal 
instance of wholeness in both discourses. It constitutes 
a primary, formal, thematic instance of wholeness that 
takes precedence over any other instance. It is that pri-
mary instance of wholeness that distinguishes the part-
whole relationship of sciences from the part-whole rela-
tionship of structure in the two discourses. The primary 
instance is a thematic one by which Newman links Discourses 
II and III in principle and form. The secondary instance 
in the aforesaid discourses is the structural whole their 
respective parts do comprise. In this context, structure 
is whole and has Entity or form only to the extent that it 
refers to the primary instance, the theme or wholeness of 
knowledge; for theme alone contains in itself the formal 
nature of wholeness for Discourses II and III. The Entity 
of wholeness here is that formed by all branches of knowl-
edge and the integrated view by which they are held. 
37The Entity of the wholeness of knowledge is the 
primary instance of the Being of the wholeness of knowledge. 
38As the form, Entity or what-IS-Being, the princi-
ple of wholeness provides ~knowability". See Ch. I, pp. 
77-78, above. 
Again, structure derives its Entity only in reference to 
that thematic oneness. 
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As equivocals by reference, thematic and structural 
wholeness appear in some ways the same and in other ways 
different. They seem the same in that all sciences are 
necessary for a structurally whole picture of Discourses II 
and III. Thematic and structural wholeness also appear 
similar in the sense that both deal with part to whole re-
lationships -- partial knowledge to the whole of knowledge, 
partial truths to the whole truth, partial views to the 
whole view, and partial structural segments to the whole 
developed picture. They differ fundamentally because theme 
deals with the relation of part to part and part to the 
whole of knowledge, while structure concerns the relation 
of partial answers to the complete one. The burden of 
their equivocity by reference, however, is to be found in 
the relationship between the primary instance that points 
to the interdisciplinary relation or view of the sciences 
and the secondary instance that stresses the structural in-
tegrity of Discourses II and III. On this relationship 
the equivocity hinges. Only in relation to it are theme 
and structure denominated "whole." 
Furthermore, if the importance of any part can be 
determined by its impact upon other parts, then Discourses 
II and III are very significant indeed to the overall theme 
and structure of the Idea. Thematically, Discourse II is 
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crucial because the principle of wholeness stated therein 
governs the whole Idea. Structurally, Discourse II is 
pivotal inasmuch as the direction of subsequent discourses 
turns on answers to the two questions it proposes.39 Dis-
course III is no less important for the elaboration of 
theme and structure it provides. As its theme, it reaf-
firms the place of theology in a university, employing the 
sa~e principle supplied in Discourse II. In its structure 
it contributes a second answer to the first question of the 
previous discourse. 
In the context of Aristotelian equivocity by ref-
erence, Discourses II and III appear equally important for 
the whole of the Idea because their thematic and structural 
wholeness mirror the thematic·and structural wholeness of 
succeeding discourses. The primary instance of wholeness 
for all of the Idea is the integrity of all knowledge and 
the interdisciplinary view of all sciences. The secondary 
instance is the structural oneness of the discourses that 
suitably reflects the basic integrity of various branches 
of knowledge. From the standpoint of an Aristotelian in-
quiry that makes the theme and structure of the whole Idea 
more intelligible, the Aristotelian approach appears well 
suited. The interrelation of knowledge is applicable to 
all the discourses, not merely the second and third. It 
39Idea of a University, p. 33· 
re0isters the highest, the primary instance of wholeness in 
:-Jewman' s work and relates unmistakably to theme. A corre-
spending oneness of structure not only refers back to theme 
but also might be said to complement it. If this wholeness 
of theme and structure can be adequately established and 
some proportional relation between primary and secondary 
instances assigned, then the reader will have a useful 
Aristotelian key to a better understanding of the unity of 
the Idea. 
now, then, do the remaining discourses form a the-
matic and structural whole? 3tructurally, Discourses II-IX 
treat two subordinate issues raised at the beginning of 
Discourse II. Again, the first of these asks whether the-
olo~y ought to be taught in a university; the second, 
whether a university should make utility its major concern. 
3oth issues are considered subordinate because they elab-
orate a larger issue. They constitute part of a larger 
question of just what is a university. This, in turn, 
forms part of a still larger issue, treated earlier as l'iew-
man's preeminent concern, the nature of a Catholic univer-
. t 40 1 . Sl y. In genera , Newman uses Dlscourses II, III, IV, 
VIII, and IX to answer the first question. Ee employs Dis-
courses V, VI, and VII to respond to the second. In elabo-
rating and responding to the two questions of Jiscourse II, 
40
see Ch. II of this study for a treatment of that 
major issue. 
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the foregoing discourses constitute important structural 
parts of the whole answer to the question of what makes up 
the nature of a Catholic university. 41 
The modes of wholeness considered previously reflect 
some of the ways that wholeness can be treated in the Idea. 
Wholeness can be expressed in many ways; but in keeping 
with the Aristotelian schema, it must always be expressed 
in reference to one definite nature. 42 Again, the one def-
inite nature, the form or the primary instance of wholeness 
in the Idea, is the interrelated nature of knowledge and 
the interdisciplinary manner in which sciences are held. 4J 
Everything else considered whole refers back to this pri-
mary wholeness, whether it be that which produces the 
wholeness, that of which the wholeness is the sign or the 
one for whom the wholeness is formulated. This dependence 
holds especially true for the organization of the dis-
courses. Structurally, the Idea is almost an artistically 
41All of the foregoing discourses, by their elabora-
tion and response to these two subordinate questions, do, in 
fact, "form" the answer to Newman's question of what consti-
tutes the essential nature and scope of a university. 
42 See Owens, p. 265. 
4JApart from the Idea, the primary instance of 
wholeness would probably-oe-that wholeness of knowledge or 
interdisciplinary grasp of knowledge found in the mind of 
God. In reference to His interrelated knowledge or "con-
nected view," the one in the Idea would be a secondary in-
stance. ----
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perfect whole to which not much more need be added and from 
which little can be removed without damage to the whole. 
In general, the structural unity of the discourses 
is assured by the uninterrupted interdependence of the 
parts -- the issues and the responses. More specifically, 
structural oneness is achieved by the response of all nine 
discourses to the primary and secondary issues raised in 
the Preface and Discourse I, by the elaboration of these 
issues that the two questions of Discourse II provide, and 
by the charge they impose for a response in subsequent dis-
courses. The structural unification of the whole Idea is 
further enhanced by the three questions raised in Discourse 
VI. 44 While Discourses II and III contribute two answers 
to the first question of Discourse II, the fourth discourse 
supplies a third answer to the same question. Discourses 
V-VII focus on responses to the second question raised in 
Discourse II. The sixth, seventh, and eighth discourses 
respond to the issues raised in Discourse VI, serving at 
the same time to elaborate the second issue raised in Dis-
course II, which, in turn, elaborates the primary and sec-
ondary issues raised in the Preface and Discourse I. 
Central to any consideration of the leading ques-
tions raised in Discourse II and the proper thematic or 
4~Idea of a University, p. 115. These deal with the 
relation of intellectual culture to "mere knowledge," "pro-
fessional knowledge," and "religious knowledge." 
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structural unification of subsequent discourses is the 
principle of the wholeness of knowledge. It serves as an 
ideal unifying principle. It supplies an orderly world or 
context for the generation of Newman's thematic response to 
the basic issues he proposes. It might be said to activate 
. 
or complete, in a formal Aristotelian sense, the matter of 
Newman's idea of a university. It is the "soul" that in-
forms the "body" of his work. Considered in the context 
of Aristotelian equivocity by reference, the principle con-
stitutes the primary instance of wholeness in all the dis-
courses. For in addition tO unifying thematically the dis-
courses, it structurally relates them to one another and to 
the whole, specifically,.by showing structurally the rela-
tionship of theology to other branches of knowledge. To 
reflect the integral relationship of the sciences, the 
structural unity of the work also requires an interdisci-
plinary point of view. The principle of wholeness inte-
grates and harmonizes the nine discourses, moving them well 
along toward what the Idea structurally ought to be. It 
provides the form that makes the nine discourses whole. 
It helps make the work a totality that, one suspects, re-
flects the totality of view and the integrity of the man 
who presented the discourses. The totality of the work 
also appeals to the person who would read the Idea with a 
total, integrated view. 
Much the same as other parts of the Idea, Discourses 
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II and III strike the reader with a sense of actuality and 
formality that can be viewed profitably in terms of equi-
vocity by reference. The reader perceives this sense in 
the subject matter and form of the university program New-
man proposes. He also notes it in the formal issue or 
primary instance of issue that constitutes what is the real 
question of Newman•s idea of a university. This sense of 
actua]j_ -~y and formality is no less perceptible in the 
grounds or primary instance of grounds on which the idea 
is treated. , It is also present in the formal nature of 
wholeness, the primary instance of wholeness, that speci-
fies theme and structure. The reader can also observe a 
sense of actuality and formality in the unifying principle 
that might be said to govern and to activate the whole 
work. The key to formality and actuality, its primary in-
stance in this case, appears to be the wholeness of knowl-
edge considered in the context of its interrelated subject 
matter or interdisciplinary view. Repeatedly, primary and 
secondary instances of the principle of wholeness arise. 
Then, too, there is the example of a specific work 
being actualized before our very eyes. Although this pro-
cess is evident in many works, it appears to hold espe-
cially true in this case where we see the idea of a univer-
sity -- its issues, grounds, theme, and structure -- being 
actualized, formed, and perfected in a singular manner. 
The ultimate factor is the form or formal cause that makes 
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this idea of a university newman's and not someone else's. 
?orm gives the idea Entity and provides its what-IS-Being. 
The formal cause of the idea is the "connected view" or 
the interdisciplinary grasp of all sciences. It is the 
formal, shaping, inner, vital, necessary, and unchanging 
principle that makes Newman's idea of a university distinc-
tive. 
It is not enough, Newman says, for a student to 
know well just one area of knowledge. Neither is it suffi-
cient that an instructor sit in his chair confident in a 
firm grasp of his own discipline. .3oth must know and do 
more than that. Their views must be more comprehensive. 
Once we concede that in reading Newman's Idea we 
should focus on "the wholeness of knowledge or the inter-
disciplinary view as an important key to the form or actu-
ality of the work, our understanding gathers around our 
formal response to its issues, grounds, theme, and struc-
ture because it arises from it. The actuality of the fore-
going elements in the work points to the sense of actuality 
by which they should be interpreted. The correlative pat-
tern of the discourses reflects the interrelated nature of 
the knowledge or sciences whose relations, especially in 
reference to theology, the structure of the discourses is 
supposed to show. In other words, the actuality of issues, 
grounds, theme, and structure should be mirrored in the 
actuality of our integrated view of them. If all knowledge 
173 
is one, and if the relationship of the various branches is 
adequately conveyed by the structure of the discourses, 
then our view as readers or listeners should also be one 
and integral. If it is, we bear the whole work in our re-
sponse. Then our response might be said to be formed and 
shaped by the work's theme. The principle of the wholeness 
of knowledge mandates that one perceive the proper disposi-
tion of the discourses and the branches of knowledge whi~h 
they treat in right relation to each other and to the 
whole. Accordingly, our understanding of the meaning of 
Newman's Idea is shaped by our correct, formal integrated 
view. This response also renders our vision of the Idea 
whole, for different facets of the Idea are being read and 
treated consistently as primary and secondary instances of 
the wholeness of knowledge or the interdisciplinary view. 
This approach, used consistently, reflects a valid, phil-
osophically connected view, with Aristotelian equivocity by 
reference being employed as its most distinctive schematic 
device. Furthermore, if a sense of actuality is present 
to the degree pointed out in this chapter, and form is the 
key to that sense of actuality, then the formal cause of 
the Idea would appear to merit some extended consideration. 
This will be given in a later chapter. 45 
~5The interdisciplinary view as the formal cause of 
Newman's idea of a university will be treated inCh. VI of 
this study. 
CHAPTER V 
A DISCORDMiT NOTE SOUNDED IN DISCOURSE IV 
In Discourse II, Newman raises the question whether 
theology ought to be taught in a university. In Discourses 
II and III, he responds that it should for a variety of 
reasons. For him, a university that professes to teach all 
sciences must teach theology. The omission of theology im-
pairs the wholeness of knowledge and inhibits the attain-
ment of truth. Then, too, Newman feels that all sciences 
bear on each other to such an extent that it is impossible 
to teach all properly unless each science is taken into 
account, and that includes theology. Moreover, the omis-
sion of theology would be injurious to the whole and parts 
of knowledge in view of its importance and its pervasive 
influence on all sciences. In Discourse IV, Newman pro-
vides yet another response to the same question. He states 
there that, if theology is excluded from its rightful 
place, other sciences will usurp its province and preroga-
tives. He employs the major part of the discourse to sup-
port that assertion. 
Underlying the examples used in support is Newman's 
principle that the dislocation of one important science 
from the whole territory of knowledge must certainly result 
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in the rush of other sciences to fill its place and that 
the rush is oftentimes accompanied by hostility. In Dis-
course IV, he cites repeated examples of such encroachment 
and hostility in regard to theology. Because the examples 
given run so distinctively counter to the educational doc-
trine advanced by Newman in earlier discourses, they merit 
our close attention. In this chapter, I purpose to con-
sider the examples in some detail with a view to showing, 
from Newman's point of view, the damage done when secular 
sciences exceed their rights and intrude where they do not 
belong. The first injury wrought by such usurpation is the 
destruction of the integrity of all knowledge by the prac-
tical omission of one of its most important parts. No less 
important is the damage done to the "connected view." The 
action of the usurping science undermines the interdisci-
plinary grasp of all knowledge that ought to be present. 
Such acti6n reflects a myopic view of the "relative dispo-
sition of things." It discounts the value of a real com-
prehensive view and satisfies itself with the illusion of 
a partial one. The most damaging effect of all, however, 
is that the usurpation of theology's province jeopardizes 
the attainment of truth. For Newman, the object of knowl-
edge is truth. Different sciences supply different ap-
proaches to truth. Theology is the best approach to truth, 
in Newman's view, because its proper study is the One Who 
comprises the whole of truth. Theology provides facts to 
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other sciences which they, left to themselves, have neither 
the capacity nor the means to ascertain. Thus, Newman con-
cludes that secular sciences need theology if a more com-
plete grasp of truth is to be had. 
As well as any of its predecessors and better than 
most of its successors, Discourse IV points up the discord 
that oftentimes arises between secular science and theology 
due to a misunderstanding of respective roles and a frag-
mented view of the wholeness of knowledge. It cites re-
peated examples of, if not secular science caught up in a 
vortex of defiance of theological science, at least of cor-
relative, sometimes subsidiary and handmaiden, sciences 
attempting to usurp the province and prerogatives of the-
ology.1 Newman asserts most emphatically that 
••• if you drop any science out of the circle of 
knowledge, you cannot keep its place vacant for it; 
that science is forgotten; the other sciences close 
up, or, in other words, they exceed their pro~er 
bounds, and intrude where they have no right. 
Discourse IV reflects an acute problem of communications 
and recognition between theology and other branches of 
knowledge. It traces the maturation of the seeds of intel-
lectual and educational discord sown and reaped by persons 
who do not know the limitations of their own sciences and 
1Idea of a University, p. 77. Newman refers to some 
Fine Arts as the "special attendants" of Religion. 
2Ibid., pp. 73-74. 
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who do not stay in their own fields. What gives them the 
right, Newman inquires; for in his judgment 
men, whose life lies in the cultivation of one 
science, or the exercise of one method of thought, 
have no more right, though they have often more 
ambition, to generalize upon the basis of their own 
pursuit but beyond its range, than the schoolboy or 
the ploughman to judge of a Prime Minister.J 
Although, to some extent, the discourse bears out 
the need for theology also to maintain its place and not go 
beyond its scope, it is entirely consistent with Newman's 
aim that the emphasis should fall on secular intrusions in 
theological matters. 4 The discourse spells out the wrongs 
that theology suffers from the secular scientific world in 
which it finds itself. It af:(irms that "if Theology is not 
allowed to occupy its .own territory ••• , sciences which are 
quite foreign to Theology will take possession of it."5 
If theology is displaced, it further notes, 
these foreign sciences will assume certain prin-
ciples as true, and act upon them, which they 
neither have authority to lay down themselves, nor 
appeal to any other higher science to lay down for 
them.6 
Accordingly, the Painter, the Antiquarian, the Philosophic 
Jibido f Po 76 I 
4Newman's purpose is that no science be excluded 
from its rightful place in a university, least of all the-
ology. 
5Idea of a University, p. 91. 
6Ibid. 
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Historian, the Comparative Anatomist, and the Political 
Economist will be found exceeding their territorial bound-
aries and making "enunciations, not of Science, but of Pri-
vate Judgment."? This judgment, in turn, will infect 
"every science which it touches with a hostility to Theol-
ogy ...... a If theology is not taught, the discourse con-
eludes, 
its province will not simply be neglected, but 
will be actually usurped by other sciences, which 
will teach, without warrant, conclusions of their 
own in a subject-matter which needs its own proper 
principles for its due formation and disposition,9 
Discourse IV underscores the damage done by the usurper in 
the form of studies fragmented, educational boundaries vio-
lated, and legitimate disciplinary rights curtailed. 
Underlying the treatment is the harm wrought to the whole-
ness of knowledge and to a "connected view .. of such knowl-
edge. If the exponent of one science usurps the preroga-
tives of another science, the usurper de facto shows he 
does not recognize the wholeness of knowledge. Furthermore, 
by trying to make his partial, limited view more than it 
is, he gives ample evidence of his loss of a "connected 
view" of the sciences. 
Discourse IV also treats of the hostility often 
?Ibid., p. 92. 
8Ibid. 
9Ibid., p. 9J. 
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accompanying this disjointed view of secular and theologi-
cal boundaries. It points out that 
the hostility in question, when it occurs, is 
coincident with an evident deflection or exorbitar.ce 
of Science from its proper course; and that this 
exorbitance is sure to take place ••• if Theology be 
not Present to defend its own boundaries and to 
hinder the encroachment.lO 
Featured in the discourse are men of various sciences who 
do not tolerate, much less respect, other sciences. Typi-
cally, each has "the obstinacy of the bigot, whom he 
scorns, without the bigot's apology, that he has been 
taught, as he thinks, his doctrine from heaven." 11 He is 
"a man of one idea" meaning "a man of one science." 12 His 
view, partly true and partly false, has limited value be-
cause it is so partial. 13 Re may expound 
principles, all of them true to a certain point, 
yet all degenerating into error and quackery, be-
cause they are carried to excess, viz. at the point 
where they require interpretation and restraint 
from other quarters and because they are em~loyed 
to do what is simply too much for them •••• l 
At any rate, the "man of one idea" who tries to make his 
limited science the whole of knowledge, or at least, more 
10Ibid. , P• 91. 
11Ibid., P• 76. 
12Ibid. 
lJibid. 
14Ibid. 
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than it is, plants the seeds of disrespect, discord, and 
hostility in what should be a garden of mutually tolerant 
and supportive interdisciplinary relationships. The fruit 
is unfortunate for all sciences involved. 
It is not difficult to see why Newman finds a useful 
example in the Fine Arts. Modify the proper view and there 
can be easily visualized these "high ministers of the Beau-
tiful and the noble" no longer serving as the "plain, 
special attendants and handmaids of Religion." 15 Disregard 
the wholeness of knowledge and "they are apt to forget 
their place, and, unless restrained with a firm hand, in-
stead of being servants, will aim at becoming principals."16 
Instead of ministering to the ends of Religion, they will 
subject Religion to their own .limited purposes. The dis-
cord, the clash between secular and divine science, would 
then become readily apparent. Painting and Gothic sculp-
ture might also be used to represent the struggle subsidi-
ary sciences can wage against that science from which they 
oftentimes draw their greatest vigor and sustenance. The 
prudence that sometimes comes with age and experience 
might have dictated another course of action for those arts 
had they been more wisely employed. But not being so pru-
dent or wise, their ministers defy what is to them an ill-
l5Ibid., p. 77. 
16Ibid. 
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founded convention of religious authority or responsibil-
ity and move on to an ultimately groundless scientific 
feud. Is this senseless feud of the Church's making? Both 
sides recognized the province and governance of the Church 
at an earlier time. Why now are the Fine Arts no longer 
able to recognize them? Newman responds that they have 
lost their wholeness of view. The result is the cause of 
Religion being subverted, while corrupt nature and the 
powers of darkness are being served. 17 
In the Comparative Anatomist who denies the immoral-
ity of the sou1, 18 Newman cites another example in support 
of his point that "any secular science, cultivated exclu-
l?Ibid., p. ?8. Inasmuch as Newman displays an un-
fortunate tendency to identify Revelation, theology, Faith, 
and religion, I think his use of these terms should be 
clarified. By theology, Newman means the "Science of God, 
or the truths we know about God put into a system," (Idea, 
p. 65). Revelation would be the major source of these 
truths. Faith is the acceptance of Revealed Truth. It is, 
moreover, an intellectual act whose object is truth and 
whose result is knowledge (Idea, p. 39). Religion, for 
Newman, reflects an effort, embracing all the faculties of 
a man, to imitate Christ. In line with Harrold's apt des-
cription (Harrold, p. ~?), religion for Newman means a to-
tal human experience. It is not a matter of mere feeling 
or sentiment. It involves "cultivation" of one•s "intel-
lect," "imagination," "will," "moral sense," and "social 
sense" to "transform the religious ideal into the real •••• " 
I might add that, for Newman, the relation of religion to 
Faith and Revelation is one of agenda to credenda. Reli-
gion entails the transformation of that which ought to be 
believed into that which ought to be done. 
18
rdea of a University, p. 82. 
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sively, may become dangerous to Religion." 19 This serves 
as one more example of discord in the garden of the sci-
ences, a disharmony stemming from a fragmented view of the 
wholeness of knowledge. In this case, the Anatomist does 
not recognize the respective roles of medicine and theol-
ogy. Once more, Newman discovers an advocate of one sci-
ence attempting to make the whole of knowledge what is but 
a limited part and to foster as a who~e view what is no 
more than a partial one. This attempt is all the more sur-
prising, Newman feels, in view of the fact that " ••• if 
there be a calling which feels its position and its dignity 
to ~ie in abstaining from controversy and in cultivating 
kindly feelings with men of all opinions, it is the medical 
f . ,.:co pro ess1.on •••• While recognizing the Anatomist's duty 
to pursue his calling, Newman does not understand why he 
goes beyond his charge by throwing himself 
upon his own particular science, which is of a 
material character and [allowing] it to carry him 
forward into a subject-matter, wliere it [has] no 
right to give the law, viz., that of spiritual be-
ings, which directly belongs to the science of 
theology.21 
Yet the comparative Anatomist is reputed to be a respect-
able man. What Newman has heard of him indicates as much. 
19Ibid. , p. 74. 
20.ll2i£. , p. 82. 
~l_, 
. ' ,~2-33 • ~· I ;l;. 
18J 
It is just that he lays down the law in cases where he has 
no right. 
Another exa~ple of the encroachment of one science 
upon another is to be found in the Anglican dignitary who 
wrote a History of the Jews. 22 He appears to Newman a 
moral-minded man, but he exceeds his disciplinary bounda-
ries because of poor judgment, insufficient ecclesiastical 
authority, and ignorance of his historical position. His 
questionable judgment leads him to an external view of this 
history and to a secular adaptation of it. He does not see 
that his view in the matter is limited and that the princi-
ples which he employs legitirr.ately in one discipline degen-
erate into "error" and "quackery" when applied to another. 
Another problem is that this author has "no teaching, to 
which he is bound to defer, which might rule that to be 
false which attracted him by its speciousness." 2J had he 
been a Roman Catholic, he might have been saved from this 
error. Had he been more prudent and knowledgeable of the 
limitations of respective sciences, perhaps he would not 
have been "betrayed into a false step by the treacherous 
fascination of what is called the Philosophy of His-
t .,24 ory •••• ~ore interdisciplinary discord is the only 
22Ibid., p. 8J. 
ZJibid., p. 8J. 
24Ibid. 
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fruit engendered by this effort. The Philosophy of History 
is "good in its place," Newman adds, "but can scarcely be 
applied in cases where the Al.rnighty has superseded the 
natural laws of society and history." 25 
Discourse IV strikes a further discordant note in 
the case of the Political Economist and his Inaugural Lec-
ture at Oxford. In this instance, Newman presents yet 
another example of a rupture in the theological-secular 
scientific relationship, a break resulting from the econo-
mist's distorted view and attempt at aggrandizement. The 
lecturer, "a gentlemen of high character," in a university 
"removed more than any other Protestant body of the day 
from sordid or unchristian principles on the subject of 
money-making," 26 advances a theory that extends well beyond 
the scope of his discipline. He does not merely propose 
that there is a science of wealth with rules for its ac-
quirement, distribution, disposal, and the like. Instead, 
his object is to recommend the science of wealth " ••• claim-
ing for it an ethical quality, viz., ••• extolling it as the 
road to virtue and happiness, whatever Scripture and holy 
men may say to the contrary. .. 27 These are not matters, in 
Newman's judgment, that pertain to economics. Moreover, if 
~5Ibid. 
26Ibid. , p. 85. 
27Ibid., p. 86. 
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he feels theology abused in the other instances cited, New-
m~~ especially feels the hurt of the encroachment of eco-
nomics upon theological matters in the setting of a Chris-
tian university. This, for Newman, is a most representa-
tive example of theology falling "prey" to the unwarranted 
excursions of a science into an area where it does not be-
long. Theology is being "put out of possession;., its sub-
ject matter is being seized by another science too anxious 
to exceed its rights. As a result of this intrusion, vir-
tue and happiness become questions of .,Private Judgment" 
rather than of theological science, and they are deprived 
of the higher and more heavenly context in which Newman 
feels they should be considered. Whether led to this posi-
tion by an over-zealous preoccupation with his own science 
or by error of private judgment, the lecturer has created 
discord among the sciences by usurping the subject area of 
one of its prominent members, theology. Any more than the 
Fine Arts, Comparative Anatomy, or History, Political hcon-
omy is not to be constitued "the sole exponent of all 
things in heaven and earth."28 
In antiquarian and historical research, Newman cites 
still another example of the usurpation attempted by some 
to the prejudice of theology. He does not deny that the 
"evidence of History ••• is invaluable in its place; but, if 
~8Ibid., p. 74. 
186 
it assumes to be the sole means of gaining Religious Truth, 
it goes beyond its place."29 Gibbon sees it otherwise. He 
"argues against the darkness at the Passion, from the acci-
dent that it is not mentioned by Pagan historians •••• "JO 
Protestants argue against Transubstantiation and Arians 
against Christ's Divinity along parallel lines. Newman 
argues the lack of scientific foundation for such asser-
tions. In pleading his case before God and man, Newman 
reveals his respect for the wholeness of all sciences, 
while displaying his love for theology and filial loyalty 
to the Church. Once again, the seeds of interdisciplinary 
di"scord and hostility are sown through the agency of those 
who assume a larger office than it is their right to under-
take. 
In all these examples, Newman•s response merits our 
respect, if not our agreement. To be told that theology is 
not a science deserving of a Chair in a university would 
upset anyone with the kind of loyalty Newman felt for the 
Church. Add to that denial the further dimension of usur-
pation and hostility, and Newman's reaction becomes more 
understandable. So does his concern over the consequent 
disunity in the family of sciences. The right of theology 
to function in its area confronts the determination of 
29Ibid., p. 90. 
JOibid. 
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other sciences to limit or even completely deny that func-
tion. If, in Newman's words, the Church would attempt .. to 
determine the orbit of Jupiter by the Pentateuch" or "to 
install the Thomist philosophy in the schools of astronomy 
and medicine, .. then her efforts would be the root of the 
discord.Jl If, moreover, she would remain silent while 
"Divine Science is ostracized" or not defend her boundaries 
from the encroachment of Medicine, History, or Economics, 
then her weakness and temerity would constitute the source 
of the rupture, and the wrongs done her would be self-im-
posed.32 If, on the other hand, she maintains her place 
a~ong the sciences, while respecting the rights of other 
disciplines, the burden of the responsibility for the dis-
~armony lies elsewhere. It lies, to quote from the dis-
course itself, with the Antiquarian who says, "Nothing has 
ever taken place but is to be found in historical docu-
ments,"33 or with the Philosophic Historian who claims, 
"There is nothing in Judaism different from other political 
institutions,"34 or with the Anatomist who cries, "There 
Jlibid., p. 92. Newman fails to mention that the 
Church periOdically has intruded where she had no right, 
e.g., in the case of Galilee. 
J2Ibid. 
J3Ibid. , p. 91. 
34Ibid., p. 92. 
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is no soul beyond the brain,"J5 or with the Political Econ-
omist who avows, "hasy circumstances make men virtuous ... J6 
If we allow that the various branches of knowledge are one, 
that none can be neglected without prejudice to the rest, 
and that any disregard of this oneness can open the door 
to usurpation, then the foregoing statements appear igno-
rant and capricious. 
There are many parallels in the examples cited in 
Discourse IV. Each, according to Newman, causes a rupture 
in the right relationship that should exist between secular 
and sacred sciences. Each counters the notion, affirmed by 
Newman in the previous discourse, that "in order to have 
possession of truth at all, we must have the whole truth; 
and no one science, no two sciences, no family of scienc~s, 
nay, not even all secular science, is the whole truth ...... J7 
Each example, moreover, confirms a tendency not to recog-
nize that 
revealed truth enters to a very great extent into 
the province of science, philosophy, and literature, 
and that to put it on one side, in compliment to 
secular science, is simply, under coloyr of a com-
pliment to do science a great damage.J~ 
35Ibid. 
36Ibid. 
37Ibid., pp. 72-73· 
38Ibid., p. 73. 
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Each displays the hann wrought when "impatience acts in 
matters of research and speculation" or "in the case of 
every person whose education or pursuits are contract-
ed ...... J9 3y fonnal though counterfeit declaration, each 
also affirms its love and devotion to truth. Unfortunate-
ly, the love of each for the whole truth appears as un-
founded as the false judgment and statement by which each 
makes its false claim on a subject matter not its own. 
Newman points out that 
though they speak truth, they do not speak the 
whole truth; ••• they speak a narrow truth, and think 
it a broad truth; ••• their deductions must be com-
pared with other truths, which are acknowledged to 
be truths, in order to verify, complete and correct 
them.4-0 
Furthermore, each example reflects a measure of blindness, 
erring judgment, and haste. Each lacks insight. Each re-
veals deception by the exponent of a given science because 
that advocate fails to perceive that "the omission of any 
kind of knowledge whatever, human or divine is , as far 
as it goes, not knowledge, but ignorance."41 While theo-
logy suffers most here from the unwarranted excursions of 
secular science into its area, ultimately all sciences 
lose, for the encroachment of one science upon another 
39rbid., p. 76. 
40Ibid. , P• 89. 
41 Ibid. , p. 73. 
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jeopardizes the territorial security of all. 
Discourse IV illustrates well the notion that dis-
cord abounds and usurpation follows when there is little 
mutual respect and recognition between secular sciences and 
theology. Its examples depict the fragmentation of sci-
ences stemming from a disorder of minds lost in themselves 
and out of touch with the rights of other sciences and the 
demands of the wholeness of knowledge. ~ith various ex-
amples, it traces the genesis of the discord to a lack of 
charity, humility, and self-knowledge. It roots scientific 
discord in intolerance and pride. All of its examples run 
counter to the principle cited earlier and reaffirmed in 
Discourse IV that 
the various branches of science are intimately 
connected with each other, and form one whole, 
which whole is impaired, and to an extent which it 
is difficult to limit, by any considerable omission 
of knowledge, of whatever kind, and that revealed 
knowledge is very far indeed from an inconsiderable 
department of knowledge •••• 42 
The family of sciences should be a close-knit unit 
with a goodly measure of familial affection and respect to 
compensate for the different scope of its members' princi-
ples and subject matter. But the bond which characterized 
the relationship between theology and other sciences in 
former times appears no longer evident. Theology's hand-
maiden and sister sciences no longer respect "the important 
42~. 
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influence which theology in matter of fact does and must 
exercise over a great variety of sciences, completing and 
correcting them."4 3 The drift of the examples Newman 
cites serves only to show how they now begrudge and even 
deny this right. As a result, the bond of unity is gone, 
. 
and in its place disharmony, mistrust, and hostility pre-
vail. 
43Ibid., p. 92. 
CHAPT:SR. VI 
A PHILOSOPHICAL VIE¥/ OF NE·Nrt.AN 'S 
GROUND FLOOR IN DISCOURSES ·v AND VI 
Three earlier chapters of this study have considered 
the Catholic and secular university issues, the grounds on 
which they are treated, and the unity that characterizes 
Newman's thematic and structural development of them, with 
the Preface and Jiscourses I-IV serving to initiate the 
discussion. University issues, grounds, theme, and struc-
ture, all have been interpreted in terms of Aristotelian 
equivocity by reference. Using Discourses V and VI as a 
point of departure, I propose in this chapter to summarize 
some of the more significant material of the two foregoing 
chapters with a view to its interpretation in the light of 
an Aristotelian schematic device. i';lore specifically, my 
aim will be to consider: (1) the intellectual and educa-
tional context in which Newman offers a "connected view" as 
his educational ideal; (2) some Aristotelian notions on 
cause and their application to the ''connected view" as a 
principle of change; (J) some Aristotelian ~deas on ~ntity 
and their application to the "connected view" as that which 
gives Entity to Newman's idea of a university. The "con-
nected view" as a principle of change and a principle of 
192 
193 
~ntity will be treated after the manner of Aristotelian 
equivocity by reference. 1 Equivocity by reference concerns 
an order of priority. Up to this point, this study has ad-
dressed itself to an order of priority in dealing with the 
relation of secondary issues, like those of the nature of 
a secular university, the grounds of the inquiry, and the 
wholeness of theme and structure, to the primary issue of 
the nature of a Catholic university. The study has also 
concerned itself with an order of priority in discussing 
the relation of Newman's theological grounds to his philo-
sophical ones, and the relation of his wholeness of theme 
to a wholeness of structure. This chapter will deal with 
an order of priority in treating that which causes the idea 
of a university and gives it Entity. 
The treatment of the "connected view" as a principle 
of change and as a principle of Entity addresses itself to 
two questions. The first asks how the "connected view" is 
involved in the development of mere learning or unrelated 
branches of knowledge into the interdisciplinary grasp that 
is the idea of a university. The second considers how it 
is that mere unrelated sciences can take on a Being or 
~ntity they themselves do not possess. Both questions re-
late to previously treated issues, especially that of the 
1The material on cause and Entity, along with the 
schematic device employed, will b~ j_r~,wn fr't)JT, Jost~I-'h C\it'?"l • s 
interpretation of Aristotle. 
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fundamental nature of a university, 2 because they ask what 
makes the idea of a university to be what it is and why it 
is what it is. While it is true that both questions merit 
consideration in that they may serve to clarify i~ewman 's 
educational theme, even more significant, perhaps, is the 
fact that their answers require a philosophical explanation 
of Newman•s university ideal. At its core, the question of 
what makes the idea of a university to be what it is is a 
philosophical one and deserves a philosophical answer. 
Then, too, the questions of the cause and Entity of the 
idea are appropriate in view of the largely philosophical 
nature of Newman's total educational idea and treatment, 
e.g., philosophical grounds, philosophical habit of mind, 
philosophical wisdom, religion of philosophy, and man of 
philosophical habit. If, from a purely philosophical point 
of view, Newman"s treatment of that which causes the idea 
and gives it Entity appears to be manifold, some exa~ina-
tion and interpretation of his multiple presentation may 
very well be in order. But Newman's treatment of the 
causes of the idea does appear to be manifold. Further-
more, Newman•s total educational ideal embraces philosophi-
cal and religious elements. It looks to the intellectually 
cultivated Christian gentleman with a comprehensive view of 
this life and the next. Moreover, Newman's manifold treat-
2This problem is treated at some length in Chapters 
I and II, above. 
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ment of some causes of the idea must be investigated if the 
philosophical element of his whole educational idea is to 
be rightly understood.} 
That Newman does consider causality and speak of 
more than one type in relation to his educational ideal is 
evident from the content of Discourses V and VI. For ex-
ample, in discussing intellectual enlargement, Newman 
speaks of "the action of a formative power, reducing to or-
der and meaning the matter of our acquirements ... 4 The rna-
terial and formal causal implications here are fairly ap-
parent. Elsewhere, in the same discourse, Newman provides 
a second example of that concern when he wonders "whether 
Knowledge, that is, acquirement, is after all the real 
principle of the enlargement, or whether that principle is 
not rather something beyond it."5 In a third example, New-
man informs his audience of his purpose: "to show ••• that 
the end of a Liberal Education is not mere knowledge, or 
)Although, as Martin Svaglic and others have pointed 
out (Svaglic, pp. ix, xv, xx-xxiii), the dominance of the 
"connected view" as Newman"s idea of a university appears 
evident from the start, still the philosophical and theo-
logical contexts in which it assumes its dominant position 
have not been explained completely. An ideal that has so 
many philosophical and theological overtones warrants in-
vestigation in the light of those overtones. 
4 Idea of a University, p. 120. 
5Ibid., p. 118. 
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knowledge considered in its matter."6 For Newman, mere 
knowledge is a condition of intellectual cultivation but 
not an end of Liberal 2ducation. Still another example of 
:;evr.nan · s interest in formal or final causality is to be 
seen in Nev1man' s declaration that "[Libera:D knowledge is, 
not merely a means to something beyond it, ••• but an end 
sufficient to rest in and to pursue for its own sake ...... ? 
Final causality also comes to mind when we see Newman pon-
der "what is the end of University .education, and of the 
Liberal or Philosophical i(nowledge which I conceive it to 
. t ,8 lmpar •••• I\ewman supplies additional evidence of his 
interest in formal or final causality when he affirms that 
"there is a knowledge worth possessing for what it is, and 
not merely for what it does. ,.C) In a seventh example, l'iew-
man points out that "Knowledge is called by the name of 
Science or Philosophy, when it is acted upon [an~ infor-
d ,10 me •••• Although there are other examples that could 
61" . d 
___2.L_. , P• 117. 
'I I bid., p. 97· 
tlibid. , pp. 96-97· 
9rbid. , pp. 105-106. 
10-b'd LL·, p. 10J. 
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be drmvn from the text, 11 the ones cited suffice to show 
r;ewman' s interest in causality and his ma...'1.ifold approach 
to the causality of his educational ideal. 
In contrast to his multiple treatment of cause, 
Newman has very little to say directly on that which gives 
3eing or Entity to the idea of a university. At least, he 
does not discuss the matter in those terms. But the inter-
preter of the idea may so discuss it. In view of !'~ewman 's 
treatment of the causality of the idea, it appears reason-
able that the interpreter should follow up a causal analy-
sis of the idea with a correlative interpretation of its 
ultimate Being. 12 What matters, however, is that the phil-
osophical scheme employed to discuss the Being of the idea 
should correspond to that used to analyze the causality of 
the idea. Aristotle's equivocal treatment of cause ana 
~ntity, as interpreted by Joseph Owens, lends itself to 
11some equally suitable material will be cited later 
in the chapter in connection with the interdisciplinary 
grasp itself. See pp. 207, 208, 210, 213, 214, and 216. 
below. Examples cited on these pages would pertain, for 
the most part, to the formal causality of the idea of a 
university. 
12For to know the idea of a university, from an 
Aristotelian philosophical standpoint, is not merely to 
know the causes involved in the movement from unrelated 
learning to related learning but also to know that which 
gives the idea of a university its ultimate Being. The 
~ntity of the idea is the principle of the idea's ultimate 
intelligibility. The first approach emphasizes more how 
unrelated sciences become the interdisciplinary grasp. The 
second concentrates more on why the idea of a university 
has its Being. 
ooth treatments. r.:ore than that, it :provides an excellent 
~eans of reconciling Newman•s manifold treatment of ca.use. 13 
~qually i~portant, this Aristotelian schematic device makes 
9ossible a plausible explanation of those elements found in 
the chanze fro~ unrelated sciences to sciences grasped in 
an interdisciplinary fashion. Jeyond that, it offers a 
.rlausible means of ascertaining the .Eein:3 of the idea. 1l'he 
system enables one to pursue the ultimate "why" of the 
ide2 .• 14 .Finally, such an Aristotelian system helps insure 
the unity of :·rewman ~ s educational idea and the integrity of 
..... ' 1 t t. t t. . t l5 ~ne e emen s cons ~ u ~n~ 1 • 
i·Jotwi thstanding the fairly extensive critical com-
mentary on certain philosophical aspects of the Idea, 16 I 
do not beli·eve that anyone has attempted to explain the 
idea of a university in reference to the cause of its be-
coming what it is and in relation to the principle of its 
lJit does so by enabling one to determine .Primary 
and secondary instances of causality and the relationship 
between secondary instances and the prLnary one. 
14Although many readers tend to associate the ulti-
:nate "why" of something with its final cause, O..,vens makes 
the Aristotelian final cause ultimately identifiable with 
the formal. For o·,Nens, Aristotle reduces the final to 
for:nal. 
l5The study of the idea of a university in the li~ht 
of its causes and Entity and by ~eans of Aristotelian equiv-
oclty by reference advances the unity of the idea by the in-
tegration of those principles and elements that give it its 
~ t . t• d -. . 
, ... e ernuna ~on an .;:::;el.nz. 
16
·'"' G,_ .,. 45 ' ::Jee Jio .i., 9• , aoove. 
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.Being. i:io one to my knowledge has tried to analyze what 
makes the idea to be what it is and why it is. Again, in 
view of the causal implications of some of the material in 
the Idea and in view of the significant role the philosoph-
ical element plays in the composition of I'iewman' s total 
. 
educational ideal, some discussion of that which gives the 
idea its determination and Being seems in order. 
In the context of the schematic device to be employ-
ed in this chapter, "cause" and "Entity" will be treated 
as terms equivocal by reference. 17 In the case of both 
cause and Entity we will see instances of terms and things 
whose definitions show a measure of sameness in difference. 
My purpose in this matter will be to determine what are the 
primary or fundamental meanings of the terms "cause" and 
"~ntity," or more precisely, the primary and fundamental 
natures of the things signified by the terms as they relate 
to what makes Newman's idea to be what it is and why it is 
what it is. It will be my purpose, as well, to locate sec-
ondary instances of the cause and Entity of the idea in 
order to determine some proportional relations existing be-
tween secondary and the primary instances. In the process 
of locating primary and secondary instances of the cause 
and the Entity of the idea, the "connected view" will emerge 
l?For a complete discussion of Aristotelian equivoc-
ity by reference, as interpreted by Owens, see Ch. I, pp. 
57-65, above. 
200 
as the formal cause of the idea and the dominant principle 
of its 3eing. It will reveal itself to be that which makes 
the idea to be what it really is. Only in reference to 
this formal cause, a "connected view," will the other 
causes of the idea be said to be causes at all. Only in 
reference to the "connected view'' will the idea be said to 
have Entity. Finally, only in reference to this view will 
the other causes be said to have ~ntity. 
Newman's idea of a university is distinctive for the 
type of education it promotes. This education is liberal. 
Its distinguishing characteristic is the "habit of mind" it 
p~oposes to inculcate. What, in turn, sets the "habit of 
mind" apart is its "connected view." 'rhis view perceives 
things in an integrated fashion. It encompasses reality, 
the branches of knowledge that reflect reality, and their 
interrelations. It entails an integrated perspective of 
science and all things subject to man on a natural philo-
sophical level by a man of intellectual refinement who has 
a predisposition to virtue, though he may also have ser-
ious spiritual deficiencies. It is on the foundation of 
this temporal "connected view'' that Newman imposes the 
eternal comprehensive perspective of science and reality 
by a m~~ of intellectual cultivation whose ultimate purpose 
is to become a wholly educated gentleman with the moral and 
intellectual attributes of a Philip Neri. In contrast to 
the purely secular goals of the man of philosophical habit, 
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the view of the intellectually cultivated Christian gentle-
man looks to transcendent and supernatural objectives, in 
addition to temporal ones. 
The "connected view" or idea of a university advocat-
ed by Nevman is really a unified philosophical and theolog-
ical perspective: philosophical, in that it relates to 
reason and the natural; theological, in that it relates to 
God and the supernatural. But this view may just as well 
be labeled a humanistic and religious one. Its humanistic 
element looks more to the interrelation of all things as 
they are subject to man. The religious element sees the 
interconnection of man and all earthly things as they are 
subject to God. This combined philosophical and theologi-
cal perspective calls for spiritual as much as it"does the 
intellectual growth of a man. It is characteristic of the 
development of the whole man whose integrated view, accord-
ing to its capacity, envelops as many sciences as possible, 
with reason its system and Revelation its guide. The hum-
anistic and religious perspective called for in the Idea 
looks to the capacity of the mind for truth and of the soul 
for perfection. It directs its gaze to the End of Truth 
and the Source of Perfection that give man and all things 
their ultimate significance • 
.Because Ne'Nman•s treatment of the "connected view" 
is twofold and such a multiple treatment needs to be recon-
ciled, we should determine which view is primary and what 
202 
is its relation to the secondary treatment :~evvman offers. 18 
In terms of Aristotelian equivocity by reference, the pri-
mary instance of the view advanced is that "connected view" 
or interdisciplinary grasp of science by a man of intellec-
tual culture in whom Faith a.YJ.d reason are allied. '.lhile 
such a man cultivates his mind, he just as actively works 
to cultivate his soul. This is the view Sewrnan pursues in 
the context of his discussion of the nature of a Catholic 
university on theological or supernatural grounds, with the 
end product being the Christian gentleman. 19 In the light 
of Aristotelian equivocity by reference, the secondary in-
st~~ce of the view is an interdisciplinary grasp of the 
scie~ces by a man of purely mental cultivation. This would 
be the view advanced by Newman in the context of the na-
ture of a university considered apart from the Church and 
on philosophical or natural grounds. But my treatment in 
this chapter will not focus on the relationship of the pri-
mary and secondary instances of the "connected view." 
Rather, it will concern itself with the manner in which a 
"connected view" can be considered a principle of chan5e 
and a principle of Entity for the idea of a university. 
18see Ch. I, pp. 28-32, above, for critical commen-
tary on Newman's twofold approach to this view. 
l9For a more extensive development of the "connected 
view" in the context of Catholic and secular university is-
sues, theological a.~d philosophical grounds, and worldly 
and Christian gentleman, see Ch. VII, below. 
20J 
The interpretation will restrict itself to an analysis of 
the philosophical or humanistic part of Newman•s education-
al ideal. It will limit itself to a philosophical explana-
tion of the philosophical elements that give the idea of a 
university its determination and Being. 
As I indicated in an earlier chapter, any discussion 
of the view advocated in the Idea raises the auestion 
---- . 
whether the view should be labeled "a connected view" or 
"the connected view."20 The former perspective would be 
one which sees truth and the interrelation of the sciences 
only gradually and in partial steps. The latter would per-
tain more to the one and only absolutely complete view of 
truth and the sciences. The first is the view gradually 
acquired by man in pursuit of truth. The second is the 
view held by God Who is ·rruth. Ne'Wman's concern in the 
Idea and my interest in this study are with "a connected 
view." This perspective entails a more or less complete 
grasp of the relation of one science to another and of one 
segment of reality to another, as the sciences and the seg-
ments mirror the Ultimate Truth Who is their Source and 
End. Here, the perception of truth is gradual and limited 
according to an individual's capacity to understand. Its 
scope embraces a relatively unified view of the "relative 
disposition of things." I spoke earlier of Newman's multi-
20
see Ch. I, pp. ~7-48, above. 
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pl e :present?.ti on of t:r~i s vi. ew ani of the l:eed to ascertain 
• rl • • + ~ h. + + ... 21 prunary an. .... seconaary l.nsc.ances or .ls .. rea .. ment... 
the "connected view" as a term equi7ocal by reference, I 
pro;;osed that ti1e prLnary instance of view is a blen:l of 
intellectual cultivation which centers on man and a spirit-
..;.al refineme~!.t that tends to focus on God, both of which 
are 
22 to be found in the Christian gentleman. As a second-
ar~r instance of view, I advanced that interdisciplinary 
~rasp of the sciences characteristic of the man of philo-
sophical habit. ~otwithstanding the preeminence of a com-
;·lete )hilosophical-theoloi;ical perspective in l~evJman' s 
sche:ne and this study's, I have decided to concentrate on 
the purely philosophical habit of mind, or seconda~y in-
stance of "cor..nected view," 23 in seekinc; to establish a 
_principle of chan::e and a principle of funda1nental .;;eing 
for the idea of a university. 
In discussing the type of "cor.nected view" a.dvoca ted 
b;;-- ~·.~evrnla.~, I d.o not :nean to su.e;gest tha.t tlte 2-cind of vievt 
21
see Ch. I, P.'"l 
-.1::'" 14-15, 19, 27-28, 67-69, above. 
22
ch. VII of this study will discuss the Christla~'1 
;en~leman's blend of spiritual and intellectual cultivation 
i::-1 some detail. 
23i.e., the purely interdisciplinary grasp of the 
sc1.ences held by the man of philosophical r12.bi t. l'he IJri-
mary i:1stal1ce of a "connected vievt" e:nbraces a compreher-.-
sive su]ernatural perspective involvin~ Jrace, ~alth, ~ev-
el::l+l. 0" an·-1 +heolo ~~H :."'C"'''-·"" r ar" Y'lo+ ~ t'neo1 o ~~ ,,.., T 
........ w .... , ~~-·'-..A. v..... oJ • ..., ..... 11..4\A.~ ..... ..a. ..... , • ..,j, v c.. - 0 ..... (;..l..J.•J -'-
Lesi t;~_te to ver-.lture into those areas anymore than l alrea:iy 
l:.:::.~.re. 
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he advances is precisely known. Newman simply does not 
define exactly what he means by such a view, however much 
he gives indication of his meaning in Discourse V or else-
where. Neither do I mean to assert that Newman, or anyone 
e.lse for that matter, has "the connected view." Material 
from the text -- I am thinking, here, as much of Part II 
(UNIVERSITY SUBJECTS DI3CU3SED IN OCCASIONAL LECTUR.i:.S AND 
ESSAYS) as I am Part I -- does seem to suggest Newman's 
moving in the direction of "a connected view." ·tihether he 
ever reached a point at which by his own definition he 
could say that he himself had developed a "connected view" 
we have no way of knowing. The movement on the part of a 
student towards a "connected view" appears largely a mat-
ter of groping and of tentatively grasping just how reality . 
and the sciences reflecting it hang together. Il'1ore than 
this, the process seems one in which the student views re-
ality, supra-reality, and the sciences that reflect them 
with some measure of unity. Finally, I think one must be 
cautious in appraising Newman or anyone else's "connected 
view" or in describing, for example, the "connected view" 
as a movement from a relatively unformed state to a rela-
tively formed one because such appraisals might suggest 
that the interpreter has a "connected view" sufficient to 
judge the merit of that view held by another. Not having 
a "con."lected view" does not, however, preclude anyone from 
moving in the direction of one. In fact, I think that is 
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the type of lifetime task Newman has in mind for each of 
us. This discussion of view brings us to Newman•s treat-
ment in Discourses V and VI of the educational and intel-
lectual framework within which "a connected view" is offer-
ed as .Newman·s educational ideal. 
In Discourse V, Newman continues his inquiry into 
the nature and scope of a university, focusing now on the 
intellectual framework within which and the view by which 
one should seek the true meaning of knowledge in a univer-
sity scheme. He states that "a university may be consider-
ed with reference either to its 3tudents or to its Stud-
ies."24 In separating his treatment of studies and stu-
dents, Newman is really distinguishing two applications of 
the same principle referred to previously, the wholeness 
of knowledge. In relation to studies, the principle con-
cerns the subject of a view, that is, the ultimately inter-
related nature of knowledge. In reference to students, the 
principle deals more with the mode of viewing, the inter-
disciplinary manner in which the various branches of knowl-
edge are held. 25 Newman•s governing principle remains un-
changed: 
All Knowledge is a whole and the separate Sciences 
parts of one •••• All branches of knowledge are 
connected together; because the subject matter of 
24Idea of a University, p. 94. 
Z5The latter application of the principle is the one 
being treated here as the formal cause o:!:' Newman's idea. 
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knowledge is intimately united in ttself, as being 
the acts and work of the Creator.2o 
r~ewman leaves little doubt in the reader's mind of the on-
going role that the principle of wholeness will continue to 
play in his deliberations. He adds: 
They (the science~ complete, correct, balance each 
other. This consideration, if well founded, must 
be taken into account, not only as regards tne 
attainment of truth, which is their common end, but 
as regards the influence which they exercise upon 
those whose education consists in the study of 
them.~? 
Fortunately for the seeker of truth -- and that is what 
Newman would have his university-educated man be -- this 
framework-is based on a solid principle, and it reveals a 
comprehensive view that reflects an integrated grasp of the 
relations of knowledge and the different asp~cts of reality 
this knowledge mirrors. This view of ''the relative dispo-
sition of things» appears reasonable because it operates 
on a unifying principle, the wholeness of knowledge, and it 
reflects a reasonable explanation of reality -- that all 
reality is one. It does not appear to be the kind of il-
lusory perspective that operates on no real, that is to 
say, true principles or that functions on apparent super-
ficial ones which merely shadow reality in some way. 
Nev~an proceeds with his treatment of the scope of 
26
rdea of a University, p. 94, 
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a university education, using a number of elements he feels 
necessary. First is the right academic atmosphere which 
conduces to the proper end. He visualizes: 
an assemblage of learned men, zealous for their 
own sciences, and rivals of each other [wh~ are 
brought, by familiar intercourse and for the sake 
of intellectual peace, to adjust together the 
claims and relations of their respective subjects 
of investigation.2~ 
The result is a "pure and clear atmosphere of thought, 
which the student also breathes, though in his own case 
he only pursues a few sciences out of the multitude." 29 
Newman feels it supremely important that students function 
in such an atmosphere if they are to grasp 
the great outlines of knowledge, the principles on 
which it rests, the.scale of its parts, its lights 
and its shades, its great points and ~ts little, 
as he otherwise cannot apprehend them.JO 
Such discriminating powers culminate in a "habit of mind ••• 
which lasts through life."Jl 
In discussing the mystique of atmosphere, the essen-
tial worth of properly motivated colleagues, and the "habit 
of mind" which atmosphere and colleagues promote, Newman 
reaffirms his declaration of faith in the university as the 
28Ibid., p. 95. 
29Ibid. 
JOibid., p. 96. 
31Ibid. 
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primary source of a dynamic intellectual life and his be-
lief in the integrated grasp of the claims, relations, and 
outlines of knowledge as the primary test of its quality. 
He just as readily acknowledses the university's responsi-
bility for seeing a student through and for enabling him to 
survive with academic integrity. This is "the special 
fruit of the education furnished at a University, as con-
trasted with other places of teaching or modes of teach-
ing."J2 Here is an educational atmosphere in which a stu-
dent can develop his educational potential, one in which he 
can learn to rely on his own intellectual resources in the 
process of determining the "relative disposition of things." 
Given the right atmosphere, colleagues, and that special 
"habit of mind, .. he cannot help succeeding. 
From a treatment of the academic elements whose 
presence he feels essential to a proper educational milieu, 
~ewman proceeds to consider more precisely the goal of a 
university education and the liberal knowledge that is its 
hallmark. He has much to say on the subject, and he ex-
presses himself in not a few ways, seeking that one which 
perhaps best embodies his meaning. Newman raises the ques-
tion thus: "What is the end of University £ducation, and 
of the Liberal or Philosophical Knowledge which I conceive 
J2Ibid. 
it to impart ••• [?]"JJ He responds it is that knowledge 
"capable of being its own end. u34 According to ~\ewman, 
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knowledge can be its own end, and it is rightly designated 
liberal to the extent that it has no end beyond itself. 
The essential value of such knowledge is to be found in 
itself. \/hile this holds true for every kind of knowledge, 
it especially applies to what l'\ewman describes as 
that special Philosophy, which I have made to 
consist i~ a comprehensive view of truth in all 
its branches, of the relations of science to 
science, of their mutual bearings, and their 
respective values.J5 
Ee adds that such knowledge is "not merely a means to 
something beyond it, ••• but an end sufficient to rest in 
d t ~ . t k .. 36 an o pursue ror l sown sa. e •••• A few paragraphs 
later, Newman observes that the quest for such knowledge 
promises "nothing beyond Knowledge itself ... J7 In addition, 
he establishes that such knowledge is aptly characterized 
JJibid., pp. 96-97. This question relates to the 
Catholic and secular university issues treated inCh. II, 
above. 
34Ibid., p. 97. 
J5Ibid. 
J6Ibid. Some correspondences between i'iewman 's 
"Philosophical Knowledge" and Aristotle's notion of ''vds-
dom" are strikingly evident. The two are not, however, 
identifiable. Newman's "Philosophical Knowledge" is more a 
matter proper to the Physics; Aristotle's "wisdom" is a 
matter proper to the Metaphysics. 
J?Ibid., p. 99. 
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by the terms "habit of mind" and "refinement or enlargement 
of mind." Newman affirms that it is also suitably called 
"liberal" in that it "stands on its own pretensions, ••• is 
independent of sequel, and expects no complement ...... 38 He 
further notes that such "knowledge ••• is then especially 
liberal, or sufficient for itself, apart from every exter-
nal and ulterior object, when and so far as it is philo-
sophical ...... J9 
The passages collected above offer sufficient indi-
cation of Newman's answer to the question raised on the 
scope of university education. That answer centers on 
"liberal or Philosophical Knowledge." It takes sharp issue 
with those who postulate that all knowledge must have some 
purpose beyond itself that it must be practical or util-
itarian. It purposes to show the natural and not merely 
utilitarian character of knowledge. It affirms that knowl-
edge can be its own end and that only knowledge worth pur-
suing for its own sake deserves to be called liberal. Its 
essential value comes from within. Such is the nature of 
that knowledge Newman makes the special end of university 
education with its comprehensive grasp of all sciences, 
their proper relations, and their respective values. 
Knowledge for its own sake, liberal knowledge, "habit of 
JSibid., p. 101. 
39Ibid., p. 10J. 
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mind.," and "enlargement of mind" are equated. All find 
their focus in the "connected view or grasp of things." 
He who has this grasp knows the "relative disposition of 
things."L+O Accordingly, the "connected view" is sufficient 
reason for its Being.L+l 
I-Jevllila.Yl feels he has good authority and is on solid 
grounds in following this traditional view of education. 
"I a111 stating," he observes, "what is both intelligible in 
itself, and has ever been the common judgment of philoso-
phers and the ordinary feeling of mankind. "42 I~1oreover, 
when he applies the word "Liberal" to knowledge and educa-
tion, he is no more than expressing "a specific idea, which 
ever has been, and ever will be, while the nature of man is 
th ,.4J . e same •••• Know~edge that exists for its own sake 
satisfies a fundamental need in man. Newman does not deny 
the validity of knowledge that has a purpose beyond itself. 
Neither does he reject its need or benefit.L+4 ne merely 
40 Ibid • , p • 1 0 5 • 
41It is sufficient reason for its being because it 
is its own end. 
42
rdea of a University, p. 97. 
L+J Ibid., p. 102. 
44Newman's reasoning and pursuit of this traditional 
view of knowledge certainly strikes the reader as Aristo-
telian. This is not at all surprising when we consider 
what Newman himself observes in Discourse V (p. 102): 
"While we are men, we cannot help, to a great extent, being 
Aristotelians •••• " 
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believes it useless in explaining the proper scope of a 
university education that would inculcate a kind of knowl-
edge or philosophy 
which grasps what it perceives through the senses; 
••• which takes a view of things; which sees more 
than the senses convey; which reasons upon what it 
sees, and while it sees; which invests it with an 
idea •••• Its worth, its desirableness, considered 
irrespective of its results, is this germ within 
it of a scientific or a philosophical process. 
This is how it comes to be an end in itself; this 
is why it admits of being called Liberal. r·iot to 
know the relative disposition of things is the 
state of slaves or children; to have mapped out 
the Universe is the boast, or at least the ambi-
tion, of Philosophy.45 
Any knowledge other than this type Newman does not see as 
the proper subject of a Liberal Education or as a substan-
tive element in his university scheme. For him, utilitar-
ian knowledge belongs elsewhere, perhaps with commercial 
or professional education, but certainly not with a liberal 
one. 
In the process of treating knowledge in relation to 
"mere learning,'' Discourse VI confirms many of those ideas 
on the scope of university education and the "connected 
view" already proposed in Discourse V. ;iv'hile reaffirming 
that "the business of a University is to make ••• intellectu-
al culture its direct scope or to employ itself in the edu-
cation of the intellect ••• , "46 i\ewma.,"1 does more than main-
45Idea of a University, pp. 104-105. 
46 I bid • , p • 114 • 
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tain Liberal Education to be the scope of a University. 
When he observes that ~the cultivation of the intellect is 
an end distinct and sufficient in itself,"47 Newman again 
asserts more th~~ the fact that Liberal Education promotes 
Liberal Knowledge. In concluding that "the intellect must 
48 have an excellence of its own," Newman once again sug-
gests more than the view of Liberal Knowledge as an end in 
itself. By the foregoing statements, Newman is, in fact, 
reaffirming the more radical thesis that a university wor-
thy of its designation must inculcate a "habit of mind" or 
a "perfection of mind" whereby the student sees the ''proper 
disposition of things." Nev-nnan 's university ideal in Dis-
course VI is once more seen to center on the integrated 
view or interdisciplinary grasp. For to be university 
trained, to be liberally educated, and to be rightly steep-
ed in Liberal Knowledge is to have that intellect 
which takes a connected view of old and new, past 
and present, far ~~d near, and which has ~~ insight 
into the influence of all these one on another; 
without which there is no whole, and no center. It 
possesses the knowledge, not only of things, but 
also of their mutual and true relations; knowledge, 
not merely ponsidered as acquirement, but as 
philosophy.LJ-9 
47Ibid., p. 115. 
48Ibid., p. 114. 
49Ibid., p. 121. Once again, it should be noted 
that Newmanadvances "a connected view" rather than "the 
connected view." The former view sees truth and the rela-
tion of the sciences only in limited, gradual steps. 
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To know in a truly Liberal manner, then, is to know 
with a philosophical view. 'J:o know in a philosophical man-
ner is to know with a "connected view." That is the funda-
mental thrust of Newman's contention for the scope of uni-
versity education, outlined in Discourse V and confirmed in 
Discourse VI. For Newman, no justification is possible for 
the existence of a university that does not foster this 
liberal view of education. No university can function in-
dependently of its efforts to promote that "cultivation of 
intellect," "intellectual excellence," "enlargement of 
mind," or "philosophical knowledge," to which a "connected 
view" is central. 
In correlative material from the s~~e discourse, 
:~ewman observes that "the true and adequate end of intellec-
tual training and of a University is not Learning or Ac-
. t .. so quJ.remen •••• It is not in his words, "mere knowledge, 
or knowledge considered in its matter •••• ,.5l 'ilhile such 
knowledge is a "condition" or "means" of ''mental enlarge-
ment," it is not the end. For that enlargement consists, 
not merely in the passive reception into the mind 
of a number of idea hitherto unknown to it, but 
in the mind's energetic and simultaneous action 
upon and towards and among those new ideas, which 
are rushing in upon it. It is the action of a 
formative power, reducine; to order and meaning the 
matter of our acquirements; it is a making the 
objects of our knowledge subjectively our own, or, 
50ibid., p. 124. 
5libid., p. 117. 
to use a familiar word, it is a digestion of what 
we receive, into the substance of our previous 
state of thought •••• 52 
Such enlargement, accordingly, requires not the passive 
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reception, but the active comparison, correlation, and as-
similation of the me~~ing of mere learning. A few para-
graphs later, Newman further comments: 
That only is true enlargement of mind which is 
the power of viewing many things at once as one 
whole, of referring them severally to their true 
place in the universal system, of understanding 
their respective vg.lues, and of determining their 
mutual dependence.)J 
Although Newman touched on these concerns in earlier 
a~scourses, here he comes to grips with the scope of a 
Liberal Education and the whole view it purposes to develop. 
Academic atmosphere, motivated colleagues, "Liberal knowl-
edge," "Philosophical knowledge," "habit of mind,'' "in tel-
lectual enlargement," all are important watchwords in ex-
plaining Newman's university ideal. But the key phrase is 
the "connected view." It sums up Uewman's idea. It helps 
us ascertain the center of his educational framework. 11:ore 
relevant to my purpose in this chapter, the "connected 
view" or interdisciplinary gra3p emerges as a viable Aris-
totelian formal cause -- as that which makes the idea to be 
what it is. It is to the Aristotelian scheme that supplies 
the machinery for an interpretation of the interdisciplinary 
52Ibid., p. 120. 
5Jibid., pp. 122-12J. 
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grasp as a formal cause that I would like now to turn. 
·ro understand better the first major application of 
Aristotelian equivocity by reference in this chapter, that 
is, to the "connected view" as a cause and principle of the 
change from unrelated sciences to sciences viewed in an 
interdisciplinary fashion, it is appropriate that we review 
some aspects of Aristotle's approach to cause as inter-
preted by Owens. Even though the first chapter of this 
study provides a fairly extensive treatment of the mat-
ter,54 I believe some additional review would be useful at 
this point. In an earlier section of his study, Owens 
sketches what he calls the "starting-point and procedure 
and goal of the Aristotelian philosophy."55 According to 
Owens, a good starting point is Aristotle's statement that 
"all men by nature desire to know ... 56 Such a desire exists 
independent of any utilitarian concern. 57 lilian wants to 
know the causes of the material world, and he wants this 
knowledge for its own sake. To gain this knowledge, Aris-
totle directs him to an appropriate starting point, sensible 
54see Ch. I, pp. 69-72, above. 
55 owens, P• 172. 
56Ibid., p. 158. 
57 Ibid. 
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reality.5~ Study of this sensible reality moves man to 
wonder what are the elements or principles by which things 
of the sensible universe can be made more intelligible. 
Aristotle responds that every object in the sensible uni-
verse is a union of two ultimate principles: the material 
principle or that out of which something is made, and the 
formal principle or that which makes the sensible object 
to be what it is. The union is an internal one in which 
that having the potential to become a determinate sensible 
thing does become a determinate sensible thing. Every sen-
sible object emerges from this discussion as a union of 
matter and form. They are the ultimate constitutive prin-
ciples. Thus, the form or shape of a man informs the mat-
ter of marble to make up the statue of a man. However, in 
speakinG of knowledge of this or any sensible object, Aris-
totle describes these two internal principles, along with 
two external elements in terms of causality, a considera-
tion which leads into Aristotle's scientific explanation of 
sensible things. For Aristotle, to have scientific knowl-
edge of a thing is to know it through its causes. The 
causes which it is the aim of scientific inquiry to dis-
cover are four. Aristotle describes them in the Physics: 
The causes are expressed in four ways. Of these we 
say that one cause is the .:.ntity, and the what-is 
Being ••• ,another the matter and substrate, a third 
that from which motion takes its source, and a fourth 
5bibid., p. 172. 
the cause corresnonding to this, the purpose and 
the good •••• 59 -
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Aristotle•s goal is the ultimate causes that fully and fi-
nally answer the questions about which man naturally won-
ders.60 
rtow does this treatment by Owens relate to my inter-
pretation of the "co~'lected view" as the cause of the idea 
of a university? The causes studied in this investigation 
will be four: the material cause or that out of which the 
idea of a university is made; the formal cause or that 
which makes the idea of a university to be what it is; the 
efficient cause or that from which the movement from unre-
lated disciplines to related disciplines takes its source; 
·and the final cause, the end or good for which the idea of 
a university exists. In line with Owens• interpretation 
of Aristotle, "cause" will be used as a term equivocal by 
reference. The causes· of the idea of a university will be 
expressed in various ways, and they will be denominated 
"cause" only in reference to one cause, the formal cause or 
"connected view." The burden of this section of the chap-
ter will be to establish the nature of the four causes, to 
locate the instances in which the term "cause" can be ap-
plied, and to determine some proportional relationship of 
the instances, one to another. 
59-b.d ~·· p. 
60Tb.d 
.:-L•, p. 
173. 
172 • 
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The primary instance of causality will be found in 
the "connected view." Other principles or elements of the 
idea of a university will be denominated "cause" as the 
undetermined material of the idea, as that from which the 
movement of the idea stems, or as that good towards which 
it moves, but they will be treated as secondary instances 
of cause. 
A few examples may help to clarify my interpreta-
tion of the causal implications of the idea of a universi-
ty from the standpoint of Aristotelian equivocity by ref-
erence. For Aristotle, causes as equivocals by reference 
are "said in many ways." For instance, the sculptor, the 
bronze, and the form or shape are causes of the statue in 
different ways. The bronze is a cause through its being 
the material; the sculptor, though his being the agent; 
and the form through its being the determinant. Much the 
same as with other equivocals of this type, the name is 
identical, but the forms or definitions are different. 
Accordingly, the things are "said in many ways." In a 
second example, we say that parents, the matter out of 
which the child is made and the human form are causes of 
the child. Again, these things are causes in different 
ways: that out of which the child is made through being 
the material; the parents through being the agent; and the 
human form through its being that which gives the matter 
its determination. Agent, material, and form have identical 
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names "cause," bu.t tt.eir forms or definitions are different. 
In a third example, we say that the builder, the bricks and 
:nortar, and the form or shape of a house are causes of the 
house in different ways: the bricks aJld mortar through 
being the material; the builder through being the agent, 
that is, the builder building; and the form or shape of 
the house through giving determination to the matter of 
brick and mortar. As I understand Owens' interpretation of 
Aristotle, the final cause, as the good or perfection to-
wards which the matter strives or points, would have ~o be, 
respectively, the determined statue, child, and house, 
Correspondingly, I say that unrelated sciences, the 
student connecting, and a "connected view" are causes of 
the idea of a university in different ways. Unrelated sci-
ences are a cause through their being the material out of 
which a "connected view" develops. The "connector" or one 
connecting is a cause through his being the agent. The 
form or "connected view" is a cause through its being that 
which gives the matter of unrelated sciences its determin-
ation. The final cause, as the perfection or good toward 
which the matter of unrelated sciences moves, would ulti-
mately be the appro'priate "habit of mind" or 11 Connected 
view" found in the gentleman. Here, once again, the name 
is identical in that they are all denominated "cause," but 
their forms or definitions are different. Accordingly, 
they are things "said in :nany ways." There is unity by 
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reference here and a principle of sameness in difference. 
~ow the interpretation of the causes of the idea of a uni-
versity is to be more specifically worked out is a matter 
that needs further elaboration. 
·The starting point of this investigation is the sen-
sible reality of the branches of knowledge and a sense of 
wonder about the nature of their relationship. The pro-
cedure involves explaining the causes of the idea of a uni-
versity in a way that affirms their mutual dependence, 
while at the same time, confirming their distinctive prin-
ciples. The goaL is the causes that fully explain the 
idea to the satisfaction of a mind that wonders what prin-
ciples or elements are involved in the change from unrelat-
ed branches of knowledge to sciences viewed in an interais-
ciplinary manner. 
Vlhat, then, are the principles or causes of the idea 
that this study seeks to penetrate? How do they make the 
idea intelligible? In what sense do they depend on the 
formal cause for their causality? how are they principles 
of change or sensible movement? Finally, wherein lies 
their equivocity by reference as causes? These are the rna-
jor questions. 
As Newman points out in Jiscourse III, the object of 
knowledge is trutn. 61 Truth pertains to facts and their re-
61Id f U . . t ea o a nlversl y, pp. 52-5J. 
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lations. Facts embrace all that exists. Reality is a com-
plex fact, a whole, which must be analyzed to determine its 
respective parts. Knowledge concerns the apprehension of 
these facts in themselves and in relation to each other. 
One cannot know these facts whole; he knows them only in 
partial views. The partial views are called sciences. 
They are branches of knowledge. Sciences, then, are logi-
cal abstractions of the whole by which the mind knows larg-
er or smaller segments of reality. Sciences differ accord-
ing to the amount of truth or enlightenment that they pro-
. 
vide. While all sciences have the same subject matter, 
they differ in the manner and measure of their view of real-
ity. The more parts one knows, the closer he is to grasping 
the whole. The better one knows the truth in part, the 
greater is his knowledge of the whole truth. The degree of 
knowledge should be measured by the depth of understanding 
regarding the relation of one science to another. The sci-
ences or partial views are comparable to a material cause. 
So considered, they appear a suitable starting point for 
a discussion of sensible change in Newman's idea of a uni-
versity. 
Standing unrelated, these branches of knowledge can 
be viewed as passive knowledge or mere learning. In that 
sense, they constitute the matter, the material cause, of 
Nevman's idea of a university. However, such passive 
knowledge does require an actualizing "view" to make it 
move towards a total grasp of truth and to attain that 
which we consider its formal determination. This deter-
mining "view" constitutes the form or formal cause of New-
man•s idea. 62 Furthermore, the activation or development 
of an interdisciplinary grasp of the branches of knowledge 
involves a change, a change from unrelated disciplines, 
mere learning, or passive knowledge to a "connected view" 
of these disciplines. However, before there can be a "con-
nected view," there must be a matter that is connectible. 
'The change here requires that a potentially "connected 
view" be actualized. 
Such a change may profitable be viewed in the light 
of potency and act. Indeed, this change cannot be explain-
ed, at least in an Aristotelian context, without considera-
tion being given the potentiality involved, in which case, 
we are, of course, addressing ourselves to the matter of 
the idea, its material cause. It should be noted that the 
matter of the idea has import only to the extent that it 
is required for the realization of the form. For Aristotle, 
a thing comes to be from that whicn it is potentially, not 
actually. Mere learning or the sciences viewed independ-
ently are potentially Newman•s idea of a university before 
62
rn discussing the material and formal causes of 
~,; ewman' s idea of a university, we are addressing ourselves 
to knowledge-content (studies) or the material to be con-
nected, and to knowledge-view (students) or the mind's in-
tegrated grasp of the content. 
225 
they actually become so. That is not to say that mere 
learning or passive knowledge which simply does not reflect 
the integrated view all at once becomes the integrated 
view. Rather, the point is that in mere learning are to be 
found the conditions of the ''connected view." If that were 
not the case, unrelated branches of knowledge could never 
be grasped in an interdisciplinary fashion; mere learning 
could never become informed learning. That it does means 
there is in mere learning the capacity to be shaped and de-
termined by the right determining "view." .::.ven more im-
portantly, that it does means that there is present a shap-
ing or determining principle that has caused mere learninG 
to pass over into a state of informed learning. Mere 
learning is the undetermined "stuff," if you will, that 
must be limited, perfected, or completed by the interdisci-
plinary grasp that is its form. To this end, mere learning 
or disunified branches of knowledge have the potentiality 
of passing from one state to another. 
While we need it to explain the change from mere 
learning to something more, potentiality alone will not 
suffice. The agency of something actual of a form -- is 
also necessary. Accordingly, although mere learning has 
the potency to become informed learning, it can never 
achieve that state without the form that shapes it into 
something more than mere learning. The form of the idea is 
the principle of its definiteness, perfection, and determin-
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ation. 63 The actuality of this form is prior to the po-
tentiality of mere learning. The form or actuality of in-
formed learning is logically prior to the potentiality of 
mere learning. For mere learning is not potentially the 
"connected view" unless it can come to be the "connected 
view" actually. 64 So too, the potentiality of becoming an 
interdisciplinary grasp presupposes the actuality of such 
a grasp. Nothing advances from potentiality to actuality 
without the agency of something actual. Actuality is prior 
to potentiality. Accordingly, unrelated sciences are not 
potentially related sciences viewed in an interdisciplinary 
manner unless they can come actually to be so viewed. They 
c~~ot come to be so viewed except by the agency of some-
thing already actual, namely, the "connected view." The 
potentiality of the former presupposes the actuality of the 
latter. The potentiality of the former has its roots in 
the actuality of the latter. The actuality of the "connect-
ed view" is the end towards which the potentiality of the 
separate unrelated sciences points. 
Furthermore, just as unrelated sciences have the 
6J . Owens, pp. 197, 337, J62. 
64 Although the material of the last few paragraphs 
may appear fairly obvious to some readers, it must be cov-
ered if the causality involved in the development of the 
idea of a university is to be adequately explained. 
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potentiality of being comprehensively graspect, 65 they have 
the potentiality of not being so viewed; while the neces-
sary, the permanent and the unchangeable form, the integra-
ted interdisciplinary view, must be. The .:orm of the idea 
is perfect and complete. It is actual. There is no ques-
tion of its coming to be and then ceasing to be. There is 
only the case of its being actualized in particu~ar instan-
ces. The actuality of the idea is restricted to the inte-
grated grasp. That form, view, hold, or grasp is here con-
strued to be completely and perfectly actual. As form, it 
necessarily and unchangeably is. 66 It does not ·begin and 
cease to be. 
The integrated view or grasp is the specific form 
that completes, determines, and shapes the matter of mere 
~earning or unrelated disciplines. The view is that which 
gives the idea the perfection rightfully due it. ~ere 
knowledge is a condition of intellectual culture, but it 
is not the form or end of that culture. The passive re-
ception or acquisition of facts is the condition of intel-
lectual enlightenment, not its formal principle. Isolated 
65 Cwens, p. 339. 
the matter of unrelated 
tentiality. 
The most notable characteristic of 
sciences would appear to be its po-
66As the form or what-Is-Eeing of the idea of a uni-
versity, the "connected view" is necessary, timeless and un-
changeable. Still the emphasis is on "a connected view .. 
rather than "the connected view." Seep. 203, above. 
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facts and sciences are the materials out of which mental 
enlargement comes, but only the integrated hold of these 
materials fulfills and completes them. The passive acqui-
sition of facts on however many subjects or disciplines 
appears not so important as the arrangement, comparison, 
correlation, and digestion of facts in a unified, harmon-
ious view. Such functions represent the true principle or 
form of the idea. They are part of that "habit of mind," 
"mental enlar~ement," or "intellectual culture" to which 
Newman refers. In mere knowledge, that is, the passive 
reception of facts, the nature of the "connected view" ex-
ists potentially. For the actuality of this nature, we 
must look to the form with which its nature is identifiable, 
the view that sees many things "at once as one whole·," that 
refers them to their rightful place in the universal system, 
and that understands their "respective values," while, at 
the same time, recognizing their "mutual dependence." New-
m~~·s idea of a university has its nature fully only when 
it exists actually-- when its form has been realized. 
·,thether this form, the "connected view," be treated in the 
context of "Liberal or Philosophical Knowledge," "habit of 
:-:1ind," "refinement of mind," "acquired illumination," "in-
ward endov~ment," or "intellectual culture," it alone dis-
tinguishes the idea of a university. 67 
67· •t f 1 l.e., as l s orma cause. 
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~.:ere learning, passive knowledge, and independent 
sciences do then become the idea of a university because 
they are informed by an inte6rated view. 1hey are shaped 
into an integrated grasp because a whole view envelops and 
actualizes them. This form or view makes them formally in-
telligible and educationally mea.Ylingful. 68 T'hat alone is 
the inner and unifying principle that makes Nevvman 's idea 
of a university one, whole, and actual. 
Thus far, we have centered our attention on the 
causes or principles necessary to explain l~ewman 's idea of 
a university from the standpoint of sensible change. ·rhe 
idea of a university has been shown to require a union of 
matter and form. The undetermined material of mere learn-
ing or unrelate~ sciences constitutes the matter; the "con-
nected view," as that determining principle which limits 
what kind of Being it is, appears to satisfy the demands of 
form. The union is construed as one of internal principles 
or constitutive elements. 
~ut matter and form are not the only physical prin-
ciples or causes necessary, in an Aristotelian context, to 
explain knowledge of the sensible change involved in the 
development of Nev.rman 's idea of a university. Two more 
causes are required, the efficient and final. They merit 
our consideration as external conditions, while the formal 
68 Owens, p. J6J. 
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and material are best treated as internal elements. Like 
the material cause, the final and efficient causes must 
ultimately be viewed in reference to form. 69 
Because, for Aristotle as interpreted by Cwens, the 
efficient cause means that out of which movement comes,7° 
we would do well to look again to the formal cause, that 
is, to the "connected view," for an explanation of the ef-
ficient causality involved in the development of the inter-
disciplinary view. The initiation for the movement from 
mere learning, passive knowledge, or unrelated sciences to 
an integrated view of them comes from the form or "connec-
ted view." This form is already present in the efficient 
cause. The efficient cause is able to cause that form in 
another matter. The efficient cause of separate sciences 
being cor~ected is the person connecting. The relation is 
that of the agent to the thing done or of the producer of 
the change to the thing changed. The immediate origin of 
the movement comes from the person who connects unconnected 
sciences. The physical causation of the movement requires 
the mutual contact of the mover and the moved. A student 
develops a "connected view" only because he is capable of 
having a ''connected view." Correspondingly, unconnected 
sciences must have the potential to become connected. Eut 
69Ibid., pp. 363-364. 
701, . d 
___Q_l_. , P• 17J. 
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the efficiency involved appears to lie in the fact that 
because a person is connecting unrelated sciences, unrelat-
ed sciences are being connected. '1'/hen the agent and pa-
tient are in the proper relation, a certain effect, namely, 
the "connected view" is inevitable. It is from the acti-
vating source of form that the development of the idea 
stems, much the same as it is towards that form, its per-
fection and goodness, that the development moves for its 
proper end and realization.71 The movement from unrelated 
sciences to an interdisciplinary view comes from within in 
the sense that it originates in the formal, constitutive 
element or internal principle. The form has within itself 
a beginning of causing movement because it is actual. Cor-
respondingly, mere learning or unrelated sciences have a 
beginning of being moved. When the agent, the form that 
initiates the movement, comes in contact with the patient, 
the matter of mere learning or unrelated sciences, the in-
terdisciplinary view or idea of a university results.72 In 
short and in less ideal terms, it seems fair to say that 
the efficient causality here amounts to a student's tenta-
tively grasping, in some unified manner, previously unre-
lated sciences and the reality which they reflect. Th·e 
form of the idea is once again seen to play a dominant 
7libid. 
72Ibid., p. 406. 
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role.73 
In determining the final cause of the idea, we 
should bear in mind that the ultimate explfu~ation of mere 
learning depends on the end that learning serves. For 
Newman's idea, the end is a relatively unified grasp on 
the part of the gentleman of all branches of knowledge. 
The form of the idea is the end towards which the develop-
ment of the idea moves. The purpose of the potency of un-
related disciplines is the act that properly relates them. 
They are moved on account of this end. They strive to be 
actually what they are potentially able to be. The actual-
ity of informed learning in the gentleman is the end to-
wards which the potentiality of mere learning points. The 
. mere acquirement of knowledge strives after the form of 
interrelated knowledge. It strives to reach the perfection 
of unified learning. It attempts to reach out for whatever 
perfection is due it. In so doing, it is really striving 
to approximate the divine life -- to share in the immor-
tal.74 The "connected view" affords it that proximity be-
cause, as form, it alone provides that which is necessary, 
unchangeable, and permanent in the idea. 
In the treatment of the final causality of the idea, 
the form of the idea has become identifiable with act; the 
'13 Ibid., p. 359. 
7'+ Cwens, p. 461. 
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matter, with potency. Now the potency to be acted upon 
differs from the potency of actins upon something else. 75 
According to this difference, act is distinguishable from 
movement. The form of the idea of a university is act in 
the more perfect sense that it does not seek an end out-
. 
side of itself. The form of the idea has a perfection of 
its mm which does not need to lead beyond itself. 'I he 
"connected view" is knowledge that is its own end. It is 
whole and unified in itself. Moreover, as liberal knowl-
edge, the interdisciplinary grasp of sciences need not be 
a means to something else. It constitutes an end suffi-
cient to rest in. So considered, the end or purpose of the 
idea of a university is the "connected view" engendered in 
the gentleman. The form or act of the integrated view is 
the purpose intended in the development of the idea. In 
the context of Owens' interpretation of Aristotle, one 
must look to the form or "connected view" for an explana-
tion of final causality of the idea of a university, not 
only as that which does not seek an end outside of itself, 
but also as that goodness and perfection towards which the 
matter of unrelated disciplines strives. 3ecause the for-
mal cause stands preeminent in the interpretation employed 
in this study, it is more exact to say that the final cause 
of the idea of a university is the "connected view" or, 
75Tb·,.... , ;u'l·) ~·' l'• -rv .J • 
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iliore precisely, the appropriate habit of mind found in the 
gentleman than it is to say that the final cause is the 
gentleman in whom the "connected view" has been fostered. 
As a formal cause, the interdisciplinary grasp that dis-
tinguishes the gentleman does not strive toward anything 
else. 
In the foregoing statements, the final cause of the 
idea reveals itself to be reducible ultimately to the for-
mal cause. It also shows itself to contain, much the s~~e 
as the efficient cause, some measure of imperfection and 
incompleteness. Both final and efficient cause depend on 
form, as the initiator or end of their movement. Both 
must be described in reference to form for their actuality 
and knowability. In sum, the final cause of the idea has 
its ultimate actuality in the form or act of the "connected 
view." 'rhe end or purpose of Newman's idea of a university 
emerges as the realization of its form in the gentleman 
since everything necessary for the complete attainment or 
realization of the idea is found in the form. The priority 
of act confirms the preeminence of form in this treatment 
inasmuch as form and act coincide. 
:lihat has the interpretation thus far revealed about 
the cause of the idea of a university? The main burden has 
been to establish the nature of the four causes involved in 
the development of mere learning or unrelated branches of 
knowledge into the informed learning or the integrated 
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grasp that is :'Jewman 's idea of a university. These causes 
are ~he four causes of Aristotle's Physics. They are physi-
cal principles, and they are real. The procedure has in-
valved naming the instances in which the term "cause" can 
be applied and establishing some relationship of these in-
stances, one to another. 
having sought out the elements or principles of the 
idea that can be labeled "cause," having found them ~o be 
four, and having located and defined their instances, I 
can now proceed with my treatment of them as equivocals by 
reference. As I indicated previously, the true nature in-
valved in such a type equivocal is to be found only in the 
primary instance.76 Accordin~ly, the nature of causality 
is found in the first instance alone.77 The primary in-
stance of causality in the idea is located in the formal 
cause, the "connected view." The form of the idea primarily 
deserves the name "cause" because it answers the ultimate 
"why" of th ·de 7B .e ~ a. It constitutes the necessary and un-
changeable element in the thing. Other principles or con-
ditions of the idea designated by the term "cause" have 
76see p. 199, above. 
77cwens, p. 178. 
78
rbid., pp. 176-177• According to Owens, "the words 
of Aristotle ••• suggest that in some sense every type of 
causality finds its ultimate explanation in the form." 
Owens adds that various commentators acknowledge ttis point. 
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their owr,_ definition as the undetermi!l.ed material of the 
idea, or as ttat out of which the development of the idea 
stems, or as that toward which it moves, but these causes 
in themselves are not properly the primary cause of the 
idea. They are secondary instances of cause. 
The formal cause, then, is the primary instance of 
causality in the idea. Final, efficient, and material 
causes need the formal cause for their clarification. On-
ly in reference to the formal can the other types be de-
nominated "cause" at all. The material cause is reducible 
to the "connected view" potentially. For scientific knowl-
edge, they must be explained in reference to form. The 
idea of a university is not knowable and neither does it 
come to be because of its matter, though the idea cannot 
be without the matter. It comes to be only because of its 
form. I•:ere learning is significant in a causal sense 
merely because the form requires it for its realization. 
So considered, the material cause is a secondary instance 
of cause. The efficient cause appears equally dependent 
upon the formal. Again, all that is scientifically knowable 
in the efficient cause is the form. Form is the mover that 
initiates the movement whereby the idea achieves its com-
plete development. The form of the idea brings over the 
mere learning, which is able to be the idea of a university, 
into the state of being the idea of a university. Viewed 
in this manner, the efficient constitutes another secondary 
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instance of cause. 
The final cause must also be considered a secondary 
instance of cause. No less than the two previously consid-
ered, it is reducible to the formal in an Aristotelian con-
text. It is dependent on form. The final cause of the 
idea is the end of the production or movement involved in 
the idea's coming to be. That end is the "connected view" 
to be found in Newman's gentleman. Furthermore, the end 
of the idea is to attain the perfection typical of it. 
That perfection is found in the form. Form makes possible 
the realization of that perfection rightfully due the idea 
of a university and the gentleman in whom it is engendered. 
In sum, as the source, the end, and the determining prin-
ciple in the movement of undetermined mat~er to the per-
fection of determined matter found in the "connected view," 
the formal cause is duly designated the cause of the idea 
of a university. As the principle of its complete attain-
ment, actualization, or realization, it is properly called 
the primary instance of causality. 
The second main application of Aristotelian equi-
vocity by reference in the chapter will focus on the "con-
nected view" as that which gives Entity to Newman's idea 
of a university. But this effort requires some elabora-
tion of Aristotle's idea on Entity as interpreted by 
Joseph Owens. Although Aristotle's treatment of Entity 
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was covered to some extent in Chapter I,79 it bears some 
elaboration here. According to Aristotle, Being signifies 
whatever is. As such, it is a concept or common predicate. 
3ut Owens sees a problem in the translation and correct 
interpretation of what Aristotle precisely means by Being. 
Aristotle's use of the word ousia seems to have various 
meanings, even in its primary significations. 8° For exam-
ple, it means the primary instance of Being. Upon it all 
other Being has some dependence. It is the cause of Being 
in things. It often signifies something concrete, and it 
often refers to some~hing individual. Owens chooses not 
to use ousia to express Aristotle's concept of Being. 
Neither does he wish to employ "substance" or "essence," 
two other possibilities. 81 Instead of these Owens opts for 
"Entity" as that term best able to describe the equivocal 
notion, or more precisely, the equivocal nature of the sen-
sible things Aristotle treats. 82 
According to Owens, if one is to understand Aris-
totle's treatment of Being, he must look to the equivocal 
term "Entity" by which Being is expressed in various ways 
79see Ch. I, pp. 73-B~ above. 
80owens, p. 1)8. 
e1Ibid., p. 14e. 
e2Ibid., p. 153· Entity is capitalized by Owens to 
indicate that it is being used to render the Aristotelian 
ousia. 
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but always in reference to something one or in reference to 
one form. For Owens, Entity is the primary instance of Be-
ing. It has within itself the true nature of Being, and 
only in reference to Entity are all other things said to 
have Being. In the context of equivocity by reference, 
Owens sees Aristotle treating different sensible things 
with reference to the nature of their primary instance, or 
secondary instances in relation to primary instances. 
Entity, moreover, conveys the primary and secondary in-
stances of the Being of sensible things in their right re-
lation. It serves as a guide to the things denoted. It 
also assumes the meaning of all instances encountered. In 
the context of Owens' interpretation: "Entity" appears as 
a comprehensive equivocal term that expresses the ultimate 
principle of unity and permanence in concrete things. It 
is the permanent, foundational principle of their Being. 
As the principle of sameness common to everything that is 
Being, Entity remains permanent notwithstanding the changes 
something undergoes. The primary instance of Entity in a 
sensible thing is located in that thing's form or What-Is-
Being. Such a form expresses that which is timeless, es-
sential, and necessary about the thing. The What-Is-Being 
expresses, as well, the formal intelligible perfection of 
the thing. As such, the form is that by which the thing 
is known. In relation to Newman's idea of a university, 
"Entity" will be treated as a term equivocal by reference. 
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Its primary instance will be located in the formal cause, 
the "connected view." Other causes of the idea will be 
said to have Entity only in relation to the formal. 
Just how "Being" as a term equivocal by reference 
extends to all things may be shown in the light of an ex-
ample involving a thing and its attributes or characteris-
tics. In the realm of changeable things, Entity is the 
primary instance of Being. All other instances of Being 
refer immediately or ultimately to Entity. The nature of 
Being as such -- Being gua Being -- is to be found only in 
Entity. Returning to the attributes or characteristics of 
a thing as .an example, we say that the attributes do not 
possess the nature of Being in themselves. The nature by 
which they are Being is not their own nature. The nature 
according to which they are Being is the Entity of which 
they are attributes. For example, when I say "the man is 
tall," it is the man alone that really is, and it is the 
man who is tall. The tallness by itself and apart from the 
Entity of which it is the attribute cannot be said to be in 
a primary sense. Tallness is only in the sense that the 
nature of tallness relates to the nature of the man who is 
tall. Accordingly, we say that the primary instance of 
Entity would be in the man; the secondary instance, in the 
tallness. From this discussion, man and tallness emerge as 
having Being but not in the same way. Because both man and 
tallness have Entity, the name "Entity" is identical as 
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applied to both, but the forms or definitions of those 
things having Entity are different. Just as in all equivo-
cals of this type, we observe here sameness in difference 
and a unity by reference. 
As I indicated above, this example may be used to 
shed some light on the manner in which Being extends to the 
causes of the idea of a university. The primary instance 
of Entity in the idea of a university is the What-Is-Being, 
"connected view," or formal cause. It is the cause of the 
idea's Being. It makes the idea of a university a definite 
something. It possesses the nature of Being in itself. 
The material cause, or that matter of unrelated sciences 
out of which the idea of a university develops, does not 
possess the nature of Being in itself. Neither does the 
efficient cause, as that from which the development of the 
idea stems, possess such Being. Nor does the final cause 
possess the nature of Being in itself. The nature accord-
ing to which they have Entity is the Entity of the formal 
cause to which they refer and to which they may be reduced. 
Accordingly, the material, final, and efficient causes can-
not be said to have Entity in a primary sense. They have 
Being or Entity only in the sense that their natures as 
efficient, final, and material causes relate to the nature 
of the formal cause. The Being or Entity as such, then, is 
that of the formal cause. The rest have Being through ref-
erence. Thus, we say that the primary instance of Entity 
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in the idea of a university is to be found in the formal 
cause or "connected view." Secondary instances are to be 
found in the other causes. They are through and in the 
Entity of the formal cause. All the causes of the idea 
have Being, then, but not in the same way. The proper 
question to be asked here is why the matter of unrelated 
sciences is something. The answer is the formal cause or 
"connected view." That is the cause of Being. 
If the idea of a university is to be known at all, 
it will have to be known after the manner of Entity. Aris-
totle himself points out that to know anything is to know 
it as Entity. 8 3 If that is so, then to know the idea of a 
university is to grasp its form, What-Is-Being, or Entity. 
Knowledge of the idea of a university requires a reduction 
of knowledge to Entity because in seeking the Being of the 
. d . k. . t ~ t. t 84 ~ ea one ~s see ~ng ~ s ~n ~ y. The Entity of the idea 
of a university is identifiable with the "connected view." 
Furthermore, in seeking to explain the Entity of the 
idea of a university, we should bear in mind that the fun-
damental question concerns why the matter of mere learning 
or unrelated sciences is something. 85 The answer, of 
SJibid., p. 321. 
84Ibid. 
S)Ibid., p. 337. 
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course, is the formal cause or ·lihat-Is-Being. 86 According-
ly, we must look to the form for the Entity of the idea. 
The idea of a university has Entity or 3eingness only be-
cause of its form. In the foregoing context, the four 
causes are conceived in much the same way as before. Only 
now they are being treated not so much as physical princi-
ples of change, but rather, as principles of the idea's Be-
ing. Once again, material, efficient, and final causes are 
absorbed in a study of the formal cause since it alone con-
stitutes the primary instance of Entity. It alone is the 
primary cause of the idea's 3eingness. 
Mere learning, the simple acquirement of knowledge, 
or unrelated sciences can take on a Being or ~ntity they 
.themselves do not possess. They do so in the composite Be-
ing of unrelated disciplines and the integrated view of 
them. This composite is not a sum of material parts. The 
form in this composite is not just another material ele-
ment. The form that gives £ntity and 3eing here is a nec-
essary, permanent, and timeless element. It provides the 
determination that makes the idea of a university a "what," 
e6o . 1' h . I • • 1 wens caplta lzes t e "ls' to emphaslze "tlme ess 
Being." A review of some distinctions made earlier might 
also be helpful here. In general, the What-Is-Being per-
tains to the form; the What-Is to the matter. So too, mat-
ter and form, strictly speakin5, pertain to the internal 
constitutive principles of indetermination and determina-
tion. However, when we speak of a scientific inquiry into 
the nature of something, we employ the terms "material 
cause" and "formal cause." 
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a 3eing determined and distinguishable from other things. 
Form takes the unrelated sciences, which may or may not be 
grasped in an integrated fashion, and determines them to be 
so integrated. Form, as the principle of definiteness and 
permanence within the idea, makes the idea a definite abid-
ing something. Being has been reduced to intity. More 
specifically, it has been reduced to the formal cause, the 
primary instance of Entity in that which we call the idea 
of a university. 
There is, then, only one cause of the idea that is 
cause in the complete sense and that has Entity in the com-
plete sense. That is the formal cause. All others are de-
nominated "cause" and are said to have Entity only in rela-
tion to it. The term "Entity" extends to the material, ef-
ficient, and final causes of the idea only through the for-
mal. Again, the formal cause is identifiable with the 
What-IS-Being of the idea. The what-IS-Being expresses the 
timeless Being and formal necessity of the integrated view. 
It expresses the formal intelligible perfection of the 
interdisciplinary grasp in relation to the matter of mere 
learning or unrelated sciences, the what-Is, or the princi-
ple of contingency and change. The what-IS-Being of the 
idea of a university also suggests that the "connected 
view," as the form, expresses the primary Being of the idea. 
Any other elements in the idea are called "Being" or second-
ary instances of Being solely in reference to that form. In 
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that context, the form of the idea constitutes its neces-
sary and unchangeable Being, in contrast to the what-Is, 
the matter of mere learning which is neither necessary nor 
unchangeable. The what-Is of the idea conveys the idea of 
a university as matter, as form, or as a composite. Each 
can be used to express what the idea is, but only the what-
IS-Being expresses the sense in which the idea of a univer-
sity essentially and necessarily is Being. 
Although the Entity of the idea of a university, as 
an equivocal by reference, can be expressed in various 
ways, our primary concern with it is in relation to form 
and substrate. In reference to substrate, the Entity of 
the idea is the form or "connected view,'' the matter or un-
related sciences, and the composite. The form is prior to 
the other two because it is the primary instance of Entity 
in sensible things. The form as Entity is primary in every 
sense: in definition, in knowledge and in time. It is 
primary in definition because Entity appears in every predi-
cation of Being; in knowledge, inasmuch as we know something 
more fully when we know what it is; in time, because, of 
all the categories, Entity is the only separate one. ooere 
learning and the composite, on the other hand, are Entity 
only through the form. ¥li thin the composite of the idea, 
form is the primary instance of Entity. The composite of 
unrelated disciplines and of the integrated view of these 
disciplines, i.e., that which makes up a specific, deter-
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mined idea of a university, has Entity and derives its 
Entity primarily from the form. 87 The composite would be 
considered a secondary instance of Entity. It is the form 
within the composite of a specific university idea that 
provides determination. In reference to substrate, the 
Entity of the idea may also be viewed as the matter. This 
matter, however, must also be considered a secondary in-
stance of Entity. Again, it is the form that gives the 
matter of unrelated sciences whatever Being and determina-
tion it has. Form is the reason the matter of mere learn-
ing or the matter of unconnected sciences is. 88 Form 
shapes and determines. Unconnected learning, considered 
potentially as the "connected view," is undetermined and 
unknowable precisely as the "connected view."89 Mere 
learning contains nothing as such to account for the form 
since it supplies neither determination nor knowability. 
The form alone provides these. 
Also in reference to Entity and substrate, it should 
be pointed out that the matter of mere learning has the 
capacity to become a "connected view." 90 If matter is a 
87 Owens, p. JJ5. 
88Ibid. , p. JJ?. 
89Ibid. , p. JJ8. 
90ibid., p. JJ9. 
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principle that can be according to a form, then unrelated 
learning, not yet the "connected view," is capable of be-
coming an interdisciplinary grasp. Unrelated disciplines 
or mere learning is the matter or potency of the interdis-
ciplinary grasp, even after this grasp has been realized 
and has come into Being. Furthermore, mere learning should 
be considered the "connected view" and one with the form in 
the sense that mere learning is the "connected view" as 
potency. Moreover, when we say that mere learning express-
es the Being of the idea and when we speak of its telling 
what the idea of a university is, we are expressing the Be-
ing of Newman's idea as potency. 91 However, when we ad-
dress ourselves only to the "connected view," we are ex-
pressing the idea of a university as act.92 Unrelated dis-
ciplines, then, appear as the integrated view potentially. 
Mere learning, correspondingly, is Entity, but only poten-
tially.93 The interdisciplinary view is Entity actually. 
The matter of the idea emerges as a secondary instance of 
Entity. Matter has been emphasized here because, in the 
final analysis, substrate means matter, and matter suggests 
9libid., p. )41. 
92Ibid. 
93Ibid. 
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indetermination.94 Substrate too appears to be only a 
secondary instance of Entity. In short, whatever Entity 
the matter or substrate of the idea has comes from the form, 
the interdisciplinary grasp, which provides the principle 
of determination, knowability, and Being for the idea. 95 
Again, the question underlying much of the foregoing 
treatment has been how the material element acquires a Be-
ing it does not have.96 The recurring answer has been the 
form of the idea, a form which provides definition, deter-
mination, and permanence -- that which makes the idea a 
definite, abiding something.97 The Being of the idea ~as 
been reduced to intity or the formal cause, the primary in-
stance of Entity in the idea. ~hile the focus has been on 
the material cause of the idea, it is no less important to 
note how the final and efficient causes also depend on the 
formal for their Being and Entity. 
The efficient cause of the idea appears identical 
with the formal cause in the sense that the form of the 
"connected view" initiates the movement of mere learning 
or unrelated sciences to the interdisciplinary grasp of 
94Ibid., p. 345. 
95Ibid. 
96Ibid. , p. 316. 
97 Ibid., p. 376. 
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them. The form of the idea provides the shaping, constitu-
tive element. It is the principle of knowability. The 
efficient cause of the idea is known and has Entity only 
in terms of form because form alone provides Entity or 
what-IS-Being. Of itself, the efficient cause has neither 
Being, Entity, Act, what-IS-Being, nor knowability.98 For 
any one of them, the efficient cause of the idea must be 
reduced to the form. This is not to say that the efficient 
cause is deduced from the form. 99 But to be scientifically 
knowable and to be understood as Entity, efficient causal-
ity must be viewed in reference to formal causality. 100 
So considered, the efficient cause of the idea constitutes 
a secondary instance of the idea's Entity. 
Furthermore, the idea of a university does not come 
into being because of its final cause, any more than it 
does because of its material and efficient, though it can-
not be without them. 101 The idea comes into being and has 
Entity because of its form. It is toward the realization 
of the "connected view" found in the gentleman that the 
matter of unconnected sciences moves for its completion. 
98Ibid., P• 359. 
99Ibid., p. J64. 
100Ibid. 
101Ibid., p. 375· 
The final cause of the idea does not serve as the inner, 
shaping principle, the principle of Entity or the intel-
ligible component. But the final cause of the idea is 
identical in some ways with that form which does provide 
these. Everything necessary for the complete attainment 
250 
or realization of the idea-- of its Being and Entity is 
to be found in the form. 102 Again, it is toward this good-
ness and perfection of the form found in the gentleman that 
the matter of unrelated disciplines reaches out. The final 
cause of the idea emerges as another secondary instance of 
the idea's Entity. 
Entity means 3eingness. Entity is the common nature 
found in all things treated as beings. Entity extends to 
all beings not as a ge~us but as an equivocal by reference. 
The idea of a university has Being by its reference to 
Entity. The Entity of the idea is to be found in that per-
manent, shaping, inner, vital principle that we have des-
cribed as a "connected view" -- the formal cause. It pro-
vides the foundation for the idea's Being. The idea has 
Entity only because of this form. Considered in the fore-
going manner, the formal cause of the idea is the primary 
instance of the idea's Entity or Beingness. Entity em-
braces the material, efficient, and final causes of the 
idea, but only as they are secondary instances referring to 
102Ibid., p. 407. 
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the primary instance, form. Thus, the material, efficient, 
and final causes of the idea can be said to have Entity but 
only in a secondary sense. The primary instance of Being-
ness and of Entity in the idea of a university remains as 
its formal cause, the "connected view." 
This concludes a rather extended treatment of the 
"connected view" as a principle of change and as a princi-
ple of Being. The form of the idea or "connected view" 
emerges as the primary instance of cause and the primary 
instance of Entity. This primacy is clarified by the use 
of "cause" and "Entity" as terms equivocal by reference. 
Accordingly, the true nature of the cause of the idea is 
located in its primary instance. So is the nature of En-
tity in its applfcation to the idea to be found there. 
That is not to say that the other causes of the idea -- the 
material, efficient, and final -- are not causes or that 
they do not have Entity. Having their own natures as prin-
ciples or conditions, they are causes and they do have ~n­
tity, but only in a secondary sense. They are not in them-
selves causes of the idea; they do not in themselves have 
Entity. They are denominated "causes" and are said to 
have Entity according to the different relations they bear 
to the formal cause. In the foregoing context, the dom-
inance of the "connected view" or interdisciplinary grasp 
as the idea of a university rests assured from the parti-
cular Aristotelian point of view employed in this study, 
just as it may appear dominant from some other not so 
philosophical context in which it has been considered. 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE HEIGHT, OF THE :SUILDING ANlJ THE NkrURE 01<, 
ITS RESIDENTS -- DISCOURSES VII, VIII, AND IX 
In Discourses V and VI, we saw that Newman's idea 
of a university is notable for the type of education it 
promotes. That education is liberal. As such, it pursues 
knowledge for its own sake --as an end in itself. Its 
distinguishing characteristic is the "habit of mind" it 
purposes to inculcate. This "habit" endures throughout 
one's life. Elsewhere, it is elaborated upon in terms of 
"cultivation of the intellect," "intellectual excellence," 
"enlargement of mind," and "philosophical knowledge • ., 
"Philosophical knowledge" applies not to mere instruction, 
simple learning, the passive acquisition of knowledge, or 
the plain accumulation of facts about unrelated sciences. 
It relates to the action of a shaping power. It involves 
the "mind's energetic and simultaneous action upon and to-
wards ••• new ideas." 1 The mind orders mere learning and 
makes it more meaningful. .3ut what truly sets the culti-
vated mind apart is its "connected view'' of the matter of 
1rdea of a University, p. 120. 
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mere learning or its interdisciplinary grasp of the matter 
of unrelated sciences. This formal grasp enables the mind 
to see the "relative disposition of things" 2 and to view 
··many things at once and as one whole. ,J 
It is to the man who possesses the "habit of mind" 
. 
that we now turn in this chapter. ?or that man is Newman's 
gentleman.· ·.;hen considering Newman's idea of a gentleman, 
we will do well to keep in mind Discourse VIII, the one in 
which his idea is nominally defined. But we must look to 
the Preface and other discourses, as well, for substantive 
materials that clarify his definition and provide grounds· 
for our interpretation of it. This chapter will deal with 
two major questions. The first asks whether Newman's def-
ini tion of a gentleman sh·ould be taken as a serious expres-
sion or not. The second considers whether i~ewman' s gentle-
man is primarily of a worldly or Christian nature. Both 
questions relate to a fundamental problem raised in Chapter 
I, namely, the nature of Newman's gentleman. 
In response to the first question, I propose that 
Newman's statement is not the ironical one some have sug-
gested.4 The issues Newman discusses in the earlier dis-
2I' . d 
_Q.!_., p. 105. 
Jibid.' p. 122. 
4
culler, McGrath, and others advance a."l ironic or 
derogatory interpretation. 
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courses bear out this assertion. so does his treatment of 
material in Discourses VII, VIII, and IX seem to support 
the need for a more serious interpretation. I submit, in 
answer to the second question, that while all discourses 
show more or less that Iliewman is discussing the na-cure of 
a gentleman in both university and Catholic university con-
texts, overall they reaffirm the latter one as the primary 
context. On a natural, philosophical, "university-in-the-
abstract" level, I';eV'rrnan proposes as his ideal the man of 
philosophical habit who has at least a predisposition to 
virtue, though he may well be a sinner. On a supernatural, 
t:r..eological, or Catholic university plane, i'~ewman is ad-
vancing as his idea of a gentleman the man of philosophical 
habit whose ultimate purpose is to become a saint with in-
tellectual and moral characteristics not unlike those of a 
Philip ;~eri. 
Critical commentary on these issues reveals agree-
ment on some significant points and marked disagreement on 
5 others. 3oth areas are significant for the light they 
shed on critical reaction to the fundamental nature of ;,-ew-
man's gentleman. 'I' hat :'Jewman 's gentleman is the ideal 
human product of a university education critics tend to 
5The forthcoming review of criticism pertinent to 
the questions stated above will be drawn for the most part 
from a more thorough review of criticism relevant to the 
Idea presented in Chapter I of this study. 
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a~ree, Jessain, for example, labels him "the ideal prod-
uct of a university." 6 Earrold also vS..ews hiLn as such. 
'I'r.en there is .3uckler, who SiJeaks of him as "education's 
best e.:1d product."? Culler, too, describes him as an ideal. 
-. ; .,.~.::o • +~+' • ~ ''l I ' • t t th Q-Jr ... _ .... ln rea_,_ _,_l rm>=> •. ewr.1an s poln , a e en of Discourse V 
that ~iberal ~ducation makes nothing else but the gentle-
man. That >lei'iman' s idea of a university finds its embodi-
ment in the gentleman sor:1e few critics also 6rant. Culler, 
perhaps, stan~s foremost i.:l declaring that the sentleman is 
"the living embodiment of i~ewman' s conception of knowl-
d - ,.8 e 6 e. 
Correspondingly, critics, for the most part, con-
cede that Newman speaks with two voices on the nature of 
the gentleman, much the same as he does on the·nature of the 
university he advocates, the grounds he employs, and the 
"connected view" he advances. In the main, critics ac-
knowledge that, alt:r_oussh Newman proposes the man of culti-
vated intellect with his comprehensive view as the ideal 
product of a university, he undercuts the total worth of 
such a man by assigning him a significant number of spirit-
ual defects. For instance, }.arrold affirms that i~ewman' s 
h ~Jessain, p. 104. 
71ictorian Prose, p. 1J9. 
3 Culler, p. 190. 
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liberal educatio~ aims not at moral improvement so much as 
at general cultivation of the mind.9 Yet, ~arrold cites 
Newman to the effect that a purely liberal education pro-
motes only pride and self-centeredness. Intellectual cul-
tivation alone is not enough. Culler's position in the 
~atter is not much different. McGrath also takes a similar 
stand, even while he holds for no real distinction between 
intellectual and moral training in the education of the 
10 
university • s human product. It should be noted, hmvever, 
that although critics admit to hearine; two voices in l·Jew-
man's response to the nature of the gentleman, they do not 
determine which voice speaks louder. I'\ei ther do they sup-
ply a means to reconcile two opposed voices offered in the 
context of one educational scheme. 11 
Now, while most of the foregoin~ material points ~o 
areas of critical agreement on the nature of Newman's 
gentleman, critical commentary on other fundamental issues 
of the Idea12 correlative to the Christian or secular ~a­
ture of the gentleman show some substantive areas of dis-
9Harrold, p. 105. 
10
-- ,.., tt... 174 ll'lCura a, p • • 
1 1 . 
- I w1ll propose Aristotelian equivocity by refer-
ence as a means to effect a reconciliation of the two 
voices. 
12
. th 1" 1.e., Ca o 1c and secular university issues, 
grounds, theme, and the like. 
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agreement. These tend more to reveal fundrunentally differ-
ent critical estimates of the gentleman's nature. These 
estimates are characterized by radical disagreement and 
some moderate agreement. In the matter of the Catholic or 
secular university issue, controversy centers on whether 
Newman's university is a place for the humanistic or Chris-
tian development of man. Positions taken on the issue 
range from Corcoran's, which excludes the possibility of 
the university as a place for any religious development at 
all, to Dale's, which precludes the likelihood of any de-
velopment other than that type in Newman's university. 13 
Between these extremes are Harrold, dise, McGrath, and 
others who recognize the university as a place for humanis-
tic development but who also acknowledge it as a"place for 
religious training. Which type of developillent is primary 
and what is its relation to the secondary type they do not 
determine. 
On the question of grounds, critics focus their at-
tention on whether the nature of a university education 
designed for a certain type of human university product is 
to be sought on theological or philosophical grounds. Once 
again, there is some agreement in that critics tend tore-
ject one set of grounds. Harrold sees Newman approaching 
lJSee Ch. I, pp. 21-23, above, for an extended 
treatment of criticism relevant to this issue. 
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his subject from many angles, the two chief ones being the 
humanistic and Roman Catholic. 14 r.:cGrath adds that the 
inquiry follows philosophical lines through the fifth dis-
course but in subsequent lectures pursues a combined phil-
osophical and theological approach. 15 Culler also confirms 
Newman's use of humanistic and religious grounds. 16 How-
ever, which type of grounds stands preeminent and its re-
lation to other grounds are matters left unresolved. Given 
the unity of Newman•s educational ideal, the likelihood of 
his using integrated grounds to pursue it, and the rela-
tionship of the educational.ideal and the grounds to the 
type of gentleman advocated, I think these are matters that 
ought not to be left unsettled. 
The nature and relation of the Idea's temporal inter-
disciplinary grasp of knowledge for its own sake to a super-
natural interconnected view of knowledge for the sake of 
something more provides a third area with some significant 
critical disagreement. The question is pertinent to the 
nature of the gentleman because it involves Newman•s whole 
educational scheme and the role of the university-educated 
man within that scheme. Does the "connected view" advoca-
14Earrold, p. 115. 
pp. 281-2S2. 
16
culler, p. 227. See Ch. I, pp. 25-28, above, for 
other criticism on Newman·s grounds. 
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ted in the Idea embrace only the intellectually cultivated 
man's view of this world, or rather, does it encompass a 
perspective that looks beyond to ~od and tte next life, as 
well? Corcoran, once more, appears at one end of the crit-
ical spectrtun; 0ale, at t:r..e other. According to Corcoran's 
position, the interdisciplinary grasp advanced by Newman 
appears ill-suited to God's purposes. In Dale's view, it 
would seem unfit for any purpose other than God's. Harrold, 
J:;:cGratL, Culler, and Svaglic, among ot.r.ers, assume positions 
somewhere between these extremes. Some of them tend to 
asree with Harrold's point that general cultivation of the 
mind, to which the "connected view" is central, does not 
reflect Iiewman 's whole educational ideal. Some of them 
would also grant, with Svaglic, that "intellectual curios-
i ty and achievement" must be united with the "humility a.Yld 
charity of the truly religious person ... l7 
The problem of the religious character found respec-
tively in the man of philosophical habit and in the saint 
offers still another area of critical disagreement. 'I' he 
religion of philosophy concerns man in relation to ma.Yl. 
The religion of the saint places man in relation to man and 
God. Which characterization better describes l'~ewman 's uni-
versity-educated man? As well as the discussion of any 
17svaglic, XXll. See Ch. I, pp. 29-J2, above, for 
additional critical commentary on this issue. 
2 ' 1 c. 
other issue, critical reaction to this problem is rich in 
the diverse critical estimates it provides on the nat~re of 
:,; ew:man' s gentleman. Corcoran 1 s basic position that ;,-evrman 
irreparably severs the link between intellect and virtue 
indicates one extreme. Jale's case for "religious exclu-
siveness and Church control of university education" offers 
a counter-perspective. Harrold marks the line between the 
spurious reli;ion of the man of philosophical habit and the 
• 1• • ~ t- • t 18 I • 1.-- n ' b 5enu1ne re 1g1on or he saln • n T.ue rormer, ne o serves 
a false religion of sentiment; in the latter, the true reli-
;ion of the sound Christian spirit. Culler's position is 
similar in a way. Ee notes the ambivalence in i,!ewman 1 s 
thought re~arding the religious make-up of the gentleman. 19 
Yet, Culler leans more to the development of the university-. 
educated man as a gentleman than to his growth as an intel-
lectually cul ti va ted saint. 20 ~.:c:rath, on the other r1and, 
holds more for a close alliance between intellectual cul-
ture a~d spiritual perfection in the education of the uni-
versity student. 21 
One other area of critical disazreement remains. It 
1~D ld 111 1 ~2 
.:arro_ , pp. . -_._ .J. • 
10 ll n 
'Cu er, p. 22,.J. 
20r'·d 2r-1 Ol • 1 D • :J • 
- ~ 
21~cGrath, p. 170. 3ee Ch. I, pp. 35-78, above, for 
other critical reaction to this issue. 
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concerns whether Newman's treatment of the gentleman is 
serious or not. Critics differ sharply in their interpre-
tations. Some, like Harrold, Vargish, ar1d Griffin, advo-
cate a serious presentation on Newman's part. Culler, 
r,!cJ.rath, and Buckler, among others, advance an ironic or 
derogatory interpretation. 22 Culler's interpretation holds 
special interest in view of the position on Ne\~an's gen-
tleman this study will propose. According to Culler, hew-
man, for want of a better name, calls his gentleman the 
"man of philosophic habit." 23 Ee is an "idealized type" 
and reflects an "unattainable ideal." his value is largely 
"inspirational."24 His char,;:;e is to seek the perfection of 
the intellect. His range of studies should be neither too 
narrow nor his mastery too superficial. Culler is impa-
ti ent with the "man of philosophical habit" because i''iewman 
subtracts an "impossible number of vices" from him. 25 
Newman, Culler feels, ends up making the university-educat-
26 
ed man a "Jack-of-all-trades." Culler points out further 
how ironic it 1s that I'fewman's portrait of a gentleman 
22'""' Ch ;:)ee • I, pp. J8-42, for additional commentary on 
this question. 
23culler, P• 190. 
24Ibid. , p. 189. 
25r 'd ~·· p. 191. 
26Ibid., p. 19J. 
26J 
"should be taken as a serious expression of Newman's posi-
tive ideal."27 
In view of Culler's position that the humanistic and 
religious views in combination render a man able to complete 
his nature and to present that nature, fully developed, in 
the service of God, 28 his ironical interpretation of New-
man's gentleman appears inconsistent. Culler equates the 
gentleman with the "ma..Yl of philosophic habit." He forms, 
in Culler's view, one-half of Newman's positive ideal, a 
Christian humanistic one. If the gentleman or "man of 
philosophic habi t 11 forms one half of ~iewman 's ideal, why 
should Nevvman 's delineation of him not be taken seriously? 
Culler further observes that some of Newman's finest com-
mentary on the religion of philosophy is contained in the 
portrait of the gentleman. If that is so, would Nev;man 
wish such a commentary to be viewed in less than serious 
fashion? Not to take this commentary seriously is to un-
dercut a religious view most characteristic of one type of 
university-educated man. It is difficult to believe that 
Newman would go to such great lengths in formulating the 
nature of a secular university on philosophical grounds, 
for the sake of fostering a temporal "connected view" with 
a specific type of natural religious orientation, for a 
27Ibid., p. 2J8. 
28Tb"d ~·· p. 242. 
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university-educated man he does not wish to be taken seri-
ously. It would be equally difficult to imagine hewman's 
developing the nature of a Catholic university on theolog-
ical or religious grounds with a view to advancing more of 
an eternal "connected view" and appropriate supernatural 
religious orientation for a Christian gentleman he wished 
to be interpreted ironically. For Culler to treat Ne~tvrnan • s 
celebrated portrait of the worldly gentleman less than ser-
iously is to eliminate a constitutive element of what 
Culler himself describes as Ne"~ovrnan 's Christian humanistic 
ideal. Such an approach leaves only the Christian part of 
the ideal, important as that may be. 
What does this review of criticism reveal, and how 
does it·bear on the purpose of this chapter? Among other 
points, the summary indicates that critics tend to recog-
nize Newman's two voices on the nature of the gentleman. 
They recognize that he addresses his efforts to the devel-
opment of a worldly human product of a university, even 
while he advocates the development of a more Christian gen-
tlemanly ideal. They acknowledge the fundamental distinc-
tion he makes between the religion of reason found in the 
man of philosophical habit and the religion of Faith ob-
served in the Christian humanist. Critics discuss this 
distinction in general terms, but their overall reaction to 
the problem leaves some serious difficulties unresolved. 
The most obvious one is that they have not yet found a 
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means of reconciling two dramatically opposed concepts of 
the gentleman within what appears to be a unified educa-
tional scheme. They do not unify ~~ewman 's two voices. Yet 
some unification and reconciliation must be made if i~ew­
man's presentation of the gentleman is to be aligned with 
the type of education advocated, the grounds employed, the 
"connected view" advanced, and the type of religious char-
acter promoted. Newman's educational ideal exists for 
someone. Is he ~he man of philosophical habit who with his 
comprehensive view sees all things as subject to man? Or 
rather, is he the man of philo~ophical and religious habit 
who with his temporal and eternal perspective sees man and 
every other thing as subjec~ to God? Correlative to that 
issue is the question of how seriously Newma."l intends ei-
ther treatment of the gentleman to be taken. Disa&reement 
among critics on this matter is as pronounced as any one 
will find in the corpus of criticism pertinent to the Idea. 
The earlier chapters of this study have dealt with 
I~ewman' s issues overall and some specific questions, like 
those of grounds, wholeness of theme and structure, the 
cause of the idea, and the principle of its Entity, accord-
ing to an order of priority. Newman's manifold approach to 
the nature of a university, the grounds of the inquiry, and 
the "connected view" has been explained according to primary 
and secondary instances of terms and things viewed as equiv-
ocals by reference. In this chapter, Ne'>'~man's twofold ap-
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preach to the nature of a gentleman will be interpreted in 
much the same manner. :L'he purpose will be to ascertain 
what constitutes ~ewman's primary statement on the nature 
of a gentleman and what comprises his secondary position. 
Once again, the critical apparatus employed will be equiv-
ocity by reference. To understand better its application 
to Nev~an's treatment of the gentleman, it may be useful to 
review some key aspects of the doctrine and to indicate how 
they will be employed in this chapter. 
In this ~ype of equivocity, things are expressed in 
various ways but always in reference to one nature or form 
that is the primary nature or form of the thing. Although 
differences are overshadowed by some degree of sameness, 
the differences are still present, and the true nature of 
the term or the thing signified is to be found only in the 
primary instance. Equivocity by reference, then, involves 
primary and secondary instances of terms and the things 
they signify. The true nature of the thing is signified 
by the primary instance of the term. Correspondingly, a 
secondary instance of the form is signified by a secondary 
use of the term. Each secondary instance of the term or 
thing signified has a special independent relation to the 
primary term and thing. 
In the context of this schematic device, "gentleman" 
will be treated as a term equivocal by reference. l\iewman 
will be interpreted as expressing his idea of a gentleman 
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in more than one way but always in reference to something 
one, that is, in reference to one type of gentleman that 
is primary in meaning. The worldly gentleman and the 
Christian gentleman will emerge as instances of terms and 
things whose definitions show a de5ree of sameness in dif-
ference. The primary or fundamental meaning of the term 
"gentleman," or more precisely, the primary or fundamental 
nature of that signified by the term, will be found in the 
intellectually cultivated Christian gentleman. A secondary 
instance of the term will be located in the worldly gentle-
man, the man of philosophical habit, and some proportional 
relationship will be established between the secondary and 
primary instances. The worldly gentleman will be deter-
mined to have form·or meaning only in reference to the 
Christian gentleman. 
The burden of the chapter, then, will be to support 
two claims. First, using Aristotelian equivocity by ref-
erence as the major schematic device, I assert that the 
primary instance of Newman's idea of a gentleman is the 
Christian gentleman and that the secondary instance is the 
secular gentleman. Second, I propose that Newman's idea of 
a gentleman should be interpreted as a serious statement, 
whatever the instance considered. The primary instance 
reflects the true nature of "gentleman" as Hewman uses the 
term. It refers to the man of "intellectual cultivation" 
whose mind is also imbued with Christian principles and 
2U3 
ideals. Ee is no mere "English Gentleman" or stock nine-
teentt-century character. Rather, he appears a distin-
5uished man of cultivated mind whose human goals are har-
;r.oni zed with transcendent, supernatural ones and v.ihose 
human conduct is reconciled with supernatural ~otivation. 
7he secondary instance of 1~ev .. man • s gentleman shows tf:e pro-
file of a worthy man drawn in the context of purely human 
goals and natural aspirations. The worldly model r;ewman 
treats as a gentleman in a secondary sense has many redeem-
ing human qualities, but he is not the type of gentleman 
,'-Jewman and his university wish primarily to advance. r.;a-
terial drawn from the Preface and from all the discourses 
will be used to support this assertion. 
29 
·,/hat some may allege to be the a'nbivalence of 
I'iewman' s thought resarding the nature of a <::Sentleman is 
reflected as early as the Preface and Discourse I of the 
Idea. It should be pointed out, however, that as one stud-
ies the Preface and succeeding discourses more closely, 
and as he applies Aristotelian equivocity by reference to 
tr.e scope of a university, its grounds, and its "view," he 
senses a more definable position and the~atic statement on 
the meaning and seriousness of Uev.rman 's gentleman. .Ambi va-
lence gives way to clarity. The seriousness of xewr:an's 
statement on the ideal surfaces, and the picture of the 
29
,-, ll 22Q vU er, p. ..; • 
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Christian gentleman with an integrated grasp of the meaning 
of this life and the next comes more sharply into focus as 
the university's preeminent human product.3° 
Although he defines the gentleman in a later dis-
course, 3l r,;ewman really initiates the discussion of the 
nature of a gentleman with his statement on issues in the 
Preface. There, he presents a university groping for the 
realization of its proper goal. In seeking that most fun-
da.rnental to the nature of university education, he appears 
to be dealing with the natural form of a university, but 
the evidence of the Preface suggests his ultimate concern 
to be the nature of a Catholic university. 32 l'ievvman read-
ily admits that the charge handed him by the Holy See and 
the Irish Hierarchy is the founding of an institution that 
would serve the "interests of f{evealed Truth'' and that 
would operate "for the sake of .rteli[;ion. ,.33 Iv:oreover, he 
wonders aloud whether the goal of such an institution ought 
3°The premises used in this chapter to support my 
conclusions on the nature of Newman's gentleman and the de-
gree of its seriousness are based on a core of evidence 
developed in earlier chapters of this study. This earlier 
treatment the reader should also note in judging the valid-
ity and soundness of the arg~ments presented inCh. VII. 
31. . 1.e., ~1scourse VIII. 
32see Ch. II, p. 91, above. See also pp. 6-7 of the 
Preface. 
33Idea of a Gniversity, p. 6. 
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not to be more than the development of just an "English 
Gentleman." The Preface reveals that, not unlike the aim 
of the Church, ;-rewman • s purpose in establishing a uni ver-
sity must ultimately be judged in the light of Calvary's 
meaning. 34 Furthermore, I\r ewrnan' s personal beliefs and con-
stant awareness of God's Presence seem to confirm the na-
ture of his ultimate educational goals, even while he cites 
the university as a place for "universal knowledge." i~ew-
man never wavers on the need for moral growth in the over-
all picture of man's educational development. Not for a 
moment does he doubt the traditional Catholic alliance of 
intellectual and religious instruction. A university must 
infuse a religious spirit. It must respond to the need for 
an omnipresent spirit of religion in university matters. 
'>'lhile Newman respects intellectual vigor and solid reason-
ing, he feels it is spiritual and moral vitality that 
crowns the image of the rational man. A cultivated, well-
educated laity who exert their intellectual and moral in-
fluence constitute his university goal, not a group of re-
ligious isolationists. 
In seeking to reconcile Newman's emphasis on the 
natural scope of a university with his concern for its 
supernatural and religious foundation, I repeat that the 
reader must bear in mind the point of view on issues that 
34 Tb.d 
=--L·· p. ?. 
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;:ewrr.an assumes at a given tir;-:e. Alle,sedly contrauic-co:cy 
. . 15 posltlons,J a conflict between natural and supernatural 
objectives, and an apparent conflict of basic issues36 can 
be ex:)lained in terms of pri:nary aEd secondary instances. 
~his is a ~atter for interpretation by Aristotelian equiv-
ocity by reference.37 The na-cure of a Catholic university 
with its emphasis on the Church, theology, and intellectual 
and moral development emerges as the primary issue of the 
Idea. 'Ji th this • .;.ristotelian apparatus we ca::i reconcile 
.':ewman' s t·No fold approach to the nature of a university . 
. ·iithout it, Sevvrnanqs tvw voices tend to appear dissonant 
and ur.mana;eable because there is no principle in evidence 
to unite them in one integrated educational sche~e. 
If one concedes the funpa~ental role of the Catholic 
'.::h'J.rch &'1d the imi)Ortance of spiritual values in dewr:1an 's 
university scheme as outlined in the Preface, and if one 
acknowledges the primacy of the Catholic university issue, 
then it is difficult not to concede, as well, that the man 
of "philosophical habit," the man for whose intellectual 
J5i.e., like those of Corcoran and ~ale in disc~ssinJ 
the role of the .:;hurch an:i reli;gion in :~evnnan 's development 
of university education. 
J6see the review of criticism in this chapter and 
also that of Chapter I. 
J7See C::h. II, lJ• 104, above, for a discussion of 
lssues in that context. 
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cultivation the university exists, should be taken as a 
serious model, rather than as a "Jack-of-all-trades," as 
Culler makes him out to be. From a natural or philosoph-
leal point of view, Newma11's Preface reveals that a univer-
sity should aim at developing a student whose intellectual 
refinement sets him apart from other men. That is :·rewman's 
response to the secondary issue. But even more signifi-
cantly, the Preface proposes that a university should pro-
duce an otherworldly man whose broader view includes eter-
nal verities as well as temporal scientific realities.38 
That is i:(ewman' s response to the primary issue. Newman 
extends himself too far, and he spends too much time and 
effort to reveal the lines separating the product of a 
university abstractly considered from the product of a 
university considered in reference to religious principles 
for one to believe that the product is merely an ironic 
caricature. If the primary issue of Newman's Idea is the 
nature of a Catholic university, then the primary instance 
of the man educated in this university is a Christian gen-
tleman. 
~iscourse I is also rich in clarifying material 
about the nature of :1ewman' s gentleman. In treating the 
JBidea of a University, p. 6. i/ith the Vicar of 
Christ, Newman feels that "achievements of the intellect" 
ought to be contemplated "simply [but not onlyJ in their 
relation to the interest of Revealed Truth." 
27J 
subject and goal of a 1;.:1iversit;;r education, tLe discourse 
moves from the Catholic vs. secular university issue raised 
in the ?reface ~o the question of the grounds on which the 
inquiry is to be conducted. The lines are natural and su-
pernatural. Sev~rnan 's primary and secondary use of these 
i:rounds will be employed to justify the statement that ?\ew-
man's definition of a gentleman is a serious one and that 
his gentleman is primarily a supernaturally oriented one. 
2ven while tiewman affirms "hunan wisdom" and "human reason" 
to be the grounds of the inquiry,J9 the presence of other 
evidence supports the thesis that the subject is not bein~ 
pursued along merely philosophical or non-sectarian lines. 4? 
!~evrman feels the discussion should be conducted under the 
sanction of the Church. The principles considered are sig-
nificant "for Catholic objects" and lend themselves to "a 
Catholic treatment. ,.4-l UltLnately, r~evnnan invokes Church 
authority. He focuses on the aim of a "University, of which 
Catholicity is the fundamental principle. "42 ~:e demands a 
"J 
"hie:h theological view of a Fni versi ty. ,,__, ?or i\ewman, the 
J 9Ibid. , p. 24. 
40Ibid., p. 27. see also Ch. III, pp. 1J2-1J5. 
41
rdea of a University, p. 20. 
42_, . j 
.iOl<. , 1 p. 27 . 
4Jibid. 
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main burden of the discourse is to underscore the issue 
that dominates his university concerns and to delineate the 
primary and secondary grounds on which he will ascertain 
the nature of his university product. ~ow, the product of 
fi ewman 's university is the gentleman along with the habit 
of mind or character of soul that distin5Uishes him. .For 
us not to take the result of these efforts seriously ap-
})ears, indeed, to do a grave injustice to 1~ewman 's in ten-
tion and efforts. 
~sing Aristotelian equivocity by reference as our 
guide, we see that the nature of a Catholic university 
emerges from the pages of Discourse I as the primary in-
stance of issue; the supernatural and theological, as the 
. . t . f d 44 pr1.mary 1.ns ance o groun s. I'J"ewman Is call for the sane-
tion of the r;hur~~-"' "a Catholic treatment," "Catholicity" 
as the basic principle, and his invocation of ecclesiasti-
cal authority45 confirms our interpretation of his priori-
ties. :i/e observe that such an order leaves the nature of a 
university considered apart from Revelation and Theoloey 
as a secondary instance of issue in Newman's Idea and ab-
stract philosophical lines as a secondary instance of 
grounds. 
This treatment of the Preface and Discourse I su~-
4L~ See Ch. III, pp. 1)8-140, above. 
45 p • 0 ,. Idea of a unl.versltJ, pp. 26, 28. 
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tleman and its interpretation as a serious or less than 
s2rious ex)ression is appro_priate if we are to :irasp i·few-
~an's idea of a university. It proposes, further, that to 
U!1d~r::-:tani ,J.nd interpret rightly Hew:nan's statement, we 
must reconsider the fundamental issues that evoked Newman's 
definition and that we ~ust assign a ~riority to the ~rounds 
on which he responds. Cur exarnination reveals that .iewman 's 
expla.na"!;lOn of the relationsLip between a Catholic univer-
si ty ar:.d a university "ir ... the abstract 11 clarifies the na-
ture of the relationship between the Christian gentleman 
anJ his worldly counterpart. It points out that .?~ewman 's 
theolo.:;ical and philosophical groun:is a.."1d issues are ger-
l.la:J.e to a discussion of the relati·ve merits of the Chris-
tian vs. the v·;orldly man of "philosophical habit. 11 Obser-
vation suggests that the temporal powers of reason, noble 
as they are, must be subordinated to the demands of .Fai tr., 
Revelation, and Scripture. 
Ey delineating issues and assigning grounds, !\e\"iillan 
addresses himself·to the Christian gentleman who would meet 
the challenges and come to grips with a secular world with-
out becoming its slaYe and without compromising his spirit-
ual integrity. In reference to the matter of a secular 
university and philosophical grounds, it should be noted 
that Jevrma:n feels the search for tr.e ;oal and product of a 
liberal education must be expressed in terms of temporal 
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efforts. So he formulates the nature of a gentleman on a 
temporal plane. In dealing with the nature of a non-sec-
tarian university on natural philosophical grounds, Newman 
provides for the human dimension of a liberally educated 
man. Such a man's "cultivated intellect" and personal 
search for intellectual truth move him well along toward 
some important goals of human existence. But this human 
approach is only a prerequisite to a more Christial'l doc-
trinal approach to man's educational .goals. For mal'l and 
the world he lives in must be reconciled with som~ tran-
scendent supernatural realities. That is where I-Iewman' s 
emphasis on the nature of a Catholic university and his 
use of theological grounds come in. 'l1hey set the stage 
for the development of a gentleman on a supernatural plane. 
This formulation looks to the supernatural dimensions of a 
liberally educated man and his realization of the goal of 
a supernatural life, namely, Christian perfection. The 
potentiality of the natural man with his cultivated intel-
lect can only be realized ultimately in the perfection of 
the Christian gentleman. In the development of this Chris-
tian ideal, the lines between Catholic university issue and 
secular university issue, between natural and supernatural 
grounds, and between natural and supernatural men of in-
tellectual refinement run closely parallel. But from the 
standpoint of equivocity by reference, one issue, one 
set of grounds, and one type of gentleman must stand 
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out. If :-;ewman 's emphasis in the Preface and Discourse I 
is on the nature of a Catholic university ai-Jd hence on the 
supernatural man of philosophical habit, however much he 
later discusses his counterpart, and if he shows in Jis-
course I that the primary grounds of the inquiry are super-
natural, I~ewman 's statement on the nature of the gentle:nan 
must be taken as a serious expression. :o believe other-
vlise lS to assume that i,lev.rman takes hi3 Catholic university 
issue and supernatural , . . grouno.s :..n ·,r;::nn. 
Jiscourses II and III provide additional material to 
help clarify our understanding of the role ;;e\A1I1la:n assigns 
the ;entleman and to help us measure :r.is seriO'J.sness on the 
subject. In the discourses l·;ew:nan 's fore;nost concerns are 
the establisr.rnent of theolo6y as a science and its "be'ar-
47 ing" on other branches of knowledge. Thematically, he 
pursues both concerns by advocating the principle that all 
4Q knowled(;e forms a whole. v 'rhi s principle points up the 
interrelated nature of all sciences and the interdiscipli-
::tary manner in which they must be viev1ed. Newman also pas-
tulates the existence of an Omnipotent ;:;.od as the .source of 
46i.e., in the primary instance of the terms "issue," 
"grour~ds," ar~d "ge::ttle.:nan." Only there will the true na-
ture of each be found. 
47 Idea of a Universit¥, pp. JJ-34, 51-52. See also 
Ch. IV, 144-146, above. 
48
rctea of a University, p. 57. See also Ch. IV, 
p. 144, above. 
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the branches of knowledge and as their ~nd. 49 In the same 
discourses, he formulates questions whose answers lead back 
to the source and whose responses move toward Truth. 
Apart from their thematic and structural implica-
tions for the whole of the Idea, Discourses II and III 
. 
point out that the true meaning of Newman's gentleman and 
the degree of its seriousness ought to be measured in the 
light of that important assumption, the existence of God. 
For the assumption illuminates the interrelated nature of 
the knowledge the gentleman, the man of philosophical ha-
bit, should ~eek, and it also clarifies the integrated 
manner in which he grasps such knowledge.5° To admit the 
existenc~ of a personal God is to admit an all-encompassing 
fact that cannot be dismissed without fragmenting the whole 
of knowledge whose grasp Newman says it is the charge of 
the gentleman to seek.5l The weight of the assumption, the 
nature of the charge, and the obligation it imposes make it 
difficult to accept an ironical interpretation of the man 
on whom the assumption, charge, and obligation weigh most 
heavily. 
Furthermore, if we accept Newman's assumption that 
49Idea of a University, pp. J7, J8, 46, 57, 62. See 
also Ch. IV, p. 145, above. 
50idea of a University, P• 57. 
5lidea of a University, p. 57. See also Ch. IV, p. 
156, above. 
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God exists and his premise that God's "presence," "provl-
dence," "impression," and "influence" bear so strone;ly on 
other sciences that to apprehend them is in some measure 
to apprehend Him,52 then it appears that we must concede, 
as well, that the man of philosophical knowledge who views 
these sciences and integrates them in an harmonious manner 
ought not to be considered merely as the worldly gentleman 
who perceives the "relative disposition of things." As-
sumption and premise dictate that he be treated as a man 
with a mind capable of comprehending God to some degree in 
this life and a soul capable of union with Him in the next. 
If the development of a Christian gentleman is not Newman's 
preeminent concern, and if this idea of a gentleman is not 
to be construed as a serious expression, then neither 
should the type of liberal education he advances, the 
wholeness of knowledge he stipulates, nor the existence of 
God he postulates be taken seriously. 
Although Discourse IV does not offer so much support 
as some other discourses for a serious interpretation of 
Newman's gentleman or the assertion that the Christian man 
of cultivated mind is the primary instance of Newman's gen-
tleman, it does provide material that can be used analo-
gously to clarify the relation between the Christian and 
secular gentleman. Discourse IV reveals the discor-d be-
52Idea of a University, p. 57. 
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tween secular and sacred sciences stemming from pride and 
0 51 lgnora.nce. ~ It develops representative samples of secular 
sciences' attempts to usurp the rights and prerogatives of 
'i4 theology.- The discourse states, from one point of view, 
that people who do not know their own limitations or the 
bounds of their ovm disciplines create discord in what 
should be the harmonious relationship of the sciences. 
In the right relation between secular and sacred 
sciences, a relation i'iewman ·defines by examples to the con-
trary,55 there may be found parallels to the proper rela-
tionship that must be established between the worldly and 
Christian gentleman. Just as secular sciences are rendered 
more meaningful by God's "presence," "providence," and· "in-
fluence" upon them -- to such an extent that to know them 
is to know Him -- so may the worldly gentleman's intellec-
tual goals in this world assume a more meaningful dimension 
by his realization of some higher spiritual ideals. Unre-
lated branches of knowledge cannot be considered whole un-
less viewed in reference to all of trutn.5 6 For to possess 
these partial views of truth ultimately is to know God, 
SJibid., p. ?6. 
54lQll., P• 74. 
55see Ch. v, pp. 180-186, above. 
56rdea of a university, pp. 72-7J. 
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their source and End. To know God more or less fully is a 
matter of personal spiritual perfection. Just as the total 
view of knowledge takes into account more than secular 
branches of learning, so the picture of the whole gentleman 
must provide for more than earthly intellectual pursuits. 
The human goal of intellectual culture must be merged with 
the divine goal of Christian holiness. Otherwise, the nat-
ural gentleman, left to his own pride and selfishness, may 
live a life counter to the realization of Gospel ideals, 
even while he appears to seek intellectual truth. His sit-
uation would then be analogous to that of a purely secular 
science which, in the advance of its own interests, works 
against the truth of theology and Revelation by treating a 
limited, true perspective as if it were the whole truth. 
'ile must acknowledge the limitations of the worldly man of 
philosophical habit much the same as we admit to the neces-
sarily restricted limits of secular sciences. Not to do so 
is to ignore the supernatural dimension of man and the ul-
timate interests of the wholeness of knowledge. 
In Discourses V and VI Ne't'ilnan goes on to show that 
"Philosophical Knowledge," which it is the purpose of the 
university to inculcate, is an end in itself.57 The intel-
lectual cultivation of Nevvman's gentleman demands a compre-
57-b·d 97 .L ]_ ., p. • See also Ch. VI, pp. 210-211, above . 
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hensive grasp of truth in all its parts and an integrated 
~s hold on the relationship of one science to another.J Lib-
eral knowledge, or knowledge for its o~n sake, is equated 
with a gentleman's knowledge. Newman's gentleman emerges 
as a·man university-trained, liberally educated, steeped 
in Liberal Knowledge, and as a man with an interdiscipli-
nary view. If there is no possible justification for the 
existence of a university that does not foster that view, 
and if no university can operate independently of its ef-
forts to promote the "habit of mind" to which that view is 
central, then it would appear that one must take Newman's 
idea of a gentleman seriously. For the "connected view'' is 
the hallmark of the university-educated man, Newman's gen-
tleman. If one chooses not to take seriously Newman's 
statement regarding him, he ought just as well to disregard 
the interdisciplinary view by which the university-educated 
man, the gentleman, attains truth while he seeks to grasp 
the wholeness of knowledge. 3ut to cast aside this view is 
to dismiss that which, in brief, expresses Newman's univer-
sity ideal.59 Newman designs his university as a place for 
the development of someone. His education is liberal edu-
cation. His knowledge is liberal knowledge. His view is 
58Idea of a University, pp. 92-9J. See also Ch. VI, 
pp. 206-207, above. 
59see Ch. VI, pp. 215-216, above. 
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an interdisciplinary grasp. One should not dismiss the 
seriousness of ~\;ewman' s statement on the ma.YJ. any more than 
he should disregard the education, the knowledge, or the 
view that characterizes the man's purpose in attending the 
university. 
Having discussed "Liberal or Philosophical Knowl-
edge" as an end in itself, Newman moves on in Discourse VII 
to the "utility" of this knowledge. 60 If pressed hard 
enough, he can show the usefulness of the liberal knowledge 
that is properly the gentleman's. Ee begins by reaffirming 
that truth is the object of the intellect, _that it is 
crasped in part, not intuitively as a whole, and that the 
inteTlect discerns truth by a mental process which is both 
a matter of training and a matter of rules. Liberal educa-
tion, or the education of a gentleman, emerges as that 
process of training, by which the intellect, 
instead of being formed or sacrificed to some par-
ticular or accidental purpose, some specific trade 
or profession, or study or science, is disciplined 
for its o~n sake, for t~e percep~i?n of its own 61 proper obJect, a.YJ.d for ~ts own n~gnest culture •••• 
. Newman adds, however, that while "intellectual culture is 
its o1rm end, ••• what has its end in itself, has its use in 
itself also." 62 He cites the principle that "though the 
60
rdea of a University, pp. 142-144. 
61Ibid., p. 1.35· 
62rb· . 
__l:.Q.' p. 142. 
234 
useful is not always sood, the good is always useful." 
UevnnaYl adds that "good is not only good, but reproductive 
f j , • 1 . n• ,61 o goor ••• • Gooa lS pro lilC. • .,., •,Jewman 's argument can be 
reduced to various syllogisms. For one, he ar~~es that 
wnich is its mvn end has its own use; intellectual culture 
64 is its own end; therefore, it has its own use. Correla-
tively, Newman contends that what is good is useful; liberal 
education is 60od; and therefore, it is useful. 3y analo,;y, 
dewman argues that 
as the body may be tended, cherished, a..Yld exercised 
with a simple view to its general health, so may 
the intellect also be generally exercised in order6 ~ to its perfect state; and this is its cultivation. ) 
Bor ~Jevrman, then, the cultivation of the mind is good and 
usefulo Correspondingly, liberal education is a good and 
useful thing. It is so not in the sense that liberal edu-
cation prepares a student for "some art, or business, or 
p. 14Lt-. 
64rbid., pp. 144-145. ;,·\ewman supports the assertion 
that intellectual culture has its own end and use by an 
analogy. :.;uch the same as bodily health, general culture 
of the mind is good and useful even though it does not ef-
fect ''any definite and distinct work or production." For 
Newman, intellectual cultivation serves as an aid to pro-
fessional and scientific studies of all kinds because it 
provides intellectual qualities necessary to take up a..Yly 
one of them. In I\ewman 's words, intellectual culture is 
useful inasmuch as it constitutes "the best and highest 
formation of the intellect for social and political life" 
(Idea, P• 183). 
65Ibid., p. 145. 
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.t:' • t d ' .,66 pro~ess~on, or rae, or worK ••.• ~,:hat the "cultivated 
intellect" does do, "because it is a good in itself," is 
to bring "with it a power and a grace to every work and 
occupation which it undertakes ...... 67 
3ut what is the point of this discussion in reference 
to the nature of Newma.Yl' s gentleman and the seriousness of 
his expression concernine him? Again, so very much hinges 
on the premise that the man who acquires r~·ewman 's liberal 
education a.nd who undergoes the intellectual cultivation is 
r.;ewman' s gentleman, a point so many critics grant aJl.d one 
which other readers must also if the ~ is to make any 
sense at all. If such an identification is made, then 
l~ewman' s gentleman emerges as 
the man -who has learned to think and to reason and 
to compare and to discriminate and to analyze, who 
has refined his taste, and formed his judgment, and 
sharpened his mental vision, who will not indeed at 
once be a lawyer, or a pleader, or an orator, or a 
statesman, or a physician, or a good landlord, or 
a man of business, or a soldier, or an engineer, or 
a chemist, or a geologist, or an antiquarian, but 
he will be placed in that state of intellect in 
which he can take up any one of the sciences or 
callings I have referred to •••• 68 
If liberal education and intellectual cultivation are 5ood 
and useful in themselves, then the knowledge of the univer-
66Ibid. , p. 144. 
67Ibid., p. 146. 
68 Tb"d 
.::.-1:.....·, p. 145 • 
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sity-trained man is good and useful. tor it prepares him 
for just about any calling. 1\:oreover, if the university-
educated man and ;jewman is gentleman are one, then the knowl-
edge of a gentleman is also good and useful. Liberal educa-
tion then promotes in the gentleman 
a clear conscious view of his own op~n~ons and 
jud~nents, a truth in developing them, an eloquence 
in expressing them, and a force in urging them. It 
teaches him to see things as they are, to go right 
to the point, to disentangle a skein of thought, to 
detect what is sophistical, and to discard what is 
irrelevant. It prepares him to fill any post with 
credit, and to master any subject with facility. 
It shows him how to accommodate himself to others, 
how to throw himself into their state of mind, how 
to bring before them his own, tlow to influence them, 
how to come to <;.n understanding with them, how to 
bear with them.69 
If :._Jewman is serious here on the go.od and usefulness of 
liberal education and intellectual cultivation and if the 
university-educated man is newman's gentleman, then ~~ewman 
is also serious about his definition of a e;entleman. The 
em:)hasis here centers on what liberal education and univer-
sity training give the man. 
The ~aterial in Discourse VII emphasizes the mental 
attitudes liberal education provides a gentleman, attitudes 
which make it possible for hi~ to take up learning any job. 
As such it merits attention as an extension of Newman's 
statement on the nature of a gentleman, and it helps .neasure 
the extent of its seriousness. The following discourse, 
69I .. d 
--2.l._·, pp. 1.54-155· 
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while providing some measure of seriousness, concentrates 
more on how liberal knowledge, in close alliance with Grace 
and religious principle, must promote the development of 
the Christian gentleman and his eternal interests. Left 
alone on a natural level, the gentleman has too many self-
imposed limitations. 
In the three previous discourses, Newman has shown 
that liberal knowledge is its own end, that it is not the 
~ere passive reception of knowledge or of unrelated sci-
ences but rather the active interdisciplinary grasp of 
them, and that such knowledge is good and useful in that 
it prepares a man with the attitudes necessary to follow a 
variety of professional occupations. In Discourse VIII, 
he pursues more specifically the relation of liberal knowl-
edge and the "connected view" that characterizes it into 
the area of religion. The intellectual refinement of 
Newman's university-educated man -- his gentleman -- can be 
a help or a hindrance to religious cultivation. In Newman's 
own words, it can be "at once a defence yet a disturbance 
to the Church ••• , at one time in open warfare with her, 
at another in defensive alliance ... 7° The educated mind is 
a blessine insofar as it is in a sense religious, that is, 
"it has what may be considered a religion of its own, inde-
70Ibid. , p. 157. 
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d t f C th 1 . . "71 pen en o a o lclsm •••. It may cooperate with the 
Church ''in the conversion of man and the renovation of his 
nature, ••• and also in his rescue from that fearful sub-
jection to sense which is his ordinary state ... 72 Intellec-
tual culture also works to replace the joys of the sense 
with those of the intellect, and it draws man from harmful 
ideas to more rational ones.73 
Furthermore, while intellectual culture does not 
produce virtue, it does e;ive the mind a natural indisposi-
tion to the excesses of evil. For such knowlede;e, "the 
discipline by which it is gained, and the tastes which it 
f ' t 1 t d t f' th . d .. 74 Ol~s, nave ana ura en ency ore lne e mln •.•• 
This refinement ''will often or generally be lively enou,5h 
to create an absolute loathing of certain offences, or a 
detestation and scorn of them as unc:;entlemanlike ...... 75 
In addition to a scorn and hatred for some kinds of vice, 
intellectual refinement creates "an irresolution and inde-
. . . d . ,76 clslon ln Olng wrong •••• Finally, cultivation of the 
71-, . d 
.J:..QL• 
72-b'd L.L_., P• 160. 
7 3I.Ql£. , p. 16L 
74_, . d 
~·· P• 162. 
75Ibid. 
76rbid. 
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intellect makes the soil of man's moral nature more adapt-
able to virtue. 
Yet there is something in such mental refinement 
that may also make it a threat to the Church. There is, 
according to Newman, a fundamental difference between in-
tellectual culture and genuine religion, in spite of any 
apparent similarities. ?or the distaste which the culti-
vated mind feels for some kinds of vice has nothin~ truly 
religious in it. .L·.ioreover, the conscience of such an edu-
cated mind may "tend to become what is called a moral 
sense."77 Then, "the command of duty is a sort of taste; 
sin is not an offense against God, but against human na-
ture."7S Virtue becomes a matter of purely subjective cri-
teria-- "nothing more than the graceful in conduct ... 79 
3ut making conscience a matter of taste places the focus on 
self, not on God. The "right thing to do" is substituted 
for true conscience and objective ~oral standards. 
Newman's present discussion turns on the difference 
between "mental refinement" and "c;e:nuine religion." In a 
sense, so does our treatment of the difference between the 
worldly gentleman and the Christian gentleman hinge on this 
??Ibid., p. 165. 
78rbid. 
'19 Ibid., p. 167. 
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point. I~Jewman 's discussion points up the fact that al-
though the goals of the gentleman, considered on a natural 
level, are worthy ones and his moral attributes are often 
commendable, these goals and attributes are insufficient to 
make such a man the desired product of a university. There 
is something more needed -- a supernatural orientation and 
perspective. If there is merit in the claim that the gen-
tleman, the natural man of philosophical habit, must have 
a supernatural dimension to be a whole university-educated 
man, then there is substance in our assertion that Newman's 
idea of a gentleman is fundamentally, that is, in the pri-
mary instance, his idea of a Christian gentleman. That 
distinction leaves us with the worldly man of philosophical 
habit as a secondary instance of the term and what it rep-
resents. ·dhether we speak of primary or secondary instance, 
we must take both instances seriously. 
By providing further clarification of the distinc-
tion between intellectual culture and genuine religion, 
!~ewman supplies us with additional support for our conten-
tion that the Christian gentleman stands preeminent in 
Newman's university scheme. Por while the intellectual 
cultivation of the gentleman, considered apart from any re-
ligious principle, may bring him "half way to Heaven,"80 
SOibid., o. 160. 
- . 
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v;hile it may free him from the bonds of his senses, 81 vvhile 
it may aid in "rescuing the victim of passion and self-
will, .. b2 and while it may refine the mind of the ;entleman 
and predisposes his soul to virtue, 8 3 it may also culminate 
for the rna~ of mental refinement 
in ••• insensibility of conscience, in ••• ignorance 
of the very idea of sin, in ••• contemplation of his 
own moral consistency, in the simple absence of 
fear, in ••• cloudless S8lf-confldence, in ••• serene 
self-possession, and in ••• cold self-satisfac-
tion •••• 84 
r;ewman adds that the intellectual culture of the "mere 
Philosopher" may ultimately result ir. a "godless intellec-
tualis;n" vvhich begins by "repelling sensuality" but "ends 
by excusing it."b5 Unfortunately, mental refinement too 
often displays a wiJ.l of its own a~d goes its own way. 
Reason is too ready to pursue its own direction and nature, 
its own course. 
?or IJevvman, the major problem with intellectual cul-
ture and the morality stemminG from it is that each deals 
with the exterior, the surface of things. True morality 
81Ibid. 
82rb'd 
--1:.:..·' p. 161. 
83r 'd 
--.£L·, p. 164. 
84Ibid. I p. 169. 
S5Ibid. I p. 173· 
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and supernaturally oriented mental culture, on the other 
1.- ' • t. t~ . ... . t' , t nan:J, alm at regenera 1ng ... e 1n ._erlor -- ne near • ~,jere 
intellectual cultivation cannot effect this spiritual re-
juvenation because, in Newman's words, 
it does not supply r~ligious motive; it is not the 
cause or proper antecedent of anything supernatural; 
it is not meritorious of heavenly aid or reward; ••• 
it does not raise us above nature, nor has it a~y 
tendency to make us pleasing to our ~aker •••• 86 
In short, the university-trained man -- the gentle-
man -- needs more than mental culture. He needs Grace, and 
he needs Faith. 'l'hese qualities form Newman's composite of 
the gentleman. ~hey provide the profile of the Christian 
gentleman, the primary instance of Newman's idea of a gen-
tleman. Grace provides· for the .. ruined state of man." a? 
It addresses iiself to the gentleman's .. utter inability to 
. ,.88 gain Heaven by anything he can do rums elf.... The Cath-
olic doctrine of Grace reaffirms the moral certainty of a 
gentleman•s "losing his soul if left to himself ...... B9 It 
allows for "the simple absence of all rights and claims on 
the part of the creature in the presence of the Crea-
86
rbid., p. 
87I' . d 
...EU:._·, P• 
88Illi· 
P9 
.J Ibid. 
161. 
1.59 • 
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tor ...... 9° It asserts the "illimitable claim of the Crea-
tor on the service of the creature" and the "imperative and 
1 . f f th . f . ..9l ob J.gatory orce o .e voJ.ce o conscJ.ence •••• It 
teaches that no man gains Heaven except by means of it and 
a "regeneration of nature ... 92 .aut Faith also is necessary 
for the gentleman to gain Heaven.. 'tli thout it, he cannot 
please God. Faith teaches that "the heart is the seat both 
of sin and of obedience," that "charity is the fulfilling 
of the Law," and that "incorporation into the Catholic 
Church is the ordinary instrument of salvation ... 9J Newman 
concludes: "These are the lessons which distinguish Cath-
olicism as a popular religion, and these are the subjects 
to which the cultivated intellect will practically be tur-
' d •• 94 ne • • •• These are also the subjects, in the light of 
. which the true nature of Newman's gentleman must be estab-
lished. 
There is ample evidence here to support at least 
three contentions. For one, if these are the proper sub-
jects to which the cultivated mind of the university-edu-
90-b"d ~· 
91Ibid. 
92rbid. 
93rbid. 
94Ibid. 
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cated man must practically, and, in view of the extended 
discussion, I would say ultimately, be turned, then New-
man's idea of a university is fundamentally his idea of a 
Catholic university. The subject matter of a university 
considered .apart from any religious principle apparently is 
not enough. Then too, if the man who turns to these sub-
jects mus~ have Faith to guide and Grace to support him, 
then he is no mere philosopher. Ee is a Christian gentle-
man. The mere gentleman tends to follow the demands of his 
ovm will, nature, and reason rather than accede to the re-
quirements of Faith and the persuasion of Grace. ?inally, 
whether !·Iewman 's gentleman is considered as a man of intel-
lectual culture or whether he is viewed as a man in whom 
Faith, Grace, and intellectual culture are combined, he de-
serves to be treated in a serious ~anner, for the subject 
areas in which his role is delineated are dealt with ser-
iously by :,revvrnan. 
In the last paragraph of Discourse VIII, i{ewman ob-
serves that Basil ~~d Julian were both students in the 
schools of Athens. Basil became a saint and supporter of 
the Catholic Church; Julian, her scornful and resolute 
enemy. There is little doubt in the mind of the reader 
which model Newman would have his university-educated man 
resemble. A university considered in the abstract ~'1d a 
cultivated mind viewed apart from religious principle are 
insufficient to explain Newman's idea of a university and 
295 
his idea of a gentleman. At the very least, such a mind 
and university setting may all too easily result in a "god-
less intellectualism." At the very worst, the result may 
be a "future Anti-Christ," a "pattern-man of philosophical 
virtue" --a Julian.95 
Thus far, this treatment has presented the reader 
with the slov,r and difficult birth of a response to a vexing 
question -- the nature of Newman's gentleman and the degree 
of its seriousness. ~while the response could have been 
shaped only in reference to Newman's definition in Dis-
course VIII, it was not because his definition there does 
not supply material adequate for a total response. Its 
complete form has to be drawn from Newman's treatment of 
various issues, grounds, theme, assumpti"ons, and the like 
in earlier discourses. As a result, I have formed a res-
ponse primarily in relation to the nature of a Catholic 
university, in relation to theological grounds, in rela-
tion to the wholeness of knowledge and an interdisciplinary 
grasp, and in relation to the existence of a personal God. 
I have also shaped the answer in reference to I~ewman 's 
equation of liberal and a gentleman's knowledge and in ref-
erence to the intellectual cultivation that must be recon-
oiled with Grace and Faith. Perhaps the most significant 
element, however, in forming a response has' been a desire 
95rbid •• p. 181. 
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to integrate Nev1111an' s idea of a gentleman with his idea of 
a university, that is, to develop a "connected view" of 
their right relationship. Developed in the context of the 
foregoing re~ations, the resp<:mse affirms that Newman pri-
marily advances the development of a Christian gentleman in 
a Catholic university context and that he advocates second-
arily the advancement of a cultivated gentleman in a univer-
sity considered apart from any religious principle. 3oth 
contexts demand that i'{ewman be taken seriously. 
Discourse IX supports the art;,-uments that Newman's 
statement on the gentleman is a serious one and that the 
Christian gentleman reflects Newman's primary use of-the 
term. Its conclusion on the fundamental nature of r'iewman • s 
university shores up these arguments. The discourse also 
helps clear up the duality of Nevvman 's gentleman, while, 
at the same time, it answers decisively the question of the 
scope of a university raised in the Preface and Discourse r. 
In the sense that_it sums up the duties of the Church to-
wards knowledge and the university, it might be said to 
serve as a "theological center" of the discourses. Struc-
turally, the discourse effects a clarifying resolution to 
Newma.n' s argument on the ultimately Catholic nature of his 
university. It serves a similar purpose for my argument. 
If one compares this discourse with previous ones,he notes 
how well Discourse IX sums up the formal role of the Cath-
olic Church in Newman's whole university scheme. 
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In discussing the duties of the Church towards knowl-
edge, Newman links the theological and religious declara-
tions of earlier discourses on the nature of a university, 
grounds, theme, .and disciplinary boundaries with a more 
explicit and definitive statement of the Catholic form or 
spirit that must characterize the institution and knowledge 
around which grounds, theme, and disciplinary limits center. 
His argu."'lent proposes, in part, that 
if the Catholic Faith is true, a University cannot 
exist externally to the Catholic pale, for it can-
not teach Universal Knowledge if it does not teach 
Catho1ic theology. 1'his is certain •••• 96 
Only one point needs to be made here. If a Catholic spirit 
~~d form should characterize the institution, then should 
it not also formally stamp the human produc.t of the insti-
tution? 
From there, Newman's are;-ument is unfolded in a 
series of contrasts between a truly secular and sacred 
scope, liberal knowledge and Revelation, mere philosophy 
and supernaturally oriented dogma, and especially, between 
institutions materially and formally Catholic. ~he first 
terms of each pair account for the failure, in Newman's 
judgment, of a university education not organically related 
to spiritual realities. The second terms represent a whole 
educational view that places heavenly demands and earthly 
96Ibid., p. 184. 
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goals in perspective. .Prom the contrasts drawn, it appears 
fairly certain that Newman's ideally educated man is a ser-
iously treated Christian gentleman who seeks to learn the 
"relative disposition of things," both temporal and eter-
nal. 
In the first example, Kev~an points out that even 
though a university has 
• 
ever so many theological chairs, that would not 
suffice to make it a Catholic University; for 
theology would be included in its teaching only 
as a branch of knowledge, only as one out of many 
constituent portions, however important a one, of 
what I have called Philosophy.97 
He feels something more is needed -- "the direct and active 
jurisdiction of the Church ...... 98 In a second example, 
- Newman contrasts liberal knowledge and Revelation. The 
former, he feels, tends to place self first. It "exerts a 
subtle influence in throwing us back on ourselves, and 
making us our own center, and our minds the measure of all 
things ... 99 Newman adds that liberal knowledge or reason 
clashes first with precept, then with doctrine, and fin-
ally, with the very principle of dogma. 100 He further 
97rbid. 
-
99Ibid., p •. 186. 
100Ibid. 
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states that mere reason can effect two dire results: 101 
one, it can ignore Theological truth; two, it can adulter-
ate the spirit of catholicism altogether. Revelation, on 
the contrary, with its emphasis on "grace, its mystery of 
the Godhead, its preaching of the Cross, its de~otion to 
the Queen of Saints, [an~ its loyalty to the Apostolic 
see,"102 places God before man and temporal concerns. In 
another significant contrast, iiewman distinguishes formally 
Catholic institutions from their materially Catholic coun-
terparts, like the Spanish Inquisition. In speaking of the 
latter, Newman says that "considered 'materially,' it was 
·nothing but Catholic; but its spirit and form were earthly 
and secular ...... lOJ Correlatively, he adds that the "whole 
of Catholic theology" is not sufficient guarantee of the 
"Catholicity" of a university. 104 According to his view, 
a university will not have a Catholic spirit and form 
unless the Church breathes her own pure and un-
earthly spirit into it, and fashions and moulds 
its organizations, and watches over its teaching, 
and ~~its to~ether its pupils, and superintends 
its action.1v.5 
101~ •• p. 187. 
102:..b.d k...J:._o 
l03Ibid., p. 18.5. 
104Ibid. 
l0.5Ibid. 
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That Newman wants the breath and spirit of Catholicism to 
formally mark his university there can be little doubt. 
That he would have the same spirit formally stamp the prod-
uct of his university appears equally true. If Newman 
wants his university imbued with Catholic principles, if 
he wishes it Catholic formally, and if he believes that no 
university can exist outside "the Catholic pale," then it 
is more than likely that he also desires the university-
educated man, the product of this formally Catholic univer- · 
sity, to be more than a mere philosopher. He must be a 
Christian gentleman. 
This interpretation of Newman's gentleman, emphasiz-
ing as it does the primacy of Newman's Christian gentleman, 
is not meant to negate the importance of Newman'~ more 
worldly model developed in a university considered apart 
from its relation to the Church. Neither is it meant to 
undermine the seriousness of Newman's statement on the gen-
tleman in that context. What the interpretation does pur-
pose to do is place the divine and human dimensions of the 
man of philosophical habit in their right perspective. 
Newman sees his university as a place in which nat-
ural and supernatural levels of activity must be harmonized. 
The human dimension of the worldly gentleman has to be 
reconciled with the supernatural dimension of the Christian 
gentleman, intent on pursuing his Divine destiny. Thus, 
the Christian gentleman actively pursues intellectual 
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truth by an interdisciplinary grasp of the sciences, but 
he does so in the broader context of a search for spiritual 
perfection. Newman grants that the philosopher's search 
for the wholeness of knowledge can move him well along to-
ward worthwhile human goals. Eut human goals, worthy as 
they may be, are insufficient for a man delegated to pursue 
Christian ideals. The pride, the selfishness, and the 
willfulness of the man of mere intellectual culture may all 
too easily impede his attainment of supernatural goals. 
His evil tendencies, left alone, may work against his par-
ticipation in the kingdom of God on earth. They may es-
trange him from God in this world. But worst of all, they 
may cause his da~nation in the next. Newman concludes that 
intellectual culture is not enough. It must be allied with 
Grace and Faith. Purely human goals must be aligned with 
transcendent ones. In short, intellectual culture must 
find its meaning and fulfillment in union with a dynamic 
spiritual life. Discourse IX states that Faith, Grace, 
Revelation, and Dogma are the means to the gentleman's be-
coming a worthy son of God. 
Much of the material in this study has been treated 
in terms of Aristotelian equivocity by reference. 106 That 
has been the key schematic device employed. Earlier, spe-
cific issues, like those of grounds and "connected view," 
106 . 
For examples, see pp. 106, 139, 162, and 192, 
above. . 
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w·ere explained according to their primary and secondary in-
stances. Now, because i~ewman 's gentleman appears to lend 
itself no less readily to the same approach, it too has 
been treated as an equivocal by reference in this chapter. 
From that treatment, the Christian man of philosophical 
habit emerges as the primary instance. His development, 
~evMa~'s university --at its core a Catholic University 
seeks to advance. In him I locate the true nature of the 
term "gentleman'' as Newman employs it. He is the Chris-
tian gentleman whose intellectual culture has been tempered 
by ::;.ospel ideals. The Christian gentleman is the primary, 
formal instance of what Hewman's idea of gentleman is. .he 
represents a primary, formal supernatural instance of human 
and supernatural traits that take precedence over the sec-
oadary collection of human qualities and goals that char-
acterize the worldly gentleman. For the secondary instance 
of Newman's gentleman, we must turn to the secular model 
whos·e mind has been cultivated in a university considered 
apart from any religious principles. But this instance is 
a true picture of .Newman's gentleman only to the extent 
that it relates to the primary one. My treatment has not 
allowed for a less than serious interpretation in either 
instance because the gentleman in both contexts appears 
to play too important a role in tr.e development of Newman's 
v:hole educational ideal. Whether Newman speaks of the man 
of intellectual culture in a university abstractly consid-
JOJ 
ered or whether he speaks o.f the Christian man of philo-
sophical habit cultivated spiritually in a Catholic Univer-
sity, he speaks seriously. 
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